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The Pricing of Progress: Economic Indicators and the Capitalization of American Life 
Abstract 
A history of statistical economic indicators in America, this dissertation uncovers 
the protracted struggle which took place in the nineteenth century over how economic life 
should be quantified, how social progress should be valued and how American prosperity 
should be measured. By revealing the historical origins of contemporary indicators such as 
Gross Domestic Product, and by uncovering the alternative measures that ended up on the 
losing side of history, this work denaturalizes the seemingly objective nature of modern 
economic indicators while offering a fresh take on the rise of American capitalism.   
Tracing the contested nature of statistical indicators since the time when Thomas 
Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton first debated how prosperity should be measured, this 
dissertation details how quantification techniques developed by profit-minded 
businessmen eventually came to be used not only to manage a railroad corporation, 
administer a slave plantation or run a textile factory but also to organize, discipline, 
manage and make sense of American society as a whole.  The micro-managing of wage 
workers led to macroeconomic indicators, slave plantation accounts led to national 
productivity statistics, corporate cost-accounting led to cost-of-living indices and the 
bottom line became the American government’s top priority. While these capitalist 
statistics were being institutionalized as the benchmarks of American progress, previously 
popular measures which gauged such social issues as propertied independence, 
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exploitation, poverty, inequality, gender discrimination, social mobility, insanity, education, 
incarceration and even prostitution mostly fell by the wayside by 1900. 
The ramifications of this historical development were enormous as these priced 
measures of productivity, consumerism, and market growth helped to transform the 
maximization of capitalist production and consumption into the main objective of 
American society, all the while turning monetary prices into the standard unit for 
measuring not only our goods but our planet, our society, our future and ourselves. Distinct 
from mere commodification, this dissertation refers to this process as the “capitalization” 
of everyday life because these figures treated American society like one big capitalized 
investment and its human citizens as human capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
v 
 
Table of Contents 
 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................................................................................... vi 
Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................................................................. vii 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................... 1 
Seeing like a Capitalist: The Hamiltonian Origins of How Capitalists Count ................................................ 34 
Seeing Like a Yeoman: Patriarchal Commercialism in the Early Republic  ................................................... 70 
Lots of Growth: Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine’s Frontier of Human Capital ................................................ 103 
An Asylum in Numbers: The Rise of Moral Statistics in Jacksonian America ............................................ 144 
Tale of Two Capitalisms: The Rise of Growth Statistics in Antebellum America ..................................... 196 
Capitalization and its Discontents: Labor Statistics in Gilded Age America .............................................. 250 
Epilogue .................................................................................................................................................................................. 304 
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................................................................... 318 
 
   
vi 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Samuel Blodget’s Financial Money Meter  61 
Figure 2: Samuel Blodget's pricing of the American people  63 
Figure 3: An engraved portrait of John Adams  93 
Figure 4: 1790 census page  96 
Figure 5: Jessup Scott’s growth chart  128 
Figure 6: Percentage of growth by city population  141 
Figure 7: Percentage of dividend given by Boston banks.  141 
Figure 8: Pauper Statistics  154 
Figure 9: Benjamin Rush's Moral and Physical Thermometer  159 
Figure 10: Church temperance statistics  160 
Figure 11: Shattuck's Wealth Pyramid  179 
Figure 12: Canal Toll Statistics  238 
Figure 13: Calculating the Railroad Business  244 
Figure 14: Aldrich Report  251 
Figure 15: The alternative statistics of the Massachusetts Bureau  259 
Figure 16: Atkinson's cost of living statistics  287 
Figure 17: Massachusetts Bureau's dietary schedule  288 
Figure 18: The Aladdin Oven.   292 
Figure 19: Incarceration rates of OECD countries  308 
 
  
   
vii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Stepping out of one of my first introductory economics classes at Tel Aviv 
University, my head whirring with differential math equations with which I had been 
instructed to maximize profits, I entered into an American history class taught by Michael 
Zakim and discovered my calling. Instead of being given answers, as in the economics class, 
I was confronted with an awe-inspiring set of questions not only about the rise of 
capitalism in America, but the very nature of the human experience in modern times. For 
opening this world to me, Michael, I thank you. For being a wonderful mentor, friend, and 
supporter ever since, I thank you again. Visiting Harvard a few years later, Professor Sven 
Beckert immediately took a disheveled Israeli with a penchant for rants under his wing, 
just as his Program on the Study of Capitalism was taking off. He has lent an enthusiastic 
helping hand ever since, teaching me the tiniest intricacies of American history while 
pushing me to ask the biggest questions. Providing endless wisdom (and her office!) not 
only as my advisor but lately as my dean as well, Professor Liz Cohen has been equally 
supportive, constantly encouraging and challenging me to refine, rewrite and rethink the 
basic contours of this project. Big thanks are also in order to Professor Chris Desan, who 
not only taught me how central banks work but also was willing to slog through a summer 
of neoclassical economics. Professor Morton Horwitz served as the elder statesmen of this 
project, and his intellectual fingerprints can be found in many of the following pages.   
 There are so many debts to so many others. I don’t know where I would be without 
Noam Maggor, who showed me the ropes, made me feel at home, and devoted hours upon 
hours to talking about so many of the ideas that went into this work.   Brian Hochman, 
David Kim, Nick Donofrio, Brian McCammack, Pete L’Official, Jack Hamilton, Tim McGrath, 
   
viii 
 
George Blaustein and Derek Etkin let an undrafted, foreign walk-on join not only the 
American Civilization Basketball League but their amazing group of friends. Joshua Specht, 
Andrew Pope, Eitan Kensky, Charles Petersen, Summer Shafer, Marisa Egerstrom and 
Jeremy Zallen are awesome. It was always a pleasure to talk slavery or bullpens with 
Katherine Stephens during some quality tent time. Whether a question about cost-
accounting or the job market, Caitlin Rosenthal was always there for me when I needed her, 
and that was early and often. Nadav Orian Peer’s never-ending thirst for knowledge was 
contagiously magnificent. Everyone should have an old army buddy like Adam Shinar. If 
this dissertation has any real, empirical grounding in nitty-gritty political economy, it’s 
because I had the pleasure of making Rudi Batzell’s acquaintance. Thanks to Rudi, Shaun 
Nichols, Liat Spiro, Jed Schwartz and many others, I always looked forward to yet another 
boisterous debate at the capitalism reading group as I was cleaning up baby vomit. 
 From an early age, my parents inspired me to be an intellectual. Dad, it is far from a 
coincidence that I followed in your footsteps. Be it 2AM sessions on the porch about gender 
history or help in the archives, my mother has been a big part of this project. While this 
dissertation has unfortunately placed Benjy far away, he still remains close and has offered 
many insights that have shaped this work (could you fix the margins here?) This work has 
brought me close once more to Sarah, who has been a big help both babysitting and 
uncovering Chinese GDP figures. I also would like to thank Rani and Aviva, who have been 
like a second set of parents with their longstanding devotion and support.  
 Most importantly, however, I’d like to thank Tali. Dragging you from our warm Tel 
Aviv home to these freezing Cambridge winters, I don’t think I’ve ever actually told you 
something I’ve always known: I never could have done any of this without you. You are my 
   
ix 
 
biggest supporter, my most thoughtful (and beautiful) critic, my favorite person, my 
dearest friend and the love of my life. Thanks to you, our adventure together in Cambridge 
has been an incredible experience and I am so lucky to know that whatever the next steps 
on our journey might be, I will be taking them with you.  
Finally, as the reader of the following pages will soon recognize, this dissertation 
questions the notion that growth is always an inherent good and that more is always better 
than less. At the risk of losing all of my intellectual integrity before the acknowledgments 
are even over, however, I must admit that my lovely Mika and Ella have taught me an 
important life lesson: Two really is better than one.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
x 
 
 
 
 
To Tali 
   
1 
 
Introduction 
The Pricing of Progress 
In the midst of his impassioned sermon in 1832 on the dangers of drinking in 
upstate New York, moral reformer Theodore Dwight Weld pulled out of his pocket a piece a 
paper which contained a series of statistics. Reading from his back-of-the-envelope 
calculations, he declared that of the 300,000 drunks in America, 30,000 would die every 
year; that of the 200,000 paupers, half had alcohol to blame for their problems; and of the 
30,000 committed to insane institutions, half had gone crazy due to drinking. Finally, he 
noted that "an inventory of all the murders committed in the land for a single year" 
revealed that "99-100th of them were committed by intoxicated men."1 Measuring the social 
effect of alcohol by examining the physical, social or mental wellbeing of the American 
people, such statistics could be found in almost every intemperance speech or moral 
reform report in Jacksonian America. Americans often called them “moral statistics.”  
Just as these moral statistics were taking America by storm, however, the manner in 
which the social cost of alcohol consumption was being measured was beginning to 
radically change. Already in 1830, for example, the New York State Temperance Society, 
which was led not by reformers or clergymen but rather wealthy Albany businessmen, 
quantified the social damage wrought from drinking not by detailing the fate of the 
drinkers themselves but rather by pricing the overall cost it would have on the town writ 
large. “There cannot be a doubt,” the society’s first report concluded, “that the city suffers a 
dead yearly loss of three thousand dollars” due to “time spent drinking,” “expenses of 
                                                 
1 Weld’s sermon quoted in Robert Abzug, Cosmos Crumbling: American Reform and the Religious Imagination 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 96.  
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criminal persecutions,” and “loss to the public by carelessness.” Treating the consumption 
of alcohol as a tax, these Albany businessmen, who had made much of their fortune by 
investing in urban real estate, used temperance figures to do what they did best: price and 
capitalize time and space. “At the present value of money,” they argued, “the tax the city of 
Albany pays to alcohol would pay the interest on six million of dollars yearly; would build 
200 houses each year costing 1500 dollars each; and rent 2000 tenements at 150 dollars 
rent per year.”2   
While there is little doubt that Weld’s moralizing statistics were used to discipline 
urban journeymen and rural farmers, his statistical focus nevertheless remained squarely 
on the wellbeing of the drinkers themselves. On the contrary, the Albany businessmen’s 
temperance statistics ignored individual wellbeing and focused only on the effect - 
measured in money prices – which certain drinking habits would have on their town’s 
market productivity. Re-conceptualizing the American people as income generating inputs 
of cash that could be plugged into growth-maximizing equations, these temperance 
statistics measured societal progress and wellbeing by gauging the effect certain labor and 
consumption patterns had on capital accumulation. This social vision treated everyday life 
like a capitalized investment. As a result, drinking alcohol was bad not because it ruined 
lives but rather because it ruined economic growth.  
Almost two hundred years after Albany businessmen priced the social cost of 
intemperance in their town, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention released a study 
in 2011 which calculated that “the cost of excessive alcohol consumption in the United 
States reached $223.5 billion…or about $1.90 per drink.” Echoing the approach of Albany 
                                                 
2 New York State Temperance Society, Circular of the New York State Temperance Society, to the Citizens of the 
State (Albany, 1830). 
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businessmen over a century and a half before, the study argued that 72% of the costs 
resulted from “workplace productivity,” 11% from “health care expenses,” 9% from 
“criminal justice expenses” and 6% from “motor vehicle crash costs.”3 Such statistical 
studies likely ring familiar in the contemporary ear. This is partly due to the fact that, since 
the 1980s, all major health and environmental regulations implemented by the United 
States government must, by law, undergo a “cost-benefit analysis.” The bureaucratic need 
for a balancing test that can determine whether a government project or regulation is 
worthwhile has led to the pricing of not only alcohol consumption, but just about 
everything: The average American is willing to pay $257 to save the bald eagle from 
extinction, $208 to save the humpback whale and $225 to drop 10 pounds. Each IQ point 
that a child loses due to lead poisoning is worth $9000. The “recreational value” of Oregon’s 
Hell Canyon is $900,000. Obesity costs the American economy $92.2 billion each year. 
Surfing the web while at work costs $63 billion. Finally, a human life today is worth $9.1 
million – up from $6.3 million under the George W. Bush administration.4 
The clear resemblances between the 1830 Albany intemperance report and the 
2011 CDC cost-benefit analysis are far from coincidental. As I will demonstrate throughout 
this dissertation, it was precisely these nineteenth century capitalization statistics - and not 
                                                 
3 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Excessive Drinking Costs U.S. $223.5 Billion,” accessed April 8th 
2013, http://www.cdc.gov/features/alcoholconsumption.  
 
4 In 1981, United States President Ronald Reagan passed executive order 12,291, which mandates cost-
benefit analysis for all major environmental and health-and-safety regulations. For the pricing of a human life 
see W. Kip Viscusi, “The Value of Risks to Life and Health,” Journal of Economic Literature 31, no. 4 (1993): 
1912-1946; Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, "Pricing the priceless: Cost-benefit analysis of 
environmental protection." U. Pa. L. Rev. 150 (2001): 1553; Richard T. Carson, Nicholas E. Flores, Kerry M. 
Martin, Jennifer L. Wright, “Contingent Valuation and Revealed Preference Methodologies, Land Economics 
(1996): 80-99; Peter Bohm and Claude Henry, “Cost Benefit Analysis and Environmental Effects,” Ambio, 8 
(1979) 18-24; Matthew Herper, “The Hidden Costs of Obesity,” Forbes, November 24th, 2006; Weight Control 
Information Network, “Economic Costs Related to Obesity,” accessed April 8th 2013, 
http://win.niddik.nih.gov/statistics on April 4th 2013; “As U.S. Agencies Put More Value on Life, Businesses 
Fret,” New York Times, February 16th, 2011.   
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their existing alternatives – which would go on, after intense political struggles and 
intellectual debates, to become the forefathers of our contemporary economic indicators 
and the progenitors of how Americans currently measure and value not only social 
progress but everyday life.   
Today, economic indicators shape our everyday lives in countless ways. Lawmakers, 
politicians, lobbyists and bureaucratic regulators often base economic policy upon the 
assumption that the main goal of American society, even on such issues as the 
environmental future of the planet, is to maximize Gross Domestic Product (GDP). A 
statistic that measures “economic growth” by aggregating the monetary prices of all goods 
produced and consumed in a certain territorial area, GDP has become the central statistic 
for measuring economic progress and social wellbeing not only in the United States, but 
across the globe.  Whether used in government cost-benefit analyses as seen above, 
political arguments, corporate board rooms, World Bank memos, political stump speeches 
or to separate “developing” nations from “developed” ones, GDP has become the main 
barometer of our economic lives.5  
Economic indicators are also our modern kingmakers. Along with statistics which 
measure unemployment, consumer confidence, cost-of-living, and the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average, GDP has been known to swing many an election. When asked what was the most 
important issue in the 2012 presidential election, for instance, the most popular response 
                                                 
5 On the contemporary role of GDP in our everyday lives see Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen and Jean-Paul 
Fitoussi, Mismeasuring Our Lives: Why GDP Doesn’t Add Up (New York: New Press, 2010); “The Rise and Fall of 
G.D.P.” New York Times, May 13th 2010; Andrew Yarrow, Measuring America: How Economic Growth Came to 
Define American Greatness in the Late Twentieth Century (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2011). 
On the role that economic indicators has played in the construction of developed and developing nations see 
James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development, ”Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and 
Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).  
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by a rather wide margin was “the economy in general.”6  But what is “the economy?” As 
many scholars have recognized in the past few years, there is no economy without 
economic indicators.  Appearing to bring the abstractions of modernity to life, it is statistics 
such as GDP which gave birth to the reified thing we moderns call “the economy” and it is 
economic indicators which allow us to see if  the economy is “sick,” “healthy,” “flourishing,” 
or “shrinking.”7 Statistical measures such as GDP, therefore, have immense social power 
because for most Americans these indicators serve as the only lens through which they can 
catch a glimpse of the economic forces that shape their lives. This leads to yet another 
reason why economic indicators are so powerful: Whatever they choose to measure 
becomes visible, whatever they don’t remains in the dark. A recent study demonstrated 
that a majority of Americans “vastly underestimated the levels of inequality” in the United 
States. This is not surprising when one looks at the economic indicators used by the main 
media outlets today: Of the 25 listed on the New York Times website, for example, not one 
measures income distribution.8  
                                                 
6 "Most Important Problem," Gallup Poll accessed April 8th 2013, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1675/most-
important-problem.aspx 
 
7 An excellent literature on the birth of “the economy” has emerged in recent years. See Timothy Mitchell, 
“Fixing the Economy,” Cultural Studies, 12.1 (1998), 82-101; Adam Tooze, “Imagining National Economies,” in 
Imagining Nations, ed. Geoffrey Cubitt (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 212-228; U. 
Kalpagam, “Colonial Governmentality and the 'Economy,'” Economy and Society, 29.3 (2000), 418-438; Daniel 
Breslau, “Economics Invents the Economy: Mathematics, Statistics, and Models in the Work of Irving Fisher 
and Wesley Mitchell,” Theory and Society, 32.3 (June 2003), 379-411; Alain Desrosières, “Managing the 
Economy: The State, The Market, and Statistics,” in Theodore Porter and Dorothy Ross, ed., The Cambridge 
History of Science, vol. 7: Modern Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2003), 553-564. 
8 Michael Norton and Dan Ariely, “Building a Better America – One Wealth Quintile at a Time,” Perspectives of 
Psychological Science, 6 (January 2011) 9-12; For the New York Times indicators see 
http://www.nytimes.com/pages/business/economy/index.html. The New York Times purchases these 
indicators from Bloomberg L.P. a data company founded by current New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg in 
1981 which made $7.6 billion in 2011. 
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How and why did certain statistical indicators become the yardsticks for measuring 
progress and wellbeing in American society? What forgotten alternatives have existed in 
the past? What role have economic indicators played in the shaping of American life and 
the rise of American capitalism? A research project on the political, intellectual and cultural 
history of statistical indicators in America, this dissertation seeks to answer these 
questions by examining the protracted struggle which took place in the nineteenth century 
over how economic life should be quantified, how social progress should be valued and 
how American prosperity should be measured. Despite the clear impact economic 
indicators have had on modern life, their history has been remarkably understudied. As a 
result, most Americans today view GDP-based economic growth figures as an a-historical, 
natural and “common-sense” measure of societal wellbeing. In the nineteenth century, 
however, the question of which statistics should serve as the yardsticks of American 
society remained open – and greatly contested.  Seemingly cold numbers were the subject 
of many a heated debate. By revealing the contested political, intellectual and economic 
origins of statistics such as GDP, and by uncovering the alternative measures that ended up 
on the losing side of history, my dissertation looks to denaturalize the seemingly objective 
nature of modern economic indicators while offering a fresh take on the emergence of 
American capitalism.   
Overview of Argument 
In his portrayal of the English working class in the eighteenth century, E.P. 
Thompson depicted how rioting peasants would often times “set the price” of bread in 
instances where they believed that they were being overcharged. Refusing to pay the 
merchant, miller or baker what they thought to be exorbitant prices, the angry crowd 
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would take the loaves of bread by force – but they would not steal them. Instead, they 
would leave behind what they felt was a fair price. While Thompson stressed that custom 
played an important role in this “moral economy,” peasants did not use force every time 
prices rose. Along with notions of economic justice and tradition, there was a second 
trigger to these riots: Peasants knew exactly what the merchant was doing. “The poor had 
their own sources of information,” Thompson explains. “They worked on the docks. They 
moved the barges on the canals. They drove the carts and manned the toll-gates. They 
worked in the granaries and the mills. They often knew the local facts far better than the 
gentry.”9  As Thompson noted, peasants experienced the production chain of bread in their 
day-to-day lives.  They could recognize instances where some link in the chain – be it the 
merchants, bakers or millers - attempted to grab a larger piece of the pie.  
By the 1820s, on the other side of the Atlantic, few Americans were able to peek into 
the proverbial village granary as the English peasants had done a century before in order to 
view the economic mechanisms that shaped their lives. As settlers pushed westward in the 
early nineteenth century and new networks of transportation and trade linked disparate 
regions together, the world became a much bigger place for most Americans. In an attempt 
to gain control of this elusively intangible and interdependent environment, people came to 
rely heavily on statistics which could relay information about activities that occurred 
outside their local communities. From the early-nineteenth century onwards, an avalanche 
of statistical indicators, tables and maps became the main lens through which Americans 
came to understand and subsequently try and take control of their social and economic 
world. “The economy” was slowly emerging - and statistical indicators were its maker. To 
                                                 
9 E.P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd,” Past and Present, 50 (1971), 115. 
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see the economic pie, future Americans would have to look at a pie chart.10  
Be they government bureaucrats, founding fathers, risk-taking entrepreneurs, labor 
radicals, southern slaveholders, populist farmers, Wall Street bankers, feminist activists or 
neoclassical economists, this dissertation uncovers the eclectic mix – and surprisingly star-
studded cast - of nineteenth century Americans who created statistical measures in order 
to gauge the successes and failures of their society. Tracing the contested nature of 
statistical indicators since the time when Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton first 
debated how prosperity should be measured in the early republic, this dissertation 
explains why certain measures (such as indebtedness, propertied independence, 
exploitation, poverty, inequality, racial and gender discrimination, social mobility, 
education, insanity, incarceration and even prostitution) have mostly fallen by the wayside 
while others (such as labor productivity, market growth, cost of living, the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average, and consumer spending) were canonized and institutionalized as the 
benchmarks of American progress by the turn of the twentieth century.  
Varied acts of capital investment lie at the heart of this dissertation and should be 
understood as the main engine which, despite countless resistances and unforeseen 
contingencies, shaped the making of modern economic indicators above all else. Tracing 
the flow of American and European capital westward in the nineteenth century, this 
dissertation follows the money. To borrow an example from the first chapter, it is 
impossible to understand why Alexander Hamilton sought out data on the market 
productivity of yeoman households without first examining his attempts, through his 
                                                 
10 For all the criticism it has accrued in the past decades, I still find Robert Wiebe’s idea of “Island 
Communities” to be a useful way of conceptualizing early America. Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-
1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967). For a good overview of the idea of “interdependence” see Thomas 
Haskell, The Emergence of Professional Social Science (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977). 
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founding of the first banking and industrial corporations in America, to transform the 
United States into a society where local and foreign investors could safely and profitably 
invest their capital. To borrow an example from the third chapter, it is impossible to 
understand why Chicago and St. Louis boosters obsessed over the results of the census in 
their respective towns without first examining how Hunt’s Merchant’s Magazine helped 
transform urban population growth into an investment tool that eastern capitalists could 
use to decide in which cities they should invest in real estate. Finally, to borrow an example 
from chapter five, it is impossible to understand why South Carolina Governor James Henry 
Hammond chose to quantify the wonders of Southern society in his famous “Cotton is King” 
by declaring that “produce per capita… amounts to $16.66 per head,” without first 
exploring how Hammond forced his slaves to weigh the cotton they had picked every night 
so that he could whip those who, in his eyes, were not productive enough.11   
Let’s return to the intemperance example once more, to see how this process often 
played out. The timing of these new capitalized temperance statistics in the 1830s was no 
coincidence as the 1820s was a crucial decade for both urban industrialization and real 
estate investment, especially in towns like Albany where the opening of he Erie Canal had 
led to an expansion of market relations and an upheaval of the colonial agrarian order.12  
Finding themselves no longer under the same patriarchal roof as their apprentices-turned-
wage-workers, and fighting such immigrant cultural phenomena as “Blue Mondays,” a 
                                                 
11James Henry Hammond, Selections from the Letters and Speeches of the Hon. James H.  Hammond of South 
Carolina (New York, 1866) 315. 
 
12 Paul E. Johnson, A Shopkeeper’s Millennium: Society and Revivals in Rochester, New York, 1815-1837 (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 2004) Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991); Mary P. Ryan, Cradle of the Middle Class (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981); Herbert Gutman, Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing America: Essays in American 
Working-Class and Social History (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977). 
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nascent class of urban manufacturers was becoming aware that for every glass of whiskey 
their wage laborer drank they would likely see a reduced output – and therefore reduced 
profits. The less men worked and the more they drank also meant the less they had to 
spend on the types of goods local merchants and urban wholesalers sold. As their 
intemperance calculations indicated, a reduction in market output and trade was also seen 
to have a detrimental effect on rent seeking urban real estate developers since there would 
be less demand for everything from commercial warehouses to dry goods stores. As a 
result, it was not at all difficult for local businessmen in booming market towns such as 
Albany to begin envisioning drinking not as a social or moral problem but as a tax on their 
capital investments.  
Businessmen, however, were not the only ones looking to statistics in order to gain a 
semblance of control and power in a radically changing world. Ever since Karl Marx decried 
how capitalism drowned society in “the icy water of egotistical calculation,” and Max 
Weber argued that “one of the fundamental characteristics of an individualistic capitalistic 
economy is that it is rationalized on the basis of rigorous calculation,” there has been a 
tendency, especially on the left, to conflate all forms of quantification with alienation, 
commodification and capitalism.13  Throughout this dissertation I try to make the crucial 
point that there is nothing intrinsically “capitalist” about statistics by tracing how different 
ideological visions shaped very distinct kinds of statistical indicators. Due to his agrarian 
republican ideology, for example, Thomas Jefferson believed that population density was 
                                                 
13 Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, Chapter 1, accessed April 8th 2013, 
www.marxists.org; Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons 
(Roxbury: 1998) 76; See also Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, ed. Gunzelin 
Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott,  (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2002) for a similar approach to 
numeracy. 
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the most important statistical indicator in America because he dreaded the day when white 
men would run out of land and be forced into factories, thus losing their republican virtue 
and patriarchal independence. Due to their obsession with unequal power relations many 
Jacksonian reformers saw the number of paupers and prostitutes as “moral statistics” 
which could measure whether the American republican experiment was thriving or not.   
Finally, due to their demands for gender equality, feminist activists such as the Knights of 
Labor’s statistician Leona Barry compared women’s wages to men’s while also quantifying 
the exploitation of female seamstresses.  As these examples demonstrate, numbers could 
be used to politicize and depoliticize economic discourse, privatize or democratize the 
economy, empower or exploit workers.   
Throughout the nineteenth century, the adherents of these very different statistical 
visions debated in Congress, daily newspapers, church sermons, best-selling books, 
political pamphlets and even the Federalist Papers over which statistical indicators should 
be canonized by the American state as the benchmarks upon which economic and social 
policies were to be evaluated – and whether these codification choices should be 
determined by political processes or left to the realm of supposedly disinterested experts. 
Exploring how these contested political, intellectual and cultural battles played out, I argue 
that while both statistical visions continued to define and shape each other, it was the 
capitalizing vision that gained the upper hand by the turn of the twentieth century. As my 
final chapter demonstrates, by the late 1890s it was largely the capitalization statistics of 
businessmen (and they were almost exclusively men) that were institutionalized by 
government bureaucracies such as the census and disseminated by daily newspapers, 
financial magazines and the emerging academic discipline of modern economics.  
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As a result of this, business quantification techniques often ended up being used not 
only to manage a railroad corporation, administer a slave plantation or run a textile factory 
but also to organize, discipline, manage and make sense of American society as a whole.  
The micro-managing of wage workers led to macroeconomic indicators, slave plantation 
accounts led to national productivity statistics, cost-accounting figures led to cost-of-living 
indices, Return on Investment metrics became “economic growth,” and the bottom line 
became the American government’s top priority. By 1900, these priced measures of 
productivity, consumerism, and market growth were helping to transform the 
maximization of capitalist production and consumption into the main objective of 
American society, all the while turning monetary prices into the standard unit for 
measuring not only our goods but our planet, our society, our future and ourselves. Distinct 
from mere commodification, I refer to this social and cultural process as the “capitalization” 
of everyday life because these figures treated American society like one big capitalized 
investment.  
The institutionalizing of modern capitalization statistics was nothing less than a 
cultural revolution for these figures helped to reverse the previous relationship between 
economic activity and social welfare in America. Instead of seeking to measure, as many 
nineteenth century statistics often did, the effect certain economic or social policies had on 
the physical, mental or social welfare of the American citizenry, these capitalizing 
indicators gauged the effect American labor and consumption had on economic growth, 
capital accumulation and market productivity. Quantifying society as if was a capital 
investment, these statistics - and the men who wielded them - helped transform economic 
activity from a means to an end (a better life) into an end in itself (more growth.) While 
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many nineteenth century measures (such as the Weld’s intemperance statistics) were 
shaped by the ideological contours of Jeffersonian Republicanism, Jacksonian democracy or 
free labor producerism and therefore placed the individual at the center of society, 
capitalist statistics played a key role in the pricing of the American citizen into money-
generating functionaries of production or consumption that could be fitted into equations 
that calculated future yields on capital investments. To use an only slightly anachronistic 
term that emerged soon after the invention of GNP in the 1930s, by the turn of the 
twentieth century the citizens of the United States were being reimagined by both 
businessmen and the state not as human beings but as “human capital.”14 
Review of Literature 
The history of modern economic indicators is a topic historians have yet to explore 
in-depth. Book indexes, always a useful window into the minds of historians, rarely include 
statistical indicators as an historical category. And while many scholars have raided past 
statistics for invaluable data, they have often not treated these figures as historical actors 
or political constructs in their own right. Products of the capitalist system they seek to 
analyze, neoclassical economic historians who practice "cliometrics" often view past 
statistics as ahistorical numbers that can be inserted into predetermined, anachronistic 
models (usually of GDP growth). Instead of seeking to historicize modern indicators, these 
                                                 
14 To remain historically accurate, I have written GNP (Gross National Product) here since that was the 
indicator used before 1950. While very similar to the GDP figures we see today, there are key differences.  The 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics defines human capital as “the productive capacities of human beings as 
income producing agents in the economy.” Such a definition, I find, perfectly articulates the social vision 
behind capitalization statistics.  
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historians play a leading role in naturalizing them by implicitly assuming that their main 
purpose as scholars is to explain the reasons behind past GDP rates.15 
In the past few decades, however, a rich literature has emerged regarding the 
epistemological problems inherent in approaching quantification and statistics as 
“objective” fact. Mary Poovey and other theorists have explored how and why statistics 
which "embody theoretical assumptions about what should be counted” have nevertheless 
succeeded in seeming “immune from theory and interpretation.”16 As this literature on 
statistics has convincingly shown, every mode of codification is embedded with its creators’ 
subjective assumptions, biases, theories and values. An in-depth analysis of what different 
Americans decided to count, and how they chose to count it, can therefore tell us a great 
deal about how they viewed the world around them and their own place in it.  Statistics, in 
short, can serve as incredibly insightful windows into the minds of past Americans. 
Unfortunately, however, it appears that this theoretical literature has led many historians 
to distance themselves from statistics all together, in fear of distorting the past. While 
disciplines such as political science and law have rushed to implement neoclassical 
economists’ problematic data-driven methodologies, historians have generally turned 
away from numbers in the past few decades. One goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate 
that while social and cultural historians have been right to avoid the quantitative analyses 
                                                 
15 For an excellent critique of cliometrics see Francesco Boldizzoni, The Poverty of Clio: Resurrecting Economic 
History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
16 Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998) xi-xv; Ted Porter, 
Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 
1995); Alain Desrosieres, The Politics of Large Numbers: A History of Statistical Reasoning (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2002); Paul Starr, “The Sociology of Statistics,” in Alonso W. and Starr P., eds., The 
Politics of Numbers (Russel Sage Foundation, New York: 1987). 
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so common in other disciplines, they should not steer away from statistics completely – but 
rather critically embrace them as rich historical artifacts.17 
Past statistics, however, haven’t just reflected America’s history - they have helped 
shape it. In this regard, my theoretical approach to quantification has been most influenced 
by the writings of Bruno Latour, Ian Hacking and Michele Foucault. The statistics in this 
book are not treated as symbols but, in the words of Latour, “as social tactics that allow 
knowledge to stick.” My main goal then is not to examine how well these images 
represented some sort of “reality,” but rather to uncover what political, cultural and 
intellectual power they had.18 As Ian Hacking and Michele Foucault have illustrated, the 
consumption of seemingly objective statistics can significantly alter one's views on just 
about everything as people often come to internalize the underlying assumptions inherent 
in these figures.19  
To get at the power of statistics, this dissertation often treats statistics as mobile 
disseminators of certain economic and social worldviews, or “ideology carriers.” By first 
analyzing the ideas and values that shaped the creation of certain economic indicators, and 
then following the institutional paths these different forms of economic quantification took, 
                                                 
17 For the role of neoclassical economics in legal thought today see Duncan Kennedy, "Law and Economics 
from the Perspective of Critical Legal Studies" The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and Law, ed. Peter 
Newman (New York: Macmillan, 1998). 
 
18 Bruno Latour, “Drawing Things Together,” in Lynch, M. and Woolgar, S. (eds.), Representation in Scientific 
Practice (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990) and We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1993) 
19 "Governmentality,” The Foucault Effect: Studies in Govemmentality, edited by Graham Burchell, Colin 
Gordon, and Peter Miller. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). Ian Hacking, "Making Up People." in 
Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality and the Self in Western Thought, ed. T. Heller, M. Sosna, 
and D. Wellbery. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986). For a good example of how historians have 
implemented these ideas see Sarah Igo, The Averaged American: Surveys, Citizens and the Making of a Mass 
Public (Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 2007). 
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I uncover the influential role statistics have played in the shaping of American political 
discourse, economic thought and the social imagination. For example, in my sixth chapter I 
show how the Senate Finance Committee’s Aldrich Report, which was designed to measure 
the condition of the American people, implemented cost-of-living statistics that had first 
been invented within New England textile factories. When these statistical indicators were 
used by the finance committee to gauge American progress, the profit-maximizing logics of 
the textile factory began to frame political debates as well as the government’s decision-
making processes. By legitimizing, for instance, the idea of corporate consolidation while 
also dramatically narrowing the political possibilities that were “on the table” for laborers, 
I show how these cost-of-living figures ended up having enormous political power.  
Despite the overall trend away from statistical analyses, however, a number of 
excellent books have been written on quantification and economic statistics in the past few 
decades. My dissertation, however, differs from these books in a number of important 
ways. Firstly, a majority of these books have tended to focus on questions of objectivity, 
probability and government bureaucracy rather than capital investment, labor movements, 
slavery, class conflict or political ideologies. The actors in these narratives, therefore, are 
usually bureaucrats, academics and scientists – not capitalists, farmers, slave-owners or 
laborers. The questions these books are usually interested in – the rise of a bureaucratic 
state, the “taming of chance,” the social construction of scientific knowledge – are all 
fascinating, but differ from the set of historical problems this dissertation has set out to 
explore.20 In this regard, my dissertation is more interested in exploring the light which 
                                                 
20 Donald Mackenzie, Statistics in Britain, 1865-1930: The Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge 
(Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1981); Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990); Theodore Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 1820-1900 (Princeton: 
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statistics can help shed on some of the central debates still ongoing amongst American 
historians, be it the relationship between slavery and capitalism, the differences between 
Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson or the impact of railroads on American society 
in the nineteenth century. 
Save for Michael Zakim’s work on clerks' labor and the epistemology of statistics, 
the few histories of quantification in America which have engaged in the social history of 
statistics in the nineteenth century, such as Patricia Cline Cohen’s Numeracy in Early 
America, Tom Stapleford’s The Cost of Living in America and Margo Anderson’s America 
Census, only loosely tied their narratives to the emergence of a capitalist society. While 
these works did reveal some of the social and cultural changes that shaped the census and 
other statistic-collecting institutions, they did not explore the quantitative vision that 
emerged out of capital investments in land, railroads, slaves or factories nor did they 
examine the effect such business practices had on the development of statistical indicators. 
Furthermore, they did not seek to explain how the decline of patriarchy or the rise of 
Jacksonain democracy and capitalist relations changed the ways in which moral reformers, 
laborers, politicians, feminists or clergymen measured progress, valued society or 
quantified everyday life.21   
                                                                                                                                                             
Princeton University Press) and Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Stephen Stigler, The History of Statistics: The Measurement 
of Uncertainty Before 1900 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990). 
  
21 Michael Zakim,"Producing Capitalism" in Capitalism Takes Command (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
2012); “Inventing Industrial Statistics,” Money Matters: The Law, Politics, and Economics of Currency, a special 
issue of Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 11.1 (2009); While similar in our approaches, the biggest difference 
between Zakim's work and my own is his belief that there was in fact something inherently "capitalist" about 
the very epistemological nature of statistical standardization and quantification. As he notes in the first line of 
his article, "Statistics were an industrial invention." Patricia Cline Cohen, A Calculating People: The Spread of 
Numeracy in Early America (Chicago: Chicago University Press: 1982); Margo Conk Andersen, The American 
Census: A Social History (New Haven: Yale Press, 1988); Tom Stapleford, The Cost of Living in America: A 
Political History of Economic Statistics, 1880-2000. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). See also 
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In most instances, the work that has been done on the history of statistics in 
America has, in fact, skipped over my most crucial question: Why have certain statistics 
became our measures of progress instead of others? In Cline Cohen’s impressive work on 
numeracy, for instance, there is a detailed chapter on the battle which ensued over 
supposed errors that were found in the section of the 1840 census which focused on 
African American insanity statistics. Cline Cohen, however, did not seek to explain why 
insanity statistics were collected in the first place, why they were taken so seriously by 
both southerners and northerners, or how they were linked both to the rise of Jacksonian 
Democracy and the Panic of 1837. Nor did she seek to explain why, ten years later, most 
sectional arguments by both northerners and southerners stopped using these figures to 
prove that their society was more advanced and instead turned to an array of economic 
growth statistics. In Thomas Stapleford’s The Cost of Living in America we get an excellent 
sense of how the birth of the Consumer Price Index in the Gilded Age shaped twentieth 
century American wealth redistribution yet we do not receive an intellectual, cultural or 
economic explanation as to why cost-of-living statistics became so bureaucratically 
important in the first place and how this statistic severely limited the field of possible 
economic discourses and policies in America.  
Part of what is missing in these narratives is the role that power, class and 
ideological conflict has played in the shaping of economic statistics. While works on 
statistics have rightfully focused on the state, they have often tended to separate 
                                                                                                                                                             
Mary O. Furner, “Knowing Capitalism: Public investigation and the labor question in the long Progressive 
Era”, Supple and Furner eds., The State and Economic Knowledge: The American and British Experiences (New 
York: 1990) ; James Leiby, Carrol Wright and Labor Reform: The Origin of Labor Statistics (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press: 1960).  
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bureaucratic developments from the larger social, cultural and intellectual debates of the 
time. This approach creates a narrative in which there are many statisticians, economists 
and bureaucrats, but very few industrialists, labor radicals or slave-owners. For example, a 
fairly large amount of research has been done on Carroll Wright, the Gilded Age chief of the 
Massachusetts and federal bureau of labor statistics. Yet in these previous works the 
tremendous impact that industrial capitalists such as Edward Atkinson had on the 
economic statistics Wright chose to collect is largely absent.  In my dissertation, the state 
and its statistic-collecting institutions are not seen as entities with their own internal logic 
but rather as fierce battlegrounds where different economic ideas and social values fight 
for cultural authority.22  
The notion of a coordinated elite class which transcends public and private 
boundaries builds on past works of the "corporate liberal" variety. Ever since Gabriel Kolko 
discovered that most railroad presidents were actually in favor of government 
intervention, the corporate liberal school has been a staple of American historiography – 
and rightfully so.23 Since the time of Kolko and James Weinstein, however, it has split into 
two main methodological camps: While historians such as Allan Brinkley have focused 
mostly on the state in their attempt to understand why government policymakers became 
supportive of a corporate-run society, other scholars, such as Jackson Lears, Jeff Sklansky 
                                                 
22 For this “internalist” approach to Wright see Stapleford, The Cost of Living in America; Furner, “Knowing 
Capitalism” and  Leiby, Carrol Wright and Labor Reform. 
23 See Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism 1900-1916 (New York: The Free Press, 1963); James 
Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968). For a similar take on the 
New Deal see Ronald Radosh, "The Myth of the New Deal," Radosh and Murray Rothbard, eds. A New History 
of the Leviathan: Essays on the rise of the American Corporate State (New York: Dutton, 1972) 146-187; Barton 
Bernstein, “The New Deal: The Conservative Achievements of Liberal Reform,” in Bernstein, ed., Towards a 
New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History (New York: Random House, 1967). 
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and James Livingston, have looked to class-based theories of cultural and intellectual 
hegemony in order to explain the relationship between capitalism and governance.24 There 
are strengths and weaknesses to both these camps. Brinkley’s state-centered approach 
allows for a nitty-gritty political history but it also tends to view the state in a cultural, 
political and intellectual vacuum. A more cultural and social approach is good at showing 
the power of class and ideology but sometimes remains rather vague and ungrounded 
regarding the actual practices that allowed certain ideas to become hegemonic.  One goal of 
this dissertation is to combine these two branches, thus creating a state-centered political 
history of capitalism that is still sensitive to the role that not-state actors such as financial 
journals, business lobbyists, Harvard University or the American Social Science Association 
have played in transforming the logic of capital into the logic of society.  
Finally, it is important to note that, in recent years, some books have approached the 
issue of economic statistics and the birth of "the economy" in ways similar to mine. 
Timothy Mitchell and Adam Tooze are excellent examples of this new scholarship, although 
they too have a tendency to focus far more on bureaucrats and economists and far less on 
capitalists or financial journalists. More importantly, however, they focus on Egypt and 
Germany and look only at the twentieth century. One of the main interventions of my 
                                                 
24 For the state-centered approach see Alan Brinkley , The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession 
and War (New York: Vintage, 1995); Colin Gordon, New Deals, Business, Labor and Politics in America 
(Cambridge University Press, 1994) ; Kim McQuaid, "Corporate Liberalism in the American Community," 
Business History Review 52 (1978); Steven Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of 
National Administrative Capacities,1877-1920 (Princeton: 1982); Theda Skocpol, “Political Response to 
Capitalist Crisis:  Neo-Marxist Theory of the State and the Case of the New Deal,” Politics and Society 10, no. 2 
(1980): 155-202.  For the hegemonic, cultural approach see Jeffrey Sklansky, The Soul's Economy: Market 
Society and Selfhood in American though, 1820-1920 (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2002); R. Jeffrey Lustig, 
Corporate Liberalism: The Origins of Modern American Political Theory (University of California, 1982); James 
Livingston, Origins of the Federal Reserve System: Money, Class and Corporate Capitalism 1890-1913 (Ithaca: 
Cornell, 1990); Jackson Lears, No Place of Grace:  Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture, 
1880-1920 (Chicago, 1981). Cohen, Nancy. The Reconstruction of American Liberalism, 1865-1914. (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2002).  
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dissertation is to argue that the social forces which shaped the rise of modern capitalist 
economic indicators – such as railroad corporations, urban real estate speculation, 
sovereign debt and plantation slavery – emerged at least in part only in America and the 
Atlantic World, not the Middle East or even Europe, and in the nineteenth century, not the 
twentieth. While Mitchell and Tooze tend to emphasize the invention of GDP in the 1930s 
and the rise of Keynesian macroeconomics, my narrative views such developments as the 
final chapter of a much earlier story. To uncover the intellectual, social, economic and 
cultural origins of modern economic statistics, as well as the historical moments in which 
other alternatives became obsolete, I believe that one must go back not only to the Great 
Depression, World War I or the Progressive Era, but to Alexander Hamilton, Thomas 
Jefferson and the very founding of the United States.25  
Capitalization and the History of Capitalism 
In very broad strokes, American historians who have written on the history of 
capitalism have fallen into three main camps: Marxian, Smithian and Weberian.  None of 
these three camps are wrong, yet alone they remain incomplete as they all miss crucial 
characteristics of capitalist societies. In the Marxian school, capitalism centers largely on 
the notion of capital accumulation through class exploitation, which takes the form of wage 
labor. American labor historians such as Sean Wilentz, Harry Braverman and David 
Montgomery could be said to lead this camp. The main problem with such an approach to 
capitalism is that the extraction of surplus value need not take the form of wage labor. 
                                                 
25 Mitchell, “Fixing the Economy”; Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 2002);  Adam Tooze, Statistics and the German State: The Making of Modern Economic 
Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), and “Trouble with Numbers: Statistics, Politics, 
and History in the Construction of Weimar’s Trade Balance, 1918- 1924,” American Historical Review, 113.3 
(June 2008), 678-700;  
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Rent-seeking landowners, slave-owning planters and credit-lending financiers, three 
figures who play a prominent role in this dissertation, accumulated capital not through 
wage labor but rather through a monopoly on land and credit or via the institution of 
slavery.26  
In the Smithian school, on the other hand, capitalism often becomes synonymous 
with market exchange.   While all very different, the writings of Joyce Appleby, Winifred 
Rothenberg, William Cronon and even Charles Sellers fit this mold as they all tend to focus 
on the changes wrought by increased market integration and a division of labor.27 The 
main problem with such an approach is that markets have been around for centuries yet 
capitalism has not. Such a focus on commodity exchange often conflates commercial 
societies with capitalist ones by not placing the proper emphasis, in my opinion, on the 
most crucial, definitive and exceptional process within a capitalist society – long-term 
capital investment. To understand this better, I will momentarily turn to Marx for 
assistance.  
While imperfect, I believe that a useful way to get at some of the major differences 
between commodity exchange and capital investment (and hence between commercial and 
                                                 
26 Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. Wage-labor and Capital (New York: Labor News Company, 1902) Marx, 
Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Digireads.com Publishing 2004); Some works of American 
history that more-or-less fit this mold by focusing on the exploitative relationship of wage labor might include 
Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1975) Sean Wilentz, Chants Democratic: New York City & The Rise of the American 
Working Class, 1788-1850 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1984); David Montgomerey, The Fall of the 
House of Labor: The Workplace, the State and American Labor Activism, 1885-1925 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987)/ 
 
27 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations; Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican 
Vision of the 1790s (New York: New York University Press, 1984); William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis: 
Chicago and the Great West (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991); Sellers, Market Revolution. Winifred Rothenberg, 
From Market-Places to a Market Economy: The Transformation of Rural Massachusetts, 1750-1850 (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1992). 
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capitalist societies) is to borrow Marx's somewhat crude depiction of commercial exchange 
processes as “C-M-C” and capital investment processes as “M-C-M'.” In a C-M-C transaction, 
commodities (C) are exchanged in the market for money (M) which is then used to 
purchase other commodities (C) for consumption. Note that it in this commercial 
worldview money is merely a means to an end rather than an end in itself. The pursuit of 
profit is not the driving force of this process since the entire logic of the exchange is built 
upon the principals of balance and equivalence: The commodity sold and the commodity 
consumed are both worth M dollars. It is important to note that such commercial exchange 
does not shun wealth-seeking behavior.  The more you labored and hence produced, the 
more you can then consume. Nevertheless, such a market-based exchange, I argue, cannot 
be defined as “capitalist.” Let us turn to M-C-M', the social process of capital investment, to 
see why. First off, it is important to see the many resemblances in these two social 
processes: Both involve markets, commodities and money. Yet in the process of M-C-M', M 
amount of money is invested into a production process in order to create a commodity that 
can then be sold for M'. This economic activity is only logical if M' is greater than M. At the 
heart of this system, therefore, lies the profit motive as well as the notion that more and 
more capital must always be accumulating. We also see that the goal of such a process is 
not the actual production or consumption of goods but rather capital gains. Rather than 
being based on commercial principals of equivalence or balance, such a system - much like 
the GDP indicator which measures investment successes and failures today - is based on 
the capitalist principal of continuous economic growth.28 
                                                 
28 For C-M-C and M-C-M' process see Marx, Capital, chapter 4 ("The General Formula for Capital.") 
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Finally, there is the Weberian school, which centers largely on the notion of 
rationalization. Unlike the Marxian and Smithian schools, the Weberian camp defines 
capitalism less as a system of distinct processes or institutions (i.e. wage labor, investment, 
banks, markets) and far more as a way of seeing.29 While I am partial to such a view, the 
main problem with this approach is that there can exist highly rationalized and 
bureaucratic forms of society that are not necessarily capitalist. In the Weberian approach, 
we often see a conflation between enlightenment values – reason, rationality, calculation – 
and capitalism. To give a quick example, it is easy to forget that Weber's prototypical 
"capitalist" in The Protestant Ethic was none other than Benjamin Franklin. While Franklin, 
as this dissertation will show, was undoubtedly fond of statistical calculations and 
rationalized forms of thinking, one would be hard pressed to label a man who was not a 
businessman, despised industrial manufacturing and once referred to commerce as 
"cheating" as the prototypical capitalist.30  
I have examined these three approaches because while this is a dissertation on the 
history of economic indicators, it is also an attempt to tell the history of the rise of 
capitalism in America. I try to do so by incorporating and synthesizing the aforementioned 
approaches to capitalism while working out some of the problems inherent to each. Like 
Marx, I believe capital investment and accumulation, or M-C-M’, lies at the heart of the 
                                                 
29 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons, foreword by R. H. 
Tawney  (London : G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1930); Guenther Roth, “Rationalization in Max’s Weber 
Development History” in Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity, ed. Scott Lash and Sam Whimster. (Allen & 
Unwin, 1987); Wolfgang Schluchter, The rise of Western rationalism: Max Weber's developmental history, 
trans., with an introduction, by Guenther Roth. (Berkeley: University of California Press, c1981). 
 
30 Weber, Protestant Ethic; In 1769 Franklin said that "there seem to be but three Ways for a Nation to acquire 
Wealth. The first is by War as the Romans did in plundering their conquered Neighbors. This is Robbery. The 
second by Commerce which is generally Cheating. The third by Agriculture the only honest Way." Benjamin 
Franklin, The Works of Benjamin Franklin: Including the private as well as the official and scientific 
correspondence, 4 (New York, 1904), 238. 
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system we refer to as capitalism. Like Smith, I believe that the market interdependence 
which emerged out of an extreme division of labor played a crucial role in the rise of a 
capitalist society as it helped create a social world in which more and more human 
interactions are mediated through abstract markets, money and statistics as opposed to 
kinship ties, custom or face-to-face interactions. Finally, like Weber, I agree that capitalism 
was, first and foremost, a way of seeing, quantifying and valuing the world. Studying how 
businessmen quantified the world around them has revealed to me the ever-changing 
bundle of values that undergirded the capitalist vision of American society in the 
nineteenth century. This dissertation will show that some of the key values of this capitalist 
worldview included growth, productivity, predictability, efficiency, inequality, futurity, 
materialism, functionalism, standardization, maximization, consequentialism and 
instrumentalism. Note you will not find “individualism” on this list. That is not a 
coincidence, and it is a point I shall return to shortly.  
In this dissertation, I often use the verb “capitalize” and the noun “capitalization.” To 
understand what I mean by this term, which I use as shorthand to describe a varying set of 
changing processes that share certain common characteristics, let us begin with the 
definition of “capitalize” in the dictionary. According to Merrian-Webster, to capitalize 
means “to convert into capital,” "to compute the present value of something by calculating 
its future income," “to supply capital for,” and, in a non-economic sense, “to gain by turning 
something to advantage.” Putting all these definitions in play at once, one can get a sense of 
how I use the word in my work.  To capitalize is to attempt to build social processes, 
institutions and relations which can transform something, someone or somewhere into a 
profitable, stable, and ongoing money yielding, profit-seeking investment (M-C-M’). Before, 
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however, any nineteenth century businessmen invested their capital in constructing a 
railroad, purchasing a slave or dividing wilderness into urban lots, they first imagined 
themselves doing so. To capitalize, therefore, was first and foremost an act of quantification 
and calculation – it was a way of seeing as well as a way of thinking. As my dissertation will 
demonstrate, this capitalizing vision required nineteenth century businessmen to translate 
people, nature and time – all the inputs that go into any capitalization process – into a 
series of priced entities. Capitalization, of course, was not only about seeing. It was also 
about the construction of very real social, legal, technological, cultural and economic 
institutions and relations, be it chattel slavery or corporate limited liability, that enabled 
products of human labor or nature’s bounty to be funneled into steady future streams of 
income. But such institutions, relations and technologies, I argue, were constantly being 
shaped and reshaped by the ways in which Americans chose to quantify different aspects of 
their world into numbers, graphs and tables.  
Finally, I have taken time to parse out the differences between commercial exchange 
(C-M-C) and capitalization (M-C-M’) because I think it is a useful way to look at American 
history. These two very different social processes, I argue, played a leading role in the 
shaping of two very different economic ideologies in nineteenth century America.  In many 
ways, the early American republic looked a great deal like Marx’s C-M-C model of 
commercial exchange as the United States prior to the 1830s mostly consisted of 
patriarchal households of petty commodity producers who exchanged their surplus 
products for finished consumer goods in local, national and international markets. Most 
early republic Americans in this patriarchal-commercial society, even merchants and slave-
owners, were not profit-maximizers and viewed the household as the central social and 
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economic unit of society.31 Based on the tenets of private property, proprietary 
independence (for the male white patriarch), commercial production and the labor theory 
of value, this system of simple commodity exchange shaped the political and economic 
worldviews of a large spectrum of middle and working class Americans throughout the 
nineteenth century, be they farmers, skilled laborers, merchants or shopkeepers. Past 
historians have labeled this patriarchal, proprietary, and producerist ideology as agrarian, 
Jeffersonian, Jacksonian, Radical Ricardian, “free labor,” populist, artisanal and, of course, 
Republicanist.32 While there are crucial distinctions to be made here, I still believe that all 
these worldviews are far more alike than they are dissimilar and they can therefore be 
placed under the single umbrella term of “patriarchal commercialism.” 
I believe it is the ideological tensions between capitalism and patriarchal 
commercialism – and not, as in Europe, the conflicts between capitalism and communal, 
anti–proprietary socialism - that should be placed at the center of American political, 
economic and intellectual history. The most important social, cultural, intellectual and 
political transformations in the nineteenth century – in both the industrializing North and 
the enslaving South – can be attributed, therefore, to the slow and contested eclipse of a 
                                                 
31As Thomas Cochran has noted, “Merchants [in the early republic] did not balance their books with a view to 
determining net worth." Cochran, "The Entrepreneur in American Capital Formation" in National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Capital Formation and Economic Growth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955); 
See also Naomi Lamaroeux,“Rethinking the Transition to Capitalism in the Early American Northeast," The 
Journal of American History, 90 (2003): 437-461. As for slave-owners, I argue in this dissertation that only in 
the 1820s – with the cotton boom and the emergence of the internal slave trade – did southern slave-owners 
begin to see their slaves not only as property but as capital and their plantations as profit-maximizing 
enterprises.  
 
32 For Jeffersonian see Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (New 
York: Norton, 1982), perhaps the best synthesis of the patriarchal commercial worldview of the early 
republic. For Radical Ricardians and artisanal-republicanism see Wilentz, Chants Democratic; For Free Labor 
see Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1976) (1970). For Populism see Charles Postel, The Populist Vision (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007); For Republicanism see Daniel Rodgers, "Republicanism: Career of a Concept" 
Journal of American History, 79:(1992) 11-39. 
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patriarchal commercial society by a capitalizing one. While each chapter in this dissertation 
draws out certain aspects of how this conflicted process occurred over time, one central, 
recurring theme should be mentioned here: the place of the individual in a society. This 
dissertation argues that the notion that capitalism should be equated with individualism is 
highly problematic. Let us return one last time to the example of intemperance statistics 
with which I opened this chapter. As a comparison of Weld’s moral statistics and the 
Albany businessmen’s proto cost-benefit analysis indicates, both these statistical visions 
treated Americans very differently. In Weld’s Jacksonian statistics, people were at the 
center of society and progress was defined by their physical, mental and social wellbeing. 
For the Albany businessmen, on the other hand, people were the means to a growth-
maximizing end rather than the end in itself. In Weld's moral statistics, the unit of 
measurement was people. In the Albany businessmen’s growth figures, it was money. 
Crucially, this is not to say that economic growth did not often lead to societal wellbeing in 
nineteenth century America. Clearly, productivity gains brought on by capitalists’ desire for 
healthy returns helped create a society in which Americans usually lived longer and ate 
better. Nevertheless, such improvements were not the main goals of railroad capitalists, 
slave-owners or textile manufacturers but rather some of the many consequences that 
emerged out of the need for never-ending capital returns.  
While this dissertation focuses on the ideological tensions between patriarchal 
commercialism and capitalism as well as the idea that market exchange and capital 
investment are two very distinct economic actions, previous American historians often 
have not made these distinctions. As the term “market revolution” suggests, even the 
clearly left-leaning Charles Sellers seemed to believe that where you have markets, 
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commodities, money, trade, commerce and exchange – you have capitalism. One of the 
main objectives of my dissertation is to show that historians should not simply equate 
market orientation with capitalism and that markets alone do not a capitalist society 
make.33 Very briefly, I will give an example of this from my first chapter: In 1791, Alexander 
Hamilton sent a statistical survey out to American farmers across the nation in order to 
ascertain what was more “productive” – manufacturing or agriculture. Imagining farms as 
capitalized investments, Hamilton asked them a seemingly simple question: After pricing 
all the goods produced on a farm in a year, what would be your annual revenue? Now 
yeoman farmers in early America were fairly market-oriented. Their account books were 
filled with cash exchanges. Yet they could not answer Hamilton’s question.  That is because 
Hamilton viewed the family farm as an income-yielding investment, while early Americans 
saw it as their livelihood. Both Hamilton and the yeoman farmers wanted wheat and shoes 
to be bought and sold in the marketplace, but only Hamilton needed to know precisely how 
much money the family farm could produce in a year in order to calculate potential returns 
on capital.  
By focusing on the role that economic indicators played in the construction of the 
American economy, I also hope to shift the history of capitalism away from market 
transactions and towards corporate and government planning. We should think of 
capitalism, I argue, more as a system of coordinated public and private planning than one of 
individualistic exchange. In this sense, my project can be seen as a continuation of Alfred 
Chandler’s “visible hand” argument that challenged the idea that the most dominant 
characteristic of a modern, capitalist society is the production and exchange of 
                                                 
33 On the crucial difference between commercial and capitalist societies I am indebted to Fernand Braudel, 
Civilization and Capitalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). 
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commodities via free market mechanisms. Yet while business historians have long 
recognized the importance of data in managing a large-scale corporate society, they have 
mostly focused on statistics at the level of the firm. This dissertation argues that we must 
go beyond the firm and show how these management techniques came to be used as tools 
for running not only companies but an entire society. Instead of focusing only on the 
microeconomics of the corporation, we must explore the macroeconomics of the nation. 
Instead of only analyzing the visible hand of the firm, we must examine the visible hand of 
everyday life.34  
Sources 
My main sources are people who counted. The sites of quantification I use as 
sources include farmers’ diaries, plantation account books, church sermons, moral reform 
pamphlets, prison and insane asylum reports, government bureaus, capitalists’ “back-of-
the-envelope” calculations, corporate reports to shareholders, census returns, private 
correspondences and business magazines. Sometimes, however, statistical thinking 
cropped up in less conventional places such as presidential speeches, utopian fantasies, 
anti-slavery tracts and feminist literature. In a surprising twist I did not expect when I 
began to write a dissertation on the history of social quantification, this project contains a 
somewhat star-studded cast: Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, Benjamin Franklin, 
Andrew Carnegie, James Henry Hammond, John Calhoun, Horace Mann, and Edward 
Bellamy all explored ways of measuring and valuing American life. That said, there are 
                                                 
34 Alfred Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Mass: 
Belknap Press, 1977); For the importance of data in the managerial revolution see Chandler, Visible Hand, 
109-120 and Thomas C. Cochran, "The Business Revolution," American Historical Review 78 (1974): 1449-
1466. 
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many fresh faces as well which few historians have explored such as Freeman Hunt, the 
founder of the first business magazine in the country, Edward Atkinson, a cost-cutting 
industrialist who helped invent the calorie, George Tucker, a southern economist who 
wrote the first science fiction book in American history, Leona Barry, the Knight’s of 
Labor’s premier statistician, and Samuel Blodget, a Washington DC businessman who 
generated the first GDP-like figures in America while being held in a debtor’s prison.  
I believe, however, that one set of sources to be of particular import: Financial 
journals. Amazingly, the history of financial journals and their editors has remained almost 
non-existent. In Anti-Intellectualism in American life, Richard Hofstadter noted that "a 
cultural history of the business magazine might be illuminating." It appears that no 
historian has yet to take him up on his offer.35  This dissertation seeks to fill in this gap by 
leaning heavily on financial journals such as Hunt's Merchants Magazine, Poor's Railroad 
Journal and De Bow’s Southern Review. In doing so, I not only cover the content of these 
magazines extensively but take a  “behind the scenes” look into the men who ran them.  
Chapter Outline:  
The dissertation traces the uneven, contested process in which capitalizing 
statistical indicators slowly went from the fringes of American society to the mainstream. 
Chapters one and two trace the intellectual origins of capitalizing statistics back to 
seventeenth century England and then tries to explain the failure of such priced 
productivity and market growth figures to gain traction in early America. In England, this 
                                                 
35 Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York: Vintage, 1966) 247-250. A few 
histories of specific financial journals or editors exist, but none of these explore the larger cultural, social or 
even economic impact that these magazines have had on the American public in the nineteenth century. See 
Dan Parsons., The Power of the Financial Press (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990); Douglas 
Steeples, Advocate for American Enterprise: William Buck Dana and the Commercial and Financial Chronicle 
(Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2002); Alfred D. Chandler, Henry Varnum Poor, Business Editor, Analyst, 
Reformer (New York: Arno Press) 1981.   
   
32 
 
chapter examines William Petty, the father of “political arithmetic” and the first person to 
price everyday life into GDP-style growth indicators. Turning to early America, the focus 
shifts to founding father Alexander Hamilton’s failed attempts to use Petty-inspired price 
statistics in order to convince his fellow Americans that they should support 
industrialization since capitalized factories would be more conducive to growth than the 
family farm. I argue that except for a few eastern businessmen and southern planters 
(including George Washington), Hamilton’s statistical vision failed to catch on because 
most American farmers did not view agriculture as a capitalized investment but rather as 
the source of their livelihood and republican independence. Despite their rejection of a 
capitalist statistical vision, however, these chapters show how the early republic abounded 
with statistical almanacs, gazetteers and atlases as Americans developed an alternative 
series of economic indicators, such as population density statistics, through which to gauge 
and quantify the young republic’s material progress. Many of these statistical indicators 
embraced markets yet did not tear asunder the American patriarchal household by 
transforming land and labor into abstract, monetized assets of capital accumulation.  
Chapter three explores how Hunt’s Merchants Magazine, the first national business 
periodical in America, transformed urban population statistics into an indicator that could 
help eastern capitalists choose in which western cities they should invest capital. These 
figures, I argue, helped businessmen re-imagine the American people as sources of 
pecuniary profit – as human capital. Chapters four and five demonstrate how the statistics 
used by northern and southern elites in their disputes over slavery shifted radically in the 
1850s. Throughout the 1830 and 40s, both sides measured their region’s prosperity using 
what they referred to as “moral statistics” such as insanity rates, literacy, incarceration, 
   
33 
 
prostitution, mortality and pauperism. By the 1850s, however, the statistical focus in both 
the north and the south shifted to economic growth and market productivity. Contending 
that the worldview of eastern investors and southern planters was not as polarized in the 
years before the Civil War as some historians have suggested, and that the North and South 
should be understood as a tale of two capitalisms, I argue that it was the westward 
expansion of the railroads in the North and the cotton boom and internal slave trade in the 
South that led to this joint shift towards capitalization statistics.  
Chapter six looks at the political struggles that raged over which economic 
indicators would be canonized by the state as the benchmarks of American progress in the 
Gilded Age. It examines how skilled wage laborers and the Knights of Labor battled 
economists, business-minded bureaucrats and politically-engaged businessmen for control 
of the state bureaus of statistics and the power to decide how the American government 
would measure societal wellbeing. These laborers generated alternative indicators of 
progress by collecting data on inequality, poverty, exploitation, education, gender 
discrimination and social immobility. Save for a few key concessions, however, it was the 
business elite’s market productivity and cost-of-living statistics which became 
institutionalized by the emerging regulatory state at the turn of the twentieth century, thus 
setting the stage for the invention of GDP, Consumer Price Index, consumer spending and 
the other economic indicators we moderns know so well.   
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Chapter One 
Seeing like a Capitalist: The Hamiltonian Origins of How Capitalists Count 
In the summer of 1791, Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton went hunting 
for data from which he could create some statistical economic indicators. Preparing to 
write his soon-to-be famous “Report on Manufacturing,” Hamilton planned to augment his 
argument for the government subsidization of American manufacturing by generating 
statistics which would reveal to the American public as well as foreign investors the 
underestimated productivity of American “manufactories” in comparison to agriculture. 
Treating both farming and manufacturing not as callings, crafts or occupations but rather 
capital investments, he intended to collect the market prices of all the goods Americans 
produced and then aggregate them into commensurable statistics that would compare the 
priced output of farm and factory. Such statistics, he hoped, would prove that Americans’ 
obsession with farming was leading them not to maximize the potential wealth of the 
nation, or as he referred to it, “the aggregate value of the annual produce of the land and 
labor of the country.” Half a year later, in the finished report, he made clear what his 
statistical objective had been that previous summer: 
The question must still be, whether the surplus, after defraying expenses of a given 
capital, employed in the purchase and improvement of a piece of land, is greater or 
less, than that of a like capital employed in the prosecution of a manufactory...Or 
rather, whether the business of agriculture or that of manufactures will yield the 
greatest product.36 
 
In his statistical search for “the greatest product,” Hamilton took advantage of the 
recently established web of federal tax collectors he himself had assembled and dispersed 
across the nation. According to the much-despised “Whiskey Tax” law Hamilton had 
                                                 
36 Alexander Hamilton, The Reports of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (New York: Harper & Row, 
1964) 121.  
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recently penned, treasury officials were supposed to venture from town to town, collecting 
an excise tax on domestically distilled spirits that would go to the funding of the national 
debt – yet another Hamiltonian innovation. Displaying his usual knack for overstepping 
official bounds, Hamilton wrote to the tax-collectors requesting that while they scoured the 
land for whiskey they also collect information on “the manufactures of every kind carried 
on within the limits of your district.” More specifically, Hamilton instructed his men to 
collect data on “the quantities periodically made” and “the prices at which they were sold” 
and “whether they are carried on by Societies, Companies or Individuals.” He then sent a 
similar letter to a number of leading manufacturers.37 
To complete his statistical experiment, however, Hamilton needed to compare the 
aggregate annual revenue of manufacturing to the aggregate annual revenue of farming.  “It 
has occurred to me,” he wrote in a second letter to his tax-collectors and several wealthy 
farmers, “that if the actual product on cultivated farms of middling quality could be 
ascertained with tolerable precision, it might afford as good a rule, by which to judge as the 
nature of things admits of.” Enclosed with each letter was a “form with a number of 
columns,” which he asked be distributed to a few local farmers in each district. Like the 
manufacturing data he had requested, the columns included the “actual quantity in 
cultivation” as well as the total cash revenue from these goods. “The price,” Hamilton felt 
the need to explain, “ought to express the value of each article on the farm. Perhaps to 
                                                 
37 “Treasury Dept Circular to the Supervisors of the Revenue,” June 22nd, 1791, in The Papers of Alexander 
Hamilton, ed. Harold C. Syrett, assoc ed. Jacob E. Cooke (27 vols, New York, 1961-87) 8:497-8; This was in fact 
the second time that Hamilton had sought out economic data on American manufacturing. On January 25th, 
1790 he sent a similar request to Benjamin Lincoln, Papers of Alexander, 6:208. 
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determine this there is no better rule than to deduct the expense of transportation from the 
price at the nearest usual market.”38 
As the results began to pour in during the fall of 1791, Hamilton must have soon 
realized that he had grossly miscalculated the quantitative bent of the citizens of the United 
States. In response to Hamilton’s inquiries regarding manufacturing data, Silas Condict, an 
artisan from Morristown, New Jersey, could not supply any quantitative information.  “I can 
say that Industry and an attention to Mechanism is gaining Ground, tho’ we have no 
established Companies or Manufactories carried on here.” No numbers appear in Condict’s 
letter. He speaks of “great many people” employed in the iron business, how the number of 
sheep is “fast increasing” and how the silk manufacturers have a “sufficient quantity of 
eggs” and a “considerable stock of worms.” Peter Colt, a Hartford businessman who likely 
sensed the level of detail Hamilton was expecting, could only apologize. “I am not possessed 
of sufficient documents on which to ground any details or calculations as to the amount of 
the products of our different manufactures or their annual value,” he lamented in his letter. 
Boston’s Nathaniel Gorham did not supply Hamilton with any quantitative data, instead 
choosing to note that household manufacturing had doubled in the past generation and a 
visitor to any New England home would find “cloth almost wholly made by [the family] 
themselves.” To be sure, not every response was a disappointment. George Cabot, a 
prominent stockholder in the Beverly Cotton Manufactory, supplied Hamilton with 
                                                 
 
38 “Treasury Department Circular,” Aug 13th 1791, Papers of Alexander, 9:35-6.  
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impressive data on the annual costs and revenue of his business. The vast majority of 
responses, however, read nothing like this.39 
 Hamilton did not fare much better with the yeoman farmers of Pennsylvania. A 
Bucks County farmer replied that the best he could do was venture some rough estimates 
due to “the novelty of the subject – and never having kept any regular account of the annual 
produce of my lands – nor know any person to whom I could apply for such minute 
information”. A tax surveyor in Pittsburgh told Hamilton that “in a new Country like this 
where farming is not yet reduced to system, it is difficult to form an estimate as you wish.” 
Timothy Pickering, a good friend of Hamilton and a prolific land speculator, became most 
frustrated in his attempt to glean statistics from the other farmers in his Pennsylvania 
town. First off, Pickering complained, he could not calculate the true value of certain farms 
because “the residue of the country is without enclosures, where the cattle range at large 
and where…the people cut wood for timber and fuel for discretion without regarding their 
own lines of property.” After sending Hamilton data from only a single farm, Pickering 
concluded his letter by remarking that “it will be impossible to ascertain the requisite facts 
with precision: For I doubt wither one American farmer in a thousand has determined by 
actual admeasurement, the size of his fields and their produce.” 40  
If Pickering was right then that one farmer was Richard Peters, the President of the 
Philadelphia Society for the Promotion of Agriculture. Capitalizing even his cows by 
calculating that they annually produced £60 worth of butter, calves and cheese, Peters sent 
                                                 
39Condict’s letter enclosed in Dunham to Hamilton, Sept 9th, 1791, Papers of Alexander, 9:193; Peter Colt to 
John Chester; July 12th, 1791, Papers of Alexander, 9:319-24; Nathaniel Gorham to Hamilton, Oct 13th, 1791, 
PAH, 9:371-2; Cabot to Hamilton, Sept 6th, 1791, Papers of Alexander, 9:177-80.  
 
40Henry Wynkoop to Hamilton, Aug 29th 1791, Papers of Alexander, 9:123; John Neville to Hamilton, October 
27th, 1791; 9:419; Timothy Pickering to Hamilton, Oct 13th, 1791, Papers of Alexander, 9:375-7.  
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in a detailed analysis of his farm’s costs and revenues in which he concluded, after 
discounting the opportunity costs of his cows and other capital investments, that farming 
was “but a bad trade when Capital is calculated upon.” As with the manufacturing data, 
however, Peters’ response was exceptional, not representative.41 
 Letters from most artisans, planters and farmers in the south read much like their 
northern brethren. Silvanus Walker from Charleston, South Carolina noted only that “there 
is no manufactories carried out in the inferior parts of this state, only in private families, 
and they in general manufacture as much as they commonly wear.” Edward Carrington 
from Richmond, Virginia gave a similar response, noting that manufacturing “is carried on 
only by the white females in poor families, and, in wealthy families, under the eye of the 
mistress, by female slaves drawn out of the estates for that purpose.” A farmer in Maryland 
replied that “if the value of things, especially of the Land, can be omitted, the quantities 
would be more readily…obtained.” Apparently, while American farmers did sometimes 
estimate the quantity of their produce they did not try and price it.42  
Nor did they calculate profits. The most detailed responses Hamilton received from 
northern and southern farmers were later compiled and sent, by none other than President 
George Washington, to the renowned English political arithmetician Arthur Young, 
publisher of the statistic-filled Annals of Agriculture and a man who never met a farm he did 
not price. Like Hamilton, Young was disappointed by the fact that, unlike in England, 
American farmers were not counting like capitalists. “Your information has thrown me 
                                                 
41 Richard Peters to Hamilton, Aug 27th, 1791, Papers of Alexander ¸ 9:114-6. 
 
42 Walker letter enclosed in Daniel Stevens to Hamilton, September 3rd, 1791, Papers of Alexander, 9:170; 
Edward Carrington to Hamilton, October 4th, 1791, Papers of Alexander, 9:275; The other four letters enclosed 
by Carrington by other Virginians read much the same way. John Beale Bordley to Hamilton, 11 November, 
1791, Papers of Alexander, 9:490-2. Letters from his Excellency General Washington to Arthur Young (London: 
McMillan, 1801) 161.  
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afloat on the high seas,” the puzzled Young noted. “To analyze your husbandry, has the 
difficulty of a problem. Is it possible, that the inhabitants of a great Continent can carry on 
farming as a business, and yet never calculate profit by per centage on capital?”43  
For Hamilton, the mostly disappointing results he received were only half the 
problem. While largely unhelpful, at least these northern and southern farmers and 
artisans exhibited an amicable desire to assist the Secretary of the Treasury. According to 
the revenue surveyors, many Americans acted as if they were “enemies of the government” 
and, fearing more taxation, were far less cooperative. Foregrounding the Whiskey 
Rebellion that would leave some of these very tax collectors tarred and feathered, 
Hamilton’s attempt at collecting statistical data hinted at the weakness of his entire 
bureaucratic apparatus. Sure enough, President Thomas Jefferson and the Democratic-
Republican Party repealed the excise tax in 1801 and any hope of using treasury officials 
for future data- gathering mission was quashed.44 
Unable to collect the price data he had wished for, Hamilton's Report on 
Manufacturers was bereft of all statistical indicators. His venture into the realm of 
economic statistics had failed miserably.  So had his attempt to transform the United States 
into a manufacturing power: The manufacturing report was the only one of Hamilton’s four 
reports that Congress did not rush to implement. Judging from Hamilton’s own writings, it 
appears that he never linked his inability to construct economic statistics with his failure to 
                                                 
43 George Washington, Letters from his Excellency General Washington to Arthur Young (London: McMillan, 
1801) 161. 
 
44 Edward Carrington to Hamilton, October 8th, 1791, PAH 9:273.  For the Whiskey Rebellion and its aftermath 
see Thomas Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1986). On the tar and feathering of Hamilton’s tax collectors see William Hogeland, The 
Whiskey Rebellion: George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, and the Frontier Rebels who Challenged America’s 
Newfound Sovereignty (New York, Simon & Schuster, 2006), 20-23.  
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bring large-scale, capitalized manufacturing to the United States. While Hamilton 
acknowledged that the statistics he needed required “numerous and complicated details” 
and an “accurate knowledge of the objects to be compared,” he believed that his statistical 
experiment simply demanded “more previous inquiry and investigation than there has 
been hitherto either leisure or opportunity to accomplish.”45 
Hamilton was mistaken. As I show in the following two chapters, Hamilton had 
failed in both endeavors because the manner in which he viewed and quantified the world 
had been imported from England and did not mesh with the ideological principals upon 
which the United States had been founded. In portraying land and labor as priced inputs of 
production to be plugged into profit-maximizing equations of capital yields and aggregated 
money values, Hamilton was essentially telling the American people that the patriarchal 
farming or artisanal household, the anchor of the American republic and the source of its 
proprietary independence, should be upended solely because it was an inefficient 
investment that offered low returns on capital. While a few Americans did share Hamilton’s 
worldview, this capitalizing vision was anathema to most residents of the United States.  As 
a result, not only could Hamilton not use these statistics to bolster his case for American 
manufacturing, he could not even collect the information he desired.  
This is not to say that the majority of early American farmers and artisans were not 
commercially-inclined or statistically-minded. As we shall see in chapter two, the early 
republic abounded with statistical almanacs, gazetteers and atlases as Americans 
                                                 
45 Cooke, Reports of Hamilton, 120. For the outcome of Hamilton’s manufacturing report see Douglas A. Irwin, 
“The Aftermath of Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures,” Journal of Economic History, 64 (Sept., 2004): 800-
821; Stuart Bruchey, “Economy and Society in an Earlier America,” The Journal of American History, 47 
(1987): 299-319. John R. Nelson Jr., “Alexander Hamilton and American Manufacturing: A Reexamination,” 
The Journal of American History, 65 (1979) 971-995.  
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developed an alternative series of economic indicators through which to gauge and 
quantify the young republic’s material progress. Internalizing a uniquely American 
ideology I refer to as “patriarchal commercialism” because it was based on both patriarchal 
households and commercial-minded exchange, many of these quantitative indicators 
embraced markets yet did not tear asunder the American household by transforming land 
and labor into abstract, monetized assets of capital accumulation. In short, although early 
American statistics counted and commodified certain aspects of the material world, unlike 
Hamilton they did not attempt to capitalize everyday life into income yielding investments.  
The Origins of how Capitalists Count  
Pausing momentarily in the Federalist No. 21 to ponder the nature of economic 
indicators, Alexander Hamilton remarked that “the wealth of nations depends upon an 
infinite variety of causes” which included “situation, soil, climate, the nature of the 
productions, the nature of the government, the genius of the citizens, the degree of 
information they possess, the state of commerce, of arts, of industry.” As a result, he 
concluded, “there can be no common standard or barometer by which the degrees of 
[national wealth] can be ascertained.”46 A few years later, in his Report on Manufactures, 
Hamilton had clearly changed his mind. While the broader reasons behind this move are 
more difficult to untangle, the direct intellectual impetus of this shift can be explained 
rather easily: while preparing to write his report, Hamilton had read Adam Smith. As 
historians have shown, Hamilton’s report paraphrased, if not directly quoted, whole 
sections of Smith’s The Wealth of Nations. There is little doubt that Hamilton’s new 
definition of national wealth as “the aggregate value of the annual produce of the land and 
                                                 
46 Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist No. 21” in Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist 
Papers (Bantam, 1982) 55. 
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labor of the country” was also taken from Smith, who in numerous places in his magnum 
opus contended, either implicitly or explicitly, that the wealth of the nation was “equal to 
the exchangeable value of the whole annual produce of its industry” or “the annual produce 
of the land and labour of the country.” Although Hamilton devoted much of his report to 
discrediting Smith’s disdain for government subsidies and mercantilist policies, both men 
were in agreement regarding the ultimate goal of society: to squeeze the maximum amount 
of commodified output, measured in market prices, out of a nation’s land and labor.47  
Smith, however, did not invent this measure of national wealth – a man named 
William Petty did over a century before him.  Thanks to a body of statistical knowledge 
known as “political arithmetic” that had been formulated first by Petty in the 1660s and 
then further developed throughout the eighteenth century by the likes of Gregory King, 
Charles Davenant, Sir John Sinclair and Arthur Young, by the time Smith published his 
much revered work in 1776 his definition of national wealth had already become a 
conventional wisdom amongst most economic thinkers in England. To trace the origins of 
                                                 
47Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin Cannan (London: 
Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1904) Book IV, Ch.2; For an in-depth textual analysis which documents the quotes 
Hamilton took directly from Adam Smith see Edward G. Bourne, “Alexander Hamilton and Adam Smith,” in 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 8 (1894): 328-344. While it has become somewhat popular of late to 
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growth; entrepreneurial profit served as the engine of his entire social system; his hierarchical society of 
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rigid class order. In short, I find it far from a coincidence that the opening scene in Smith’s Wealth of Nations 
takes place not in some free-wheeling marketplace but rather a pin factory where market productivity is 
being maximized. For a narrative that portrays Smith in a very different light see Emma Rothschild, Economic 
Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); 
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Hamilton’s statistical vision, therefore, we must briefly return to the statistical work of 
William Petty in mid-seventeenth century England.48  
In those tumultuous times of social dislocation and not-so-primitive capitalist 
accumulation, it was the dramatic upheavals in the English countryside which first 
provoked Petty’s statistical revolution.  Due to the rising European market for grain and 
woolen goods, by the turn of the sixteenth century many English landholders had come to 
recognize the potential profit in transforming subsistent plots, marshy fens, and peasants’ 
commons into privately owned, staple-producing farms. Unable to control freehold 
peasants’ labor or their use of the commons, English landholders confiscated, consolidated 
and enclosed large tracts of lands. In a long and complex process that peaked in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, millions of freehold peasants lost their rights to the 
fruit of the land. In their place, a profit-oriented tenant farmer rented out and ran the 
consolidated farms, paying the now landless peasants subsistence wages.49  
 By William Petty’s day in 1660, 75 percent of English lands were organized in such 
a manner and England was awash with pamphlets on agricultural improvement that 
                                                 
 
48 For the history of English political arithmetic Eli Cook, “The Pricing of Everyday Life,” Raritan Quarterly 
Review, 32 (2013): 109-121; Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences 
of Wealth and Society (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998); Peter Buck, “People Who Counted: Political 
Arithmetic in the Eighteenth Century,” Isis, 73 (1982): 28-45; Richard Stone, Some British Empiricists in the 
Social Sciences, 1650-1900 (Cambridge, 1997); David McNally, Political Economy and the Rise of Capitalism 
(Berkeley: California University Press, 1988) 22-85;  Ted McCormick, William Petty and the Ambitions of 
Political Arithmetic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).  
 
49 My synthesis of the English transition from feudalism to capitalism has been influenced by the following 
works: Maurice Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism (London, 1946); Robert Brenner, “Agrarian 
Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-industrial Europe,” Past and Present, 70 (Feb., 1976.),  30-
75; E.J. Hobsbawm, “The General Crisis of the European Economy in the 17th century,” in Past and Present, 5 
(1954),  33-53; E.P. Thompson, “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism,” Past & Present, 38 (1967): 
59-97. Christopher Hill, The Century of Revolution, 1603-1774 (Edinburgh, 1961); Joyce Appleby, Economic 
Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth Century England (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); 
Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World 
Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York, 1976).  
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advised profit-oriented farmers how best to maximize the amount of grain or wool they 
could sell in the market.  Often, the titles of these books said it all:  
A discoverie for division or setting out of land, published by Samuel Hartlib esquire, 
for direction and more advantage and profit of the adventurers and planters in 
the fens and other waste and undisposed places in England and Ireland…with a 
philosophical query concerning the cause of fruitfulness, and an essay to shew how 
all lands may be improved in a new way to become the ground of the increase 
of trading and revenue to this common-wealth.50 
 
Increased fruitfulness, increased profit, and increased revenue to the 
commonwealth - this was the recurring message in all these works. With expressions such 
as “its publique good to quicken industry,” these books made sure to equate private profit 
and public good, arguing that the radical changes occurring in the English countryside 
would benefit everyone. They even wrote poems:  
GO tell the World of Wealth that's got with ease,  
Of certain profit (gain most men doth please)  
Of Lands Improvement to a treble worth,  
A Five, a tenfold Plenty's here held forth;  
The greedy Land-Lord may himself suffise,  
The toyling tenant to estate may rise,  
The poor may be enricht, England supplyid  
For twice so many people to provide;  
Though this a Paradox may seem to you,  
Experience and Reason proves it true;  
By floating dry, and purging Boggy Land,  
The Plough old Pasture betters to your hand;  
Directions to Inclose, to all mens gain,  
Minerals found out, Land rich'd with little pain;  
Woods ordred so, in few years yeeld such store,  
So large, so good as you'l desire no more.  
 
                                                 
50 The statistic on English lands is taken from Hobsbowm, “The General Crisis”; Samuel Hartlib, A Discoverie… 
(London, 1653).   
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With a human labor force that could now be hired and fired, these agricultural improvers 
began to imagine peasants as abstract, mobile units of capital investment that could be 
allocated in different ways. Take, for example, how the working day was described:  
He plowed his 8 acres a day, he found but 3 men to the work, he went to plow with 
two Teems, two horses and one man to one plough, and two horses and one man 
together in the morning, & one man to shift them at noon, and meat and gear them, 
and then he brought in two Teem in the afternoon, two horses in a Teem with the 
same men, and so plowed, as aforesaid, his eight acres: I saw the ground thus 
plowed, & the poor man got his three shilling and four pence for his men and 
himself, that is ten pence a day a man,  which is good wages in Norfolk. 51  
 
In order to efficiently allocate these mobile units of priced labor, the authors of these 
improvement treatises turned their focus to productivity calculations, or as one work put 
it, “a general computation of men and cattel’s labours: what each may do without hurt.”  
Calculations regarding how many acres one man could plow in a day if it was “stiff ground” 
(2.5 acres), “light ground” (4 acres “at least”), or a “rough uneven meadow” (1 acre) became 
more and more common in their books. As the authors openly advised their readers, this 
data was not only helpful in allocating resources but also as disciplining devices to insure 
that the wage-laborers were not “lazy” or “idle” – a persistent problem amongst peasants 
accustomed to working at a pace determined not by acres per hour but the daily needs of 
the family or the lord. Thousands of miles away, such productivity calculations of human 
exertion were emerging in the Caribbean sugar plantations as well, only there the units of 
capitalized inquiry were not wage-earning peasants but African slaves.52 
                                                 
51 Walter Blith, The English Improver Improved (London: 1653), 3, 120. 
 
52 Gervase Markham, A Way to Get Wealth (London: 1660) 113. For the disciplining of peasants see 
Thompson, “Time-Work Discipline.”; On the Caribbean sugar plantations see Mintz, Sweetness and Power; 
British Capitalism and Caribbean Slavery: The Legacy of Eric Williams, ed. Barbara L. Solow, Stanley Engerman 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Arthur Stinchcombe, Sugar Island Slavery in the Age of 
Enlightenment: The Political Economy of the Caribbean World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
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Adamant supporters of Sir Francis Bacons’ empirical methods, these agricultural 
improvers went on to form the “Hartlib circle,” an intellectual meeting group led by Samuel 
Hartlib devoted to the pursuit of scientific husbandry. Among their members was William 
Petty, who believed that the English state should be managed by scientific minded 
gentlemen who expressed themselves in “terms of number, weight and measure,” and who 
“use[d] only arguments of sense, and consider[ed] only such cases as have visible 
foundations in nature; leaving those that depend upon the mutable minds, opinions and 
passions of particular men, to the considerations of others.” He coined this empirical 
quantification of English society “political arithmetic.”53  
Unlike most members of the Hartlib circle, Petty saw himself first and foremost as a 
political advisor to the King. The primary goal throughout his long quantifying career was 
to increase national wealth so that the King’s tax revenues would also rise. As a result, his 
statistical focus was not on the single farm but the entire nation. Envisioning England as a 
total market society in which all the fruit of nature and labor had been sent to the 
marketplace to be sold, Petty – for the first time in history –measured the wealth of the 
nation by adding up the monetary values of all the commodities that had been produced 
and consumed. Observing the goings-on in local markets, Petty estimated that the English 
people annually spent roughly £40 million on food, housing and other consumable goods. 
He then divided this “wealth of the nation” in two – that which was produced by land and 
that which was produced by labor. Turning once again to market relations to quantify the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
53 William Petty, The Economic Writings of Sir William Petty, ed. Charles Henry Hull (2 vols, Cambridge, 1899), 
1: 244.  This article was written in 1671. On the relationship between political economy and agricultural 
capitalism see Appleby, Economic Thought, chap 1-2; McNally, Political Economy, 35-45; Polanyi, The Great 
Transformation, chap 10. On the effect the Hartlib Circle had on Petty, see T Aspromourgos, “The Invention of 
the Concept of Social Surplus: Petty in the Hartlib Circie,” in European Journal of the History of Economic 
Thought (2005): 1-24.  
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world around him, Petty argued that the land’s contribution to the wealth of England could 
be calculated by aggregating all the rent payments landholders’ received each year. 
Subtracting this from the £40 million of total wealth he had first calculated, Petty computed 
that the average English laborer produced roughly seven pence worth of value per day. 
Capitalizing this income flow over a twenty year span (this is how one capitalized things in 
the 1600s), Petty set the “value of the people” at £138.54  
While Petty shifted the statistical focus from the singular farm to the aggregate 
nation-state, his basic premise remained the same as his colleagues: quantification could 
help allocate resources, maximize production and discipline the labor force.  “Knowing the 
fertility and capacity of our land,” Petty wrote early on, “wee can see whether it hath not 
produced its utmost through the labors of the people. Wee can see whether plenty makes 
them lazy, and remedy it. In briefe we can find the best ways and motives to make as many 
hands as possible to work, and that to the best advantage.” By pricing the productive 
capacity of men, Petty could now, for instance, compute how much potential national 
wealth had been lost due to the Great Plague of 1665 (£7 million), holidays (£4.5 million 
per year), or unemployment: “Having shew’d that 340,000 of spare hands are in Ireland,” 
Petty pointed out to the King in one essay “means you are missing out on the wealth of 
£2,380,000.” Petty even priced dinnertime, arguing that if laborers only “dine in one hour 
and a half, whereas they take two,” the wealth of the nation would increase by £200,000.55 
                                                 
54 Petty, “Verbum Sapienti, and the Value of People,” in Economic Writings, 1:103-111; this piece was written 
in 1665. 
 
55 Sir William Petty, The Petty Papers: Some Unpublished Writings of Sir William Petty (London, 1927); Petty, 
“The Political Anatomy of Ireland,” Economic Writings, 147; Petty, “Verbum Sapienti,” Economic Writings, 110.  
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Petty did not invent economic quantification. Ever since domesticated animals and 
farm crops were first counted on Mesopotamian clay tablets over 5000 years ago, the 
standardized quantification of economic life had been most common throughout ancient 
and medieval times. A quick glance at economic quantification in feudal England, however, 
demonstrates just how radical Petty’s political arithmetic was.  Not long after William I 
conquered the British isle in 1066, he commissioned a massive survey to discover "what 
dues he ought to have by the year." The final product was an enormous statistical survey 
known as the “Domesday Book” for its intimidating ability to settle any political dispute. A 
typical entry from the Domesday book, regarding a manor in Witshire, looked like this:  
Vigot held it [in the time of King Edward] and it paid geld for 5 hides. There is land 
for 4 ploughs. Of this 2 hides are in demesne. There are 3 villans and 5 bordars and 1 
slave with 3 ploughs. There is meadow 6 furlongs long and 2 furlongs broad, and 
pasture 2 furlongs long and as many broad. It was worth 100 shilling [in the time of 
King Edward], now 4 pounds.56 
 
As the final line in this typical entry indicates, price data was collected in feudal 
England. But as opposed to Petty’s political arithmetic, money prices were not viewed as 
the central unit through which the world could or should be measured. It was the “hide” - 
not market prices - that was used to calculate the enormously important land-tax known as 
the “geld.” Deemed the amount of land needed to support a single household, the hide 
measured the value of land in a quintessentially feudal manner - according to the number 
of families it could sustain. The Domesday Book was no outlier. Roman common law 
similarly distinguished between Quanti venire potest, (“what the article can be sold for”) 
and verum pretium, (“the true price.”) Suspicious of the hoarding, manipulating and 
                                                 
56 Saxon Chronicle from 1075 quoted in David Rowland, A Manual of the English Constitution (London, 1859) 
31.; Domesday Book, ed. Ann Williams and G.H. Martin (London, 2002)  185. For a synthesis of social 
quantification in antiquity see David Graeber, Debt: The First 5000 Years (New York: Melville House, 2010).  
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asymmetrical bargaining power that often went along with mercantile pursuits and market 
exchanges, money values were often described in antiquity and medieval times with 
adjectives such as “arbitrary”, “accidental,” “circumstantial” or “unjust.” As a result, they 
were rarely used to measure wealth. They simply were not seen as a reliable reflection of 
value. In equating productivity with income, value with money and the wealth of a nation 
with the aggregate price value of all commodities produced, Petty pushed prices from the 
margins of society to the center.57  
Comparing Petty and the Domesday book also reveals the differences between 
commodification and capitalization: As the Domesday Book entry indicates, land could be 
imagined as a commodity in medieval times because it could, while infrequently and 
inconsistently, be bought or sold – and therefore priced. The annual productivity of land 
and labor however, could never be priced. As long as feudal peasants could rely on the land 
for their subsistence and did not need to work for wages, and as long as most of the goods 
produced were not sold in a market, medieval quantifiers could not measure the amount of 
money revenue produced by labor and land each year. Land could only be priced as a static 
good – but not as a dynamic flow. Nature may have been viewed sometimes as a set of 
alienable commodities worth 20 pounds but it could not be capitalized into an asset that 
yielded a future return of 20 pounds each year.  Only in Petty’s mode of quantification did 
land (and labor) become valued by how much cash they could secrete in the future. Only in 
Petty’s political arithmetic did the capitalization of everyday life first emerge.  
 
                                                 
57 Nathan Matthews, “The Valuation of Property in the Roman Law,” Harvard Law Review 34 (1920-21): 229-
259. On the notion of a “just price” as well as skepticism of market values see Thompson, “Moral Economy." 
Even Petty did not believe at first that money prices reflected value. On how he came to terms with using 
market prices as a unit of value see Cook, “The Pricing of Everyday Life." 
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First Attempts to Capitalize America 
If one were to create a checklist of the economic institutions, state infrastructures, 
global networks and social relations historians have regularly attributed to capitalist 
societies, by the 1790s the English empire pretty much had them all - albeit in partial or 
nascent form: There was a large landless population dependent on wage labor; a 
smattering of joint-stock companies whose equity was traded on a centralized capital 
market; a money supply and sovereign debt regulated and managed by privately owned, 
yet government-chartered, financial institutions; a legal infrastructure whose mission, first 
and foremost, was the defense of property rights; national markets in which even basic 
human needs such as grain or clothing had been commoditized and removed from state 
regulation; a global mass extraction of raw materials on British farms and New World slave 
plantations; mass-production of these materials into finished goods either domestically “by 
the piece” or in concentrated factories; and finally, a novel view of the world known as 
political economy as well as a novel approach to economic quantification known as political 
arithmetic.58 
Beginning with his role in founding the Bank of North America in 1781, and ending, 
more or less, with his failed Report on Manufacturers in 1791, if one were to create a 
checklist of the economic institutions, state infrastructures, global networks and social 
                                                 
58 For the intellectual inspirations for this checklist see Christine Desan, "Beyond Commodification: Contract 
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relations Alexander Hamilton tried to establish in the United States during his time as 
banker, investor, framer of the Constitution and Secretary of the Treasury, the list would 
look very similar. Hamilton’s statistical endeavor therefore cannot, and should not, be 
separated from his lifelong objective:  To capitalize America by transforming the United 
States into a society where local and foreign investors could safely and profitably invest 
their capital.59  
Money, Hamilton argued, when “employed merely as an instrument of exchange” 
was “dead stock.” Only when deposited in banks did it “acquire life, or in other words, an 
active and productive quality.” Similar to Adam Smith’s definition of productive and non-
productive labor, Hamilton thought that only money which was invested in a manner that 
led to even more money could be deemed “productive.” In transforming otherwise dormant 
savings into credit lent out to active, profit-seeking entrepreneurs, Hamilton thought 
financial institutions were by far the most prolific and productive money-makers, enlarging 
“the mass of industrious and commercial enterprise,” and serving as “the nurseries of 
national wealth.”60 Small wonder, then, that when Hamilton sought an indicator to measure 
such national wealth, his experience as a banker led him to adopt a mode of quantification 
in which productivity was measured solely by monetary yields. If the end result of a human 
                                                 
59 Of Hamilton's numerous biographies the ones which go into the most detail regarding his business pursuits 
and economic views are Forrest McDonald, Alexander Hamilton: A Biography (New York: WW Norton, 1979) 
and Jacob E. Cooke, Alexander Hamilton: A Biography (New York: Scribner's, 1982). On Hamilton’s desire to 
shape America in the image of England see Lawrence S. Kaplan, Alexander Hamilton: Ambivalent Anglophile 
(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2002) 79-99; Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 103, 227-8. 
While it is impossible to completely trace the origins of Hamilton’s capitalizing vision, the fact that he was 
born and raised on an island of slave plantations might explain why he came to uphold a capitalist value 
system based on productivity, hierarchy and profit maximization.  
 
60 “Second Report on the Further Provision Necessary for Establishing Public Credit,” in Reports of Alexander 
Hamilton, 48, 50. 
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activity was not the creation of monetary revenue, it need not be deemed productive. If you 
could not count it in dollars and cents, it did not count.61  
This financial vision for quantifying the world dovetailed nicely with Hamilton’s 
attempts to bring factories to the new world. Only a few weeks after Hamilton sent out his 
statistical inquiries to the revenue inspectors, he asked for numerous other economic 
statistics from a man named Thomas Lowery. Unlike his two previous letters, however, in 
this instance Hamilton was acting not as the Secretary of the Treasury but as a private 
investor. Along with a few other American and European businessmen, Hamilton and 
assistant treasurer Tench Coxe were subscribers in the Society for Establishing Useful 
Manufactories (S.U.M.). Their goal was to attract capital and skilled engineers from Europe, 
charter a corporation, and establish an entire city of textile manufactories somewhere on 
the eastern seaboard. While the society would end up creating the city of Paterson, New 
Jersey along the banks of the Passaic River, in the fall of 1791 Hamilton and his fellow 
investors were still searching for the most advantageous site for their project. Upon 
Hamilton’s request, Lowery, the director of the society, supplied him with “the prices of the 
sundry articles of provisions, fuel [and] labor” in western New Jersey, noting that “the labor 
of an able bodied man may be obtained for 15 to 18 pounds per annum.”62   
Hamilton was in need of such data since his previous official inquiries had only 
requested information on the annual monetary yields from manufacturing and farming – 
                                                 
61 For a similar reading of Hamilton's approach to money and banking see Christine Desan, "From Blood to 
Profit: The Transformation of Value in the American Constitutional Tradition," Journal of Policy History,  26 
(2008): 26-46. On Hamilton the banker see Bray Hammonds, Banks and Politics in America from the 
Revolution to the Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957) 114-141. 
 
62 Lowery to Hamilton, Oct. 14th, 1791 in  Papers of Alexander Hamilton, ; For S.U.M. see Joseph S. Davis, Essays 
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but not the initial costs. He had asked for the outputs of the factory and farm, but not the 
inputs.  While Petty, Smith and other classical economists often equated productivity with 
compensation, Hamilton - like any businessman - did not. He understood that in order to 
imagine future returns on capital one needed to see within each worker or piece of land 
both their productive potential and their minimum costs - as it was between these two 
figures where profits lay. A hallmark of how manufacturers viewed the world, textile 
magnet George Cabot exhibited this very ‘double vision’ in his response to Hamilton’s 
inquiries, noting that “while our artists have been learning their trades at our expense, 
their work is now worth more than it costs.”63  
As revealed in the personal papers of Tench Coxe - Hamilton’s business partner, 
assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, and kindred ideological spirit – Hamilton was not 
the only one whose interest in manufacturing led him towards Petty’s brand of capitalized 
political arithmetic. An inside look at Coxe’s shifting approach to social quantification 
allows us to see some of the crucial differences between a commercialist, mercantile 
worldview and a capitalist one. As a merchant in the 1780s focusing on importing 
Caribbean crops, the only economic indicators that the young Coxe seemed to care about 
were commodity prices. “Our present markets are high in the extreme,” he noted in a 
typical correspondence, “rum is 58, sugar 40.” Requesting that a British merchant send him 
a “monthly price current,” from which he hoped “to get profitable information,” Coxe 
focused on commodity prices because he knew that his profits were largely dependent on 
                                                 
63 Cabot to Hamilton, Sept 6th, 1791, PAH;  The notion of a capitalist double vision has been inspired by Walter 
Johnson, Soul by Soul: Life Inside the Antebellum Slave Market (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); 
Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange: A Study of Imperialism of Trade (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
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Wallerstein and others usually use this term to analyze transactions between nations I find it a fruitful 
framework to examine capitalist exchange among individuals as well. This distinguishes a capitalist vision 
from a market one, in which the underlying assumption is that the goal of trade is equivalence not profit.  
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the arbitrage between commodity markets. Interested solely in commercial exchange 
between different geographical regions, Coxe the merchant sought only the prices of 
commodities such as sugar or coffee.64  
Once Coxe invested in S.U.M and began to move his capital into manufacturing, 
where one purchased not finished goods but labor power and raw materials, his 
quantitative focus shifted dramatically. In hopes of calculating the profits which would 
derive from replacing domestic industry with factory industrialization, Coxe began to seek 
out data that could price both the costs and productivity of the American household’s day-
to-day activities.  As these numerous data-collecting missions illustrate, and as his work 
compiling the 1810 census of manufacturing further demonstrates, Coxe was most 
interested in uncovering the daily costs of maintaining American laborers as well as the 
estimated revenue of their home manufacturing. Coxe’s profit-oriented ‘double vision’ had 
moved from coffee to humans. Here we see one of the crucial differences between a 
commercial worldview and a capitalist one: As a commercial merchant he had skimmed the 
top of American society, glancing at its fringes but never delving into its core. As a capitalist 
manufacturer, his statistical gaze led him to examine the very fabric of American life - the 
potential market productivity of the patriarchal household.65  
                                                 
64 Coxe to Tennant and Ress Co.(?), November 4th 1778, Coxe to Robert Barclays, February 25th, 1784. Coxe 
Family Papers, reel 1, microfilm collection. Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA. Running two 
different merchant houses in the 1770s and 1780s, Coxe shifted his attention to land speculation and 
manufacturing in the early 1790s.  
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Coxe not only began pricing the American family, but the natural resources which 
sustained it. After he heard that coal had been discovered in Northeastern Pennsylvania, 
Coxe purchased 80,000 acres in Luzerne County in hopes that this tract could provide the 
fuel for the American factories of tomorrow. He also took a great interest in the type and 
value of timber that existed on whatever land he had just bought. The speculative 
calculations which came to fill the margins of his papers reveal how he began to capitalize 
his land by estimating how much cash, in the form of coal or timber, he could annually 
extract in future years. Instead of pricing land according to how much it would fetch today 
if a yeoman farmer were to purchase it (this is how most land speculators of the era treated 
their investments in American land) Coxe was pricing land according to how much future 
income he could systematically reap from its raw materials. This was not just an act of 
commodification, but capitalization. As he began to expand his landed portfolio, Coxe 
quantified the North Carolina land he had purchased in much the same way. Only this time, 
instead of coal or timber he turned his focus to a fiber that was just beginning to catch on in 
the South – cotton.66 
Coxe, however, not only began capitalizing nature’s raw materials but space. 
Platting imaginary manufacturing towns on the banks of the Susquehanna River (upon 
                                                 
66 For Coxe’s voluminous correspondence regarding land investments see Coxe Family Paper, reel 1, passim. 
For letters in which Coxe is fishing for information to price his lands according to future potential income 
from raw materials, see for example Coxe to Ben Smith, Sept 9th 1785, reel 1, Coxe Family Paper; Coxe to 
Ephraim Kirby and Sam Law, Jan 16th 1796 reel 63. For Coxe’s land investments see also Cooke, Tench Coxe, 
311-333; Cooke notes that there exist in Coxe’s archive “thousands of doodles clearly related to acres 
acquired and dreamed of, to projected profits, to money owed.” (Coxe bought most of the land on credit.) For 
an example of such a doodle see scrap of paper filled with aggregated land prices titled “Rutherfod Lands” and 
dated 1796 in Coxe Family Paper, reel 63. Coxe’s biographers do not focus on his interest in coal. See History 
of Luzerne County, H.C. Bradsby ed. (Chicago, 1893) 300; Coxe, View of United States, 70, 180-1. For cotton, see 
Angela Lakwete, Inventing the Cotton Gin (Baltimore, 2003) 36,73-4, Coxe, View of the United States, 20, Coxe 
to Waightstill Avery, January, 1802 and Coxe to Robert Livingston, June, 1802, reel 74, Coxe Family Paper. I 
believe the temporal emphasis on the future is one of the key distinguishing markers between a mere ‘market 
mentality’ and a capitalizing worldview.  
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which his precious coal deposits sat) became one of his favorite past times. As his papers 
reveal, Coxe would often attempt to estimate how much he would earn from renting out 
these lands as future urban lots. Unlike most land speculators of the era, who saw the 
world through a commercial lens, Coxe’s intent was not necessarily to resell this land to 
settlers (although he did that too) but rather to perhaps retain ownership and earn 
consistent future cash revenues from renting space. As with his coal and cotton fields, this 
wasn’t just about making a one-time speculative killing - it was about systematically 
squeezing sustained future profits from the environment and an emerging manufacturing 
society.67 
As mercantile newspapers of the era confirm, unlike Coxe and Hamilton most 
American merchants continued to show little interest in quantifying the daily actions of 
American households or the produce of their lands. Their statistical vision remained 
strictly commercial. Roughly until the opening of the Erie Canal in 1825, the pages of the 
New York Commercial Advertiser contained commodity price lists and money exchange 
rates – but little other data. With their attention turned to the goods in far flung port cities 
such as Canton, Marseille, and Havana, even the results of the decennial census were 
mostly ignored by the mercantile press. On the other hand, the Senate Committee on 
Commerce and Manufacturers, the Philadelphia Society for the Promotion of American 
Manufacturers and publications such as Matthew Carey’s The American Museum and 
Hezekiah Niles’ Weekly Register yearned to put price tags on Americans’ “internal 
industry,” and “domestic commerce.” Serving as the driving forces behind the short-lived 
                                                 
67 For Coxe's interest in collecting information on rent see Coxe to Robert Trail, April 3rd 1786, Oct 1, 1789, 
"Schedule of Penn Land"; Coxe to William Smith, April 12 1792, Coxe to Nathaniel Gorham, Nov 7th 1795, reel 
1, Coxe Family Papers. For platting of city lots see plat dated Aug 12, 1815.  
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manufacturing censuses of 1810 and 1820, these pro-manufacturing forces hoped to 
succeed where Hamilton had failed by pricing both the costs and productivity of 
Americans’ daily routines.68 
But back to Hamilton for one final, yet crucial, point regarding his data-collection: 
Monetized statistics of the American household’s costs and productivity were relevant not 
only to the objectives of Hamilton the banker and Hamilton the manufacturer but Hamilton 
the Secretary of the Treasury as well. In convincing Congress to convert the American war 
debt into a permanent sovereign debt that would be financed by issuing government bonds 
which usually yielded six percent interest, Hamilton had in essence transformed the entire 
nation into an aggregated capital investment. Having spent much of 1790 and the first half 
of 1791 poring over tomes of taxation data in order to work out his intricate financing 
schemes, Hamilton became accustomed to envisioning the productivity of American land 
and its people as the “revenue of society.” Not unlike Petty, the imperatives of a centralized 
nation-state and the need to estimate the stream of tax revenues that would flow into the 
state’s coffers played an important role in his desire to price the productive resources of 
the nation.69  
But whereas Petty priced land and labor in order to maximize tax revenues, 
Hamilton’s decision to fund the permanent debt through capitalists (instead of taxation and 
                                                 
68 For the mercantile press of the era see David P. Forsyth, The Business Press in America, chapters 1-2 
(Philadelphia: Chilton Books, 1965). Examine any issue of the New York Commercial Advertising before 1825 
to gain a sense of the statistics merchants looked at. For more on this, see chapter 3 on Hunt’s Merchants 
Magazine. On Carey and Niles, who shared Hamilton, Coxe and Blodget’s capitalizing vision, see Kenneth W. 
Rowe, Matthew Carey: A Study in American Economic Development (PhD diss., Johns Hopkins University, 
1933), Richard Stone, Hezekiah Niles as an Economist (Baltimore, 1933); Norval Luxon, Niles’ Weekly Register: 
News Magazine of the Nineteenth Century (Baton Rouge, LA, 1947).  
 
69 For a sample of Hamilton’s many calculations on the national debt, see the rough drafts of his first and 
second reports on public credit that are in his personal papers. As Elkins and McKitrick have noted in regards 
to the permanent debt, “the taxing power of the United States was being capitalized.” Elkins and McKitrick , 
Age of Federalism, 116.  
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paper money) forced him to put an emphasis not only on efficient resource allocation but 
profitable returns on capital. He had to ensure that the American economy would be 
capable of not only returning the principal of the debt but also the additional interest 
payments. Hamilton didn't need to just balance the budget; he needed to turn money into 
more money. Similar to the vision required of bankers and manufactures, as the manager of 
a permanent sovereign debt Hamilton had to tend to the “enhancement of the value of the 
debt; by giving it a new and additional employment and utility.” To be mildly anachronistic 
for a moment, he needed “economic growth.” Not surprisingly, Hamilton thought the best 
way to do this was by putting the borrowed debt in a bank – a privately owned, yet 
government-sponsored, national bank. This national bank would funnel bondholders’ 
capital into entrepreneurial projects such as Hamilton’s pet project in Paterson, thus 
increasing the annual cash revenue produced by American society and ensuring that the 
bondholders would receive their six-percent annual interest. Behind this “financial 
revolution” of capital flows, bond markets and national bank branches, therefore, lay the 
same basic imperative as with private finance and manufacturing: If Hamilton were to 
succeed in transforming America into a good investment, the manner in which man and 
nature in the United States was utilized, organized and quantified would need to undergo 
revolutionary social change. This was the profit-maximizing pivot upon which all of 
Hamilton’s grand plans – and statistical vision – turned.70  
                                                 
70 “Prospectus of the Society for Useful Manufacturers,” in Papers of Alexander Hamilton; Desan, "From Blood 
to Profit,"; Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 118. For a celebratory yet still accurate depiction of 
Hamilton’s work in the treasury department and the “financial revolution” he brought about see Richard 
Sylla, “Hamilton and the Federalist Financial Revolution, 1789-1794,” The New York Journal of American 
History, Vol. 55 (Spring, 2004); Robert E. Wright, Hamilton Unbound: Finance and the Creation of the America 
Republic (Westport CT: Greenwood, 2002); Robert W. Wright, Financial Founding Fathers: The Men who Made 
America Rich (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2006) 11-26. Unfortunately, this celebratory literature tends 
to separate Hamilton’s financial and manufacturing visions. 
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Besides Hamilton and Coxe, no one demonstrates the intricate relations between 
English political arithmetic and American capital investment in this era better than Samuel 
Blodget Jr. The son of a successful New Hampshire merchant and entrepreneur, Blodget 
was a man of capital through and through. In 1791 he founded the Boston Tontine 
Association, a life insurance scheme in which wealthy individuals pooled their capital and 
received annuities until they died (survivors kept dividing the dead’s annuities between 
them until only one lucky investor remained). When sales soured, Blodget and the other 
investors used this capital to organize the first joint-stock company in the United States – 
the Insurance Company of North America. Selling 40,000 shares in only 11 days, Blodget 
used this windfall to purchase 494 acres of land on a site along the Potomac planned for the 
nation’s future capital – months before the official sale of lots actually began. Throughout 
the 1790s, Blodget became a fixture in the District of Columbia as he speculated in lots, 
raised funds through the organization of a lottery and founded the Bank of Columbia.  In 
short, where capital was being raised and investments were being made - you could find 
Samuel Blodget Jr.71   
An enthusiastic supporter of Hamilton’s economic policies at a time when recently 
elected President Thomas Jefferson was planning to get rid of the permanent national debt 
and the national bank, in 1801 Blodget published a statistic-filled article titled “thoughts on 
increasing wealth and national economy of the United States.” In the article, Blodget 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
71 Blodget left behind few papers. A few illuminating letters can be found in the papers of Thomas Jefferson, 
George Washington and Blodget’s father, Samuel at the Mass Historical Society. On Blodget’s business affairs 
see Marquis James, Biography of a Business, 1792-1942: Insurance Company of North America (Indianapolis, 
1942); Thomas Harrison Montgomery, A History of the Insurance Company of North America of Philadelphia 
(Philadelphia, 1885),  1-9; W.B. Bryan, A History of the National Capital from its Foundation Through the Period 
of the Adoption of the Organic Act (New York, 1914), 187-226. Blodget was also a mediocre architect. He 
designed the forgettable First Bank of the United States in Philadelphia. 
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contended that the American government should in fact take on far more sovereign debt 
since an increase in the nation’s capital stock was “the only requisite to American 
prosperity and greatness.” As with Hamilton, this desire to increase the amount of capital 
invested in the United States caused Blodget to imagine the American people as money-
producing units. He computed that to cover the sovereign debt in 1791 each American had 
contributed 19 dollars a year to bondholders – which amounted to 19 bushels of wheat or 
38 days of labor. Repeating this computation for the year 1800, Blodget calculated that due 
to an increase in both grain prices and population, the number of days Americans now 
needed to work in order to pay off the sovereign debt had, in the past decade, dropped to 
only 12 days a year. Since capital accumulation was not keeping pace with population or 
prices, Blodget warned, Jefferson should be issuing more bonds – not less. Otherwise, the 
U.S. would not be maximizing its productive abilities, thus wasting an opportunity to 
become “the most powerful nation of the universe.”72 
In 1806, Blodget expanded this argument in his book Economica which he published 
- and possibly wrote - while in debtor’s prison. (Apparently, Blodget had miscalculated the 
amount of investors interested in his lottery and was unable to compensate the winner 
with the promised $50,000 prize.) Using, among other charts and tables, a statistical 
diagram he referred to as the “financial money-meter,” Blodget reiterated his argument 
that American prosperity was dependent on the amount of capital per capita. At the bottom 
of the meter, one dollar of capital per person meant “extreme distress, universal distrust, 
government in danger.” If one moved up the meter dollar by dollar, as capital flowed into 
the country, things got rosier and the nation slowly improved from a situation in which 
                                                 
72 Samuel Blodget, Thoughts on Increasing Wealth and National Economy of the United States of America (City 
of Washington D.C., 1801).  
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“idleness abounds” to one where “commerce flourishes, everything improves.” At the 
highest level of prosperity on the meter, the U.S. finally reached the “average of commercial 
Europe in 1805” - $25 of capital per capita.73  
 
Figure 1: Samuel Blodget's Financial Money Meter. This appears to be the first graphical 
representation of economic activity in American history. Blodget, Economica, 186. 
 
                                                 
73 Samuel Blodget, Economica: A Statistical Manual for the United States of America (Washington D.C., 1806), 
80. 
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To keep track of such economic development, Blodget also implemented many of 
William Petty’s pricing techniques. In one chart, he measured the wealth of the nation by 
pricing -  among other things - American exports, homes, churches, dock yards, timber, 
slaves, shops, tools, mills, furniture, carriages and animal stock as well as the capital 
invested in turnpikes, canal, bridges and banks.  In another, which cited Petty by name, he 
priced the American people by capitalizing their productivity. Accepting the racially-tinged 
tropes of the era, slaves were valued at only $200 while farmers and free planters were 
valued at $400, artisans and professionals at $500. Just like Petty, Blodget had discovered 
the magic of money: it could make any two things, be it timber and churches or slaves and 
artisans, commensurable and thus capable of aggregation. Aggregating the capitalized 
powers of the American people, he concluded that the wealth of the United States was $2.8 
billion. Over 150 years later, economic historians would credit Blodget for being the 
American forefather of G.D.P.74  
                                                 
74 On Blodget as father of GDP see Paul Rohde and Richard Sutch, “Estimates of National Product before 
1929,” Historical Statistics of the United States: Millennial Edition Online.  
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Figure 2: Samuel Blodget's pricing of the American people. In order to calculate national wealth, 
Blodget gave all Americans, not just slaves, a price. Blodget, Economica, 89. 
Playing the Numbers Game – and Losing 
Be it banks, manufacturing enterprises, the sovereign debt, insurance companies, 
turnpikes, urban land speculation or lotteries, all capitalized projects in America were 
dependent on two fundamental prerequisites: First, due to the dearth of American capital 
one needed to persuade foreign investors that the United States was a site of safe and 
profitable investments. Second, since these projects were dependent on government 
policies that would, for instance, subsidize domestic manufacturing or provide monopoly 
privileges for a private national bank, one needed to convince American legislators and the 
broader public that these endeavors would lead not only to private profit but public good.  
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Failing in one of these two missions, as Blodget himself knew all too well, led to failed 
investments and even debtor’s prison.75   
In seventeenth century England, agricultural improvers used poems to convey their 
arguments. Recognizing the bourgeoning rhetorical power of numbers in the late 
eighteenth century, aspiring entrepreneurs like Hamilton, Coxe and Blodget hoped 
statistics could help them overcome both America’s dearth of capital as well as its 
republican legislatures. All three businessmen sought out cost and productivity data that 
would convince rather conservative European financiers that the United States was not a 
decentralized agrarian republic of self-sufficient farmers incapable of even paying off its 
war debts, but rather a commodity-producing wonderland teeming with the cheap labor 
power, abundant natural resources and investment-friendly institutions needed to yield 
tremendous returns on capital. Most of Coxe’s statistical work, for example, appeared in a 
set of newspaper articles seeking to disprove an English Lord’s claim that the British 
needn’t be concerned with the future of American manufacturing.  Basing one article on the 
meager statistical returns he managed to procure from a single village in Virginia, Coxe 
calculated that the average American family annually produced $83.5 worth of “home-
made hosiery and cloths of wool, flax, hemp and cotton.” Hoping to reveal the potential in 
transforming domestic tasks into private enterprises, Coxe multiplied this revenue by the 
number of households in the nation and declared that the domestic cloth business was 
potentially worth $20 million a year.76   
                                                 
75 For the dearth of capital in early America see Douglass North, The Economic Growth of the United States 
1790-1860 (New York: Prentice Hall, 1966). 
 
76 Tench Coxe, A Brief Examination of Lord Sheffield’s Observations on the Commerce of the United States 
(London, 1792); Coxe, A Statement of the Arts and Manufacturers…1810 (Philadelphia, 1814). For the 
rhetorical power of numbers during this period see Bruce G. Carruthers and Wendy Nelson Epseland, 
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Instructed by Congress to ignore domestic production and focus only on 
“manufacturing establishments,” the 1820 census made it far easier for investors to 
envision the potential profits which lurked below America’s republican surface. Tabulating 
the “market value of articles annually manufactured,” the “cost of raw materials annually 
consumed,” the “amount of capital invested” and the “amount paid actually for wages,” all a 
foreign investor would have to do is a few calculations in order to estimate each 
manufacturing establishment’s annual profits and return on capital. Here then was a 
capitalized worldview in a single statistical table: People and nature as priced inputs of 
production, market values as the measure of productivity and wealth, and the difference 
between the two as the profits from which the overall capital return could be deduced.77  
Dependent not only on foreign capital but domestic government policies for the 
establishment of their private projects, Hamilton, Coxe , Blodget and other entrepreneurs 
understood that while this capitalized arithmetic was what the European investor was 
craving – it would not suffice for the American public. Whether it was Blodget’s financial 
“money-meter” of human progress or Hamilton’s argument that manufactories would 
“yield the greatest product” to the American people, they made sure to consistently frame 
their statistics not only in a calculus of personal profit but in a republican language of 
public good and overall well-being. Often times, the need to convince legislatures to enact 
investment-friendly policies served as the driving force behind data collection. The first 
census of manufacturers in 1810 was established because, following yet another failed 
                                                                                                                                                             
“Accounting for Rationality, Double-Entry Bookkeeping and the Rhetoric of Economic Rationality", American 
Journal of Sociology, 97 (1991) 31-69; Cohen, A Calculating People; Poovey, The History of the Modern Fact.  
 
77 See abstract of manufacturing tables in Census of the United States, Digest of Accounts of Manufacturing 
Establishments (New York, 1990, 1822c); For the instructions to ignore domestic manufacturing in 1820 see 
Carroll D. Wright, The History and Growth of the United States Census (Washington DC., 1900) 133.  
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attempt to price the productivity of American manufacturing, Secretary of the Treasury 
(and manufacturing entrepreneur) Albert Gallatin concluded that “the information which 
has been obtained is not sufficient to submit…the best plan to protect and promote 
American manufacturers.” In 1817, the Philadelphia Society for the Promotion of American 
Manufactures sent out a detailed statistical survey to manufacturers “for the purpose of … 
strengthening our applications to the legislatures by the most powerful means - a well 
digested statement of facts.” Fishing for flattering statistical tidbits they could present to 
the state legislature, surveyors asked for the “national gain” each manufacturer added to 
the republic.78 
Aspiring American capitalists were right to try and use capitalized arithmetic as a 
medium for attracting foreign investments. Sharing their profit-maximizing vision, 
European investors were hungry for statistics that would help them make tough global 
investment decisions. When a Dutch investor who had purchased large tracts of land in 
America met diplomat John Adams in Europe, he requested specific data on the population 
growth and settlement patterns in the United States.79 Jefferson’s Notes on the State of 
Virginia was written following a request for statistical information on the United States by 
French consul to the United States Francois Barbe-Marbois.80 Economic statistics on 
American banks, bonds or land prices, as well as data compiled by Coxe, Blodget and the 
                                                 
78 United States Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, “Report of the Committee of Ways and 
Means on the memorial of the manufacturers of the city of New York,” 1814; Philadelphia Society for the 
Promotion of American Manufacturers. Broadside. (Circular), The Committee Appointed on the Part...to Report 
a Plan in Aid of the Internal Industry. (Philadelphia?, 1817).  
 
79 On Europeans’ interest in American statistical data see James H. Cassedy, Demography in Early America: 
Beginnings of the Statistical Mind, 1600-1800 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969) 195 
 
80 Thomas Jefferson to Count de Montmorin, June 23d 1787, Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. A.E. Bergh 
(Washington D.C,. 1903) vi,  186. 
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manufacturing censuses, were featured regularly in business-minded newspapers such as 
London’s The Morning Chronicle and The Liverpool Mercury. Perhaps most telling of this 
thirst for American data, however, was the fact that while the statistical responses  
Hamilton collected in 1791 never made it into his Report on Manufacturers, the most 
detailed answers did end up being compiled  into a best-selling London book published in a 
joint effort by President George Washington and famous English political arithmetician 
Arthur Young.81  
Despite the demand for such statistics overseas, however, attempts to implement 
Petty’s capitalized arithmetic in the United States ended in almost complete failure. We 
have already seen how Hamilton failed to collect the data he needed. Coxe, Blodget, 
Gallatin, promotional societies, newspapers and the manufacturing censuses did not fare 
much better. When presenting the data he had collected for the 1810 manufacturing 
census, the head marshal of South Carolina (much like the marshals of Rhode Island, 
Kentucky, Georgia and Pennsylvania) felt the need to add that the returns were “not more 
than on half of the real value and that, in general, the manufacturers are much more 
considerable.” Turn to Louisiana’s page in the 1820 census a decade later and an 
indecipherable chart appears. Beneath it, the disgruntled compiler had added a disclaimer: 
“The above returns are in such a confused state that it is impossible to reduce them to the 
form required by Congress.”82  
                                                 
81 George Washington, Letters from his Excellency General Washington to Arthur Young (London: McMillan, 
1801). 
 
82 Tench Coxe, A Statement of the Arts and Manufacturers of the United States (Philadelphia, 1814)  36; Census 
of the United States, Manufacturing Establishments, 25. 
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In a rare moment of honest despair even Tench Coxe suggested that “foreigners, 
who sincerely desire information, take up the Philadelphia directory and learn by this 
simple but authentic document, the ingredients of which our towns are composed.” 
Admitting that he “found himself restrained in the statement of facts concerning the United 
States by the want of that accurate and various information,” in the end the best Coxe could 
offer the foreign investor was the 1790s version of the yellow pages. Hoping to use the 
wonders of money to aggregate, abstract and make commensurable the labor of the 
American people and the resources of American nature, time and again Coxe had to settle 
for descriptions such as this:   
That produce, manufacturers and exports of Pennsylvania are very many and 
various, viz. wheat, flour, middling, ship=stuff, bran, shorts, ship-bread, white water 
biscuit, rye, rye flour, Indian corn or maize, Indian meal, buckwheat, buckwheat, 
meal, bar and pig iron, steel, nail rods, nails, iron hoops, rolled iron tire, gun powder, 
cannon balls, iron cannon, musquets, ships, boats, oars, handspikes, masts, mingles, 
wooden hoops, tanners' bark, corn fans, coopers' ware, bricks, coarse earthen or 
potter' ware, shoes, boots, foal-leather, upper leather, dressed deer and sheep skins, 
and gloves and garments thereof, fine hats, many common, and a few coarse.   
A similarly rambling list of corporeal, tangible, incommensurable things appeared in the 
appendix to Hamilton’s Report on Manufacturers - precisely where his statistical 
calculations ought to have been. This was no way to get investors excited about American 
manufacturing nor did it do much to convince Americans that the country would be better 
off shifting its productive energies from the home or workshop to the capitalized factory.83 
Without proper funding or subsidies, the manufacturing town in Paterson 
floundered. By the time of his tragic death in 1804, Hamilton had trouble getting investors 
to pay their installments and the few existing mills closed down. Coxe did not fare much 
                                                 
83 Tench Coxe, A View of the United States of America (Philadelphia, 1794), 62, 104,201.  
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better elsewhere. Despite purchasing giant tracts of land in Southeastern Pennsylvania that 
sat upon the largest deposit of anthracite coal in the country, he never succeeded in 
importing from England the manufactories that would make such an investment profitable. 
Dying depressed, almost penniless, and in heavy debt, only Coxe’s grandchildren would 
reap the tremendous rewards of his industrializing vision. As for Blodget, he was never 
really the same after his stint in debtor’s prison. As one biographer noted, “his optimism 
frequently outran his prudence, for which he ultimately paid a heavy price.”84  
As for these men’s statistical work, their inability to collect information led to sharp 
criticism. In an article in the North American Review in 1816, Blodget was criticized for 
being too “speculative” and “deficient in the details.” In 1819, Coxe was censured in the 
pages of the same magazine in much the same way. It likely would have been little 
consolation for both men to know that their statistical failures should not have been 
attributed to their own calculating abilities but rather to the fact that the American public 
simply could not supply them with the data they requested. But why exactly did Hamilton, 
Coxe and other capitalizing entrepreneurs fail to collect the statistics they desired? To 
answer this question we must turn to the way most American artisans and farmers 
quantified their material world in the early republic.85  
 
 
 
                                                 
84 Kenneth Hafertepe “Samuel Blodget,” in American National Biography Online. On the failure of the SUM see 
Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 271, 274,279-80.  
 
85 “Pitkin’s Statistical View,” in North American Review, v. 3 (Sept. 1816) 348-9; “Seybert’s Statistical Annals” 
in North American Review, 9 (Sept., 1819): 221.  
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Chapter Two 
Seeing Like a Yeoman: Patriarchal Commercialism in the Early Republic 86 
It is an undeniable fact that, by the 1790s, the United States was one of the most 
commodified societies in world history. As the ubiquitous existence of commercial farming, 
human slavery and land surveys in colonial and early America suggests, the concept that 
tracts of land, agricultural produce or even human beings were potentially alienable 
bundles of property rights that could be bought or sold was neither foreign nor abhorrent 
to the property-owning American farmer or planter. What is more, white American 
farmers' daily lives were filled with a whirlwind of priced exchanges. In a typical 
transaction of the era, New Hampshire farmer Matthew Patten was paid two shilling to 
write a neighbor’s will.87 Even in barter trades of “book credit,” where no actual money was 
exchanged, men (but not necessarily women) would almost always jot down the money 
value of each good.88  Embracing not only local trade but international export markets, 
most yeoman landholders would have likely agreed with Massachusetts farmer and 
almanac author Nathaniel Ames that “we must raise something to sell for exportation, if we 
                                                 
86 In this chapter I use the term “yeoman” as shorthand for the land-owning, patriarchal yet still 
commercially-oriented agrarian household which served as the basic social, cultural and economic unit of 
American life in colonial times as well as during the early republic. Due to the patriarchal-commercial (rather 
than capitalist) nature of pre-cotton plantation slavery in America, I would include most southern planters in 
this category as well. (As Thomas Jefferson effectively demonstrates, even planters with a large amount of 
slaves often held a "yeoman" worldview.) This chapter will focus mostly on agrarian farmers and planters and 
not urban artisans because 90 percent of the population in 1800 lived in rural areas. Nevertheless, many 
historians, including Elizabeth Blackmar, have shown how the artisan household shared many of the 
“yeoman” traits of the agrarian home. See Elizabeth Blackmar, Manhattan For Rent: 1785-1850 (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1991). 
 
87 Matthew Patten, The Diary of Matthew Patten (Concord, N.H.: Rumford Printing company, 1903),  354. 
 
88 For notion of “book credit” and how Americans priced their dealings even though money did not often 
exchange hands, see Christopher Clark, The Roots of Rural Capitalism: Western Massachusetts, 1780-1860 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990)  32-35. On the gender differences regarding the use of money prices 
see Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, “Martha Balland and her Girls,” in Work and Labor in Early America, ed. Stephen 
Innes (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 75-86 
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would increase in wealth.”89 Support for such market-making “improvements” as turnpikes 
and roads was widespread, especially amongst yeomen farmers in staple-growing regions 
such as Pennsylvania, New York and Maryland.90 
The two great commoditizers of the early republic were the land survey and the 
slave auction. The brainchild not of capitalist Hamilton and the Constitution but republican 
Jefferson and the Northwest Ordinance, land surveys and the cadastral maps they created 
were a cutting edge form of land commodifying technology. Without their slicing and 
dicing, there would have been no pricing of the American countryside and its townships. 
Thanks to these surveys, by the early nineteenth century, land prices would become a 
hallmark of the American farmer’s statistical imagination. While prices were initially set 
through government auctions to speculators and settlers (mostly speculators), local 
property tax assessors insured that as the price of American space fluctuated – and 
fluctuated it did – updated land values which charted these trends would be available in 
such popular works as Vermont’s Alphabetical Atlas.91  Whether you were a farmer seeking 
to purchase more land for your children, a planter hoping to enlarge your growing 
plantation or a Dutch investor in the Holland Land Company looking to turn a handsome 
profit, everyone linked to the United States had some stake in land prices. There was, 
however, no consensus on the direction these land prices should take. Reflecting perhaps 
                                                 
89 Nathaniel Ames, An Astronomical Diary (Boston, 1766). 
 
90 On colonial and early Americans’ embrace of commerce and export markets see McCoy, The Elusive 
Republic; Richard Lyman Bushman, “Markets and Composite Farms in Early America,” The William and Mary 
Quarterly, 55 (1998) 351-7; Rothenberg, From Marketplaces to Market Economy; For the south see Gavin 
Wright, The Political Economy of the Cotton South: Households, Markets and Wealth in the Nineteenth Century 
(New York: Norton, 1978); Alan Kulikoff, The Agrarian Origins of American Capitalism (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 1992). 
 
91 James Dean, An Alphabetic Atlas or Gazetteer of Vermont (Montpelier, 1808). 
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the most burning class conflict of the era, while American settlers seeking to purchase land 
for themselves or their children preferred land prices to stay low, speculators seeking to 
get a healthy return on capital naturally hoped they would rise.92  
The fact that human beings were being imported to the United States and then sold 
off to the highest bidder meant they too were being commodified. The slave auction, 
however, remained largely on the fringes of the American statistical imagination, appearing 
in local advertisements or planters’ account books but rarely in gazetteers or national 
government reports. Just as with the Constitution, however, while slavery statistics were 
rarely articulated openly, they always lurked in the shadows. What is more, there existed 
enough exceptions to this rule to see how ingrained the concept of human commodification 
was in the minds of not only southerners but northerners as well.  Seeking to price 
American population growth in the 1790s, for instance, a New York newspaper noted that 
by “calculating the value of each person, in a pecuniary view, only at the price of a negro,” 
one discovered that the nation’s wealth was “equal to nearly one hundred million 
sterling.”93  
Not only coerced labor was, however, being priced. In the local exchanges that 
animated the early American countryside, the exchange of labor for money (in the form of 
book credit) was a daily occurrence as well. In 1806, the town of Oxford, Massachusetts 
                                                 
92 For the manner in which the United States sold off its land see Malcolm Rohrbough, The Land Office 
Business: The Settlement and Administration of American Public Lands, 1789-1837. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1968). On the Holland Land Company see Paul Demund Evans, The Holland Land Company 
(Buffalo: Buffalo Historical Society, 1924). 
 
93 New York Commercial Advertiser, Aug 2nd 1792; 
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paid John Mackwell, a local farmer, $1.58 “for repairing the old School House.”94 Maine 
midwife Martha Ballard received money payments for many of her deliveries and even for 
shocking stalks for a neighbor.95 In order to collectively set their labor rates urban artisanal 
guilds such as the House Carpenters of Pittsburgh published yearly “books of prices” which 
priced everything from the cost of grooving door panels to installing circular shutters.96  
Yet despite the American yeomen’s day-to-day interactions with these varying types 
of priced exchanges, when Hamilton, Coxe, Washington, Gallatin or the census marshals 
requested that Americans aggregate and monetize every article that was produced on the 
farm or in the workshop they could not – as we have seen  - supply them with this 
information.  To return momentarily to the opening scene of the previous chapter, we will 
recall that Americans in the north and south noted “never having kept any regular account 
of the annual produce of my lands,” that “farming is not yet reduced to a system,” and that 
while the quantities of goods might be obtained “the value of things” could not.  
Not only did heads of American households not record this information they didn’t 
seem very interested once such data had been collected.  A return to the newspapers of the 
era on the days following the publishing of the 1810 and 1820 manufacturing census 
reveals neither disdain nor enthusiasm for such statistical endeavors but rather an almost 
                                                 
94 Jonathan Prude, The Coming of Industrial Order: Town and Factory Life in Rural Massachusetts, 1810-1860;  
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complete indifference. Were it not, in fact, for the census marshal who had entered the 
home to collect this information, most Americans would not have known such a 
manufacturing census even took place. “At the last census the marshals were required to 
enter every family,” one Southern Congressman complained in the debates over whether 
there should be a second census of manufacturers in 1820, “but what benefit was it to the 
nation?”97 It appears that most Americans shared this sentiment. By 1830, the 
manufacturing census that Hamilton and Coxe had so desired was abolished, largely due to 
a lack of public interest.98 
If the patriarchal American farmer, artisan and planter were open to the commercial 
exchange of labor and land, why didn’t they share Hamilton, Washington, Coxe or Blodget’s 
capitalizing vision of American society? Why didn’t they know how much cash was 
annually produced in their households? Why didn’t they want to know the labor costs and 
productivity rates of their wives, children, slaves, cows and land? Why, as Arthur Young put 
it, did they “never calculate profit by per centage on capital?” To examine these questions, 
we must explore how these yeomen farmers viewed the world around them. In doing so, 
some key distinctions emerge between capitalist and patriarchal-commercial ideology such 
as the difference between capitalization and commodification, exchange and investment, 
capital and money, prices and value, businesses and households, capital accumulation and 
market equivalence.  
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As I hope to make clear, patriarchal planters, farmers and artisans did not reject 
Hamilton’s capitalizing vision because they were pre-modern or anti-market. Yeoman 
farmers in early America were quite market-oriented. Their account books were filled with 
cash exchanges and they were very interested in selling some of their produce, land or 
labor for cash. Nevertheless, this chapter will argue that they were not interested in 
capitalizing forms of quantification because they did not view the family farm or 
manufacturing workshop as an income-yielding investment, but rather as their livelihood. 
Both capitalist and yeoman wanted wheat or shoes to be sold and traded in the 
marketplace, but only investors seeking to calculate their future return on capital needed 
to know precisely how much money American land and labor could produce in a year. 
While commercially-oriented, the American farmer, planter or artisan did not see his farm, 
plantation or workshop as a profit-maximizing enterprise and therefore was not interested 
in such statistical data.  To understand how and why the yeoman and the capitalist counted 
things differently is to understand the main differences between a “patriarchal-
commercial” ideology and a capitalist one. It is also to understand that economic exchange 
and market orientation alone does not a capitalist society make. 
Patriarchal Commercialism vs. Capitalism  
One main reason the American yeoman farmer did not bother to keep track of his 
annual monetary costs or revenue was because much of what was produced in the 
American household was never sold in the market. As a typical entry in Matthew Patten’s 
diary on the day of the rye harvest demonstrates, any good not exchanged did not get 
priced:    
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We carted in 27 stooks and 8 sheaves that we Reapt in this field and in the afternoon 
I went to James Moors in Goffestown and I got 31/2 Gallon of Rum from him and I 
gave him a dollar toward it which paid 3 gallon of it.99 
 
Treating money, therefore, as the ultimate unit in which material prosperity and 
productivity should be measured made little sense to Americans as they did not live in the 
total market society that Petty, Adam Smith, or Hamilton and his fellow entrepreneurs had 
imagined. Wary that those who lived only by market sales could easily become victims of 
“the casualties and caprice of customers,” even the most enterprising of Americans did not 
organize their family household exclusively around commodity-production.100 Purposely 
allocating their energies between the market and the household, revenue-maximizing 
behavior flew in the face of republican notions of proprietary independence. While 
Americans may have timed the slaughtering of their hogs by responding to price incentives, 
the notion of shifting all of one’s household production to pig-breeding, for instance, was 
unthinkable. What is more, with land prices and property taxes relatively low and 
mortgages rare and rather short-term affairs, American farmers, except for in such 
moments of liquidity crisis as Shay’s rebellion, were not forced to devote most of their 
labor to producing a consistent cash flow.101  
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When American patriarchs did sell their produce to the market or trade labor and 
supplies with their neighbors on book credit, the main purpose of such exchanges was to 
procure consumer goods that would improve their household’s livelihood. “Commerce!” 
Ames’ almanac exclaimed, “We do thy numerous blessings own, thou bring the fruits of 
other nations home.”102 Money, therefore, was seen as a means to an end, not an end in 
itself. As a young Ben Franklin argued, “men have invented MONEY, properly called a 
medium of exchange because through or by its means labor is exchanged for labor, or one 
commodity for another.”103 While Hamilton had referred to such transactional uses of 
money as unproductive “dead stock” since it did not seek profit, for most Americans the 
social purpose of money was not the accumulation of capital but the exchange of useful 
goods. This is why American farmers and artisans loved paper money while investors 
hated it: The increased money supply greased the wheels of commerce while inflation hurt 
only those who lent out money for interest or accumulated large cash reserves. This is also 
why most American farmers did not charge interest on borrowed money – the notion that 
money itself could somehow create value over time was unacceptable.104  
When Benjamin Franklin, therefore, famously noted that “time was money,” he was 
referring to labor time. When capitalist investors charged money for time, on the other 
hand, they were imagining a very different temporal world, one of opportunity costs. 
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According to the capitalists’ worldview, time was money because one had to charge 
interest on loaned out capital since that money could have been accumulating and growing 
elsewhere, in an alternative investment. For capitalists, therefore, the baseline assumption 
was that money was capital - it should not simply serve as a static medium of market 
exchange but should rather be “alive” and constantly creating more of itself than had been 
there before.105 
The fact that Americans did not quantify the world like capitalist profit-maximizers 
was not due to a disdain for markets but rather an enthusiastic respect for their ability to 
mete out egalitarian justice. In their eyes, the pursuit of ever-accumulating profit was not 
the driving force of market exchange, nor could it have been, for the market was built upon 
the principal of equivalence. Since economic exchange was perceived as a voluntary, self-
interested, non-coercive, contractual agreement which occurred only if both sides agreed 
to it - every transaction had to be more-or-less equal. Otherwise, one of the two exchangers 
wouldn't have agreed to the deal. Franklin, in expressing this view of market equivalence, 
noted that “trade in general [was] nothing else but the exchange of labor for labor.”106 
Trying to profit from such exchanges, as merchants, speculators or bankers did, was not the 
work of markets but rather their corruption. This explains the familiar producerist tropes 
of colonial clergymen’s sermons in which merchants, “whose professed aim, as such, is 
Gain,” must not be enabled to “enrich themselves at the ruin of others.”107 The profit-
seeking ‘double vision’ of capitalist investors had no place in the zero-sum game of early 
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American commercialism, where one man’s profit was another man’s loss. No one made 
this producerist point clearer than Benjamin Franklin who once explained how “there seem 
to be but three ways for a nation to acquire wealth. The first is by war, as the Romans did, 
in plundering their conquered neighbors. This is robbery. The second by commerce, which 
is generally cheating. The third by agriculture, the only honest way, wherein man receives a 
real increase of the seed thrown into the ground, in a kind of continual miracle, wrought by 
the hand of God in his favor, as a reward for his innocent life and his virtuous industry.”108  
While Hamilton admired commerce for its ability to maximize material output 
thanks to an efficient division of labor, yeoman Americans admired commerce for their 
ability to sustain a republican citizenry of equal, free, white men. Privatizing the notion of 
civic virtue and pushing it into the realm of exchange, self-interested behavior in this era 
(often referred to as “self-love”) became not only one of the central tenets of American 
republicanism but the very definition of liberal freedom: Since landed patriarchs need not 
depend on anyone else for their subsistence, they could choose to transact with other free 
people at their discretion. Unlike “the multitude of poor without land in a country…who 
must work for others at low wages or starve,” the ownership of land gave men the 
bargaining power needed to safeguard not only the political realm from corruption but the 
market as well.109 While Hamilton, Coxe and Blodget’s statistics painstakingly tried to 
convince white, American men that the key benefit of manufacturing was that it maximized 
output, they failed to realize that this was not the top priority of the American patriarch. 
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“Secure our independence by impoverishing, discouraging and annihilating nine tenths of 
our sound yeomanry?” Virginian political economist John Taylor, the epitome of patriarchal 
commercialism, asked in response to Hamilton’s manufacturing scheme. This would turn 
Americans into “swindlers and dependent on master capitalists for daily bread.”110 
While American farmers, artisans and planters did not think that maximizing output 
was society’s top priority or that prices were the sole unit for measuring productive output 
(since not all goods went to the market), their belief in the evenhanded mechanism of the 
market did lead them to believe that money prices were an accurate measure of a natural, 
intrinsic value. This was why Franklin believed that market exchange was merely trading 
equal amounts of labor or that “time was money.” While English peasants’ questionable 
experiences with market-manipulating merchants often caused them to see prices as 
cynical, circumstantial, coercive and arbitrary measurers of value, Americans’ landed 
independence led them into the liberal arms of the labor theory of value, as they too came 
to see prices as a precise reflection of labor value. In his anti-Hamiltonian diatribe titled 
“Letters to the Yeomanry,” George Logan argued that competition alone established “the 
just value of every commodity,” and that “a perfectly free trade” ensured “the farmer the 
highest price for his produce.”111 In The Rights of Man, Tom Paine rejected government 
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regulation of labor rates, and called to “leave [artisans] free to make their own bargains.”112 
While in England an emergent “moral economy” sought the customary and paternalist 
protection of the Assize of Bread, American farmers were far more trustworthy of the 
market as they had a bargaining chip English peasants did not - they could always grow 
their own grain. As we shall see in later chapters, Americans positive experience with 
decentralized markets would, ironically, eventually play a crucial role in the legitimization 
not only of fairly equal market relations, but hierarchical capitalist ones as well.113 
Like all political economists of his day, Adam Smith was greatly influenced by 
William Petty. In The Wealth of Nations, however, there is only one direct reference to 
political arithmetic. “I have no great faith in political arithmetic,” Smith writes.114 This 
makes sense.  Unlike master-planners such as Petty and Hamilton, as the father of laissez-
faire liberalism Smith likely distrusted the use of aggregated data as much as he disdained 
centralized, government planning of the economy. What was the point of collecting all this 
information when all that was needed to guide society was the “perfect liberty” of self-
interested men? While Hamilton referred to the notion of an invisible hand as a “wild, 
speculative paradox,” most American thinkers, including Thomas Jefferson, tended to side 
with Smith.115 Here, then, was yet another reason why they rejected Hamilton’s statistical 
inquiry: While American farmers and artisans were, as we shall see, enamored with certain 
economic indicators that could allow them to measure the progress of their republican 
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experiment, few were interested in establishing centralized statistical institutions that 
could be used by wealthy elites to intervene in their everyday lives through the 
implementation of protective tariffs, funded debts, chartered banks or subsidized 
manufacturers. 
 Furthermore, most Americans farmers and artisans had little need for such 
statistical data. Even relatively wealthy American farmers and mechanics re-invested 
nearly all of their savings back into their own household, as they bought another cow, tool 
or acre of land. Since most Americans were not seeking to place their wealth in capitalized 
assets they did not directly control, capitalizing statistics was not a crutch they needed to 
lean on. While investors of capital were subjected to an interdependent society where one 
could not see or control the economic mechanisms which determined one’s wealth, most 
Americans still lived in relative “island communities” where their propertied independence 
negated the need for such far-seeing statistics.116 
The Segregated Household and the Difference between Property and Capital  
Finally, many Americans rejected Hamilton’s capitalizing statistical vision because it 
had made no place for the patriarchal household– only individuals. Just as Petty’s pricing of 
the peasant at seven pence per day had wiped away the Domesday Book’s feudal 
distinctions between “bordars” and “villans,” the pricing of Americans as capitalized inputs 
of labor served as an atomizing force that disentangled people from their webs of social 
relations. As we clearly saw in Blodget’s pricing of the American people, whether a cotton-
picking slave, a home-spinning wife, or a free-holding farmer, capitalists imagined 
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everyone the same – they priced them as atomizing units of income. In tearing asunder the 
basic institution of American society, this statistical vision brought the individualizing 
culture of capital into the inner workings of the patriarchal household.  
This is not how white, American yeomen envisioned their society. Having created 
propertied, gendered and racialized social and legal barriers they preferred to segregate 
their wives, slaves and children from what they viewed as the free, self-interested, 
contractual and equalitarian world of liberal market exchanges. Insulated from market 
relations, the productive household was to remain hierarchical, coercive and unequal.  
Instead of money and free bargaining regulating this realm of production, the American 
yeoman believed that paternalist forms of social relations - be it the ties between husband 
and wife, master and slave, or artisan and apprentice - should control productive 
processes. Dividing society between liberal realms of exchange (the market) and 
hierarchical realms of production (the household) this economic ideology of patriarchal 
commercialism may appear schizophrenic or hypocritical, but it was neither. With each 
realm defining the other, the freedom white men experienced in the market was dependent 
on the power they exacted in the patriarchal household. Often times, the very principals of 
propertied liberty were best articulated through a denial of such freedoms for women, 
children and slaves.  One reason African American slaves were considered “unvirtuous” 
was because “while the drudgery is theirs…the profit is entirely ours.”117  By the end of the 
eighteenth century most male patriarchs did not allow their wives to make any 
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unsupervised cash transactions nor could they sign contracts. In doing so, they were not 
only limiting their wives’ freedoms, but defining their own. 118 
Acts of quantification and valuation can help reveal the conceptual segregation of 
the patriarchal from the commercial in early American society. When entering into a realm 
of exchange, whether it was the local fair, the mercantile port city or the land office’s 
auctioning block, white men of property often envisioned society in priced, contractual 
transactions.  Rarely, however, did these prices infiltrate into the patriarchal realm of 
production.  As Hamilton grimly discovered, American farmers and artisans simply did not 
know the aggregate cash value of their family’s labor or land and no farmer monetized the 
costs or productivity of his wife and children or aggregated the revenue of the household. 
Even slaves were seen more as patriarchal pieces of household property than priced 
units of income-yielding capital. It is true that some planters in the early republic kept track 
of their slaves’ market values. A few “enlightened” ones even discounted the opportunity 
costs from their investments in slaves when completing their double-entry accounts. But 
until the 1830s, almost none of these planters monetized the annual costs of maintaining 
slaves nor did they seek to price their annual productivity or even determine their pace of 
work. This is partly due to the fact that slave-owners in the early republic only sold their 
slaves in moments of crisis such as death and bankruptcy as they paternalistically 
considered their slaves a part of their proprietary household. As we shall see, the 
capitalization of slavery only really took off in the 1820 and 1830s with the cotton boom 
                                                 
118 For the best and most detailed description of patriarchal relations in this era see Alan Kulikoff, Tobacco 
and Slaves: The Development of Southern Cultures in the Chesapeake, 1680-1800 (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1986; 
For the theory that republican independence was dependent on slavery see American Slavery, American 
Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia (New York: Norton, 1975). For the non-commercial “Woman’s 
sphere” see Nancy Cott, The Bonds of Womanhood: “Woman’s sphere” in New England, 1780-1835 (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1977).  
   
85 
 
and the emergence of a widespread, highly liquid market in slaves. In the early republic, 
therefore, the price of slaves was rarely determined by capitalizing the future revenue 
stream they would produce. This is why the price of slaves did not rise and fall with the 
price of tobacco in the 1790s but did rise and fall with the price of cotton in the 1830s. The 
colonial and early American slave plantations, in short, were still based on the paternal and 
proprietary tenets of the patriarchal household.119  
Livestock and land were quantified in similar ways to slaves. In his response to 
Hamilton, Pennsylvania farmer Richard Peters priced the value of his cow by capitalizing 
the annual revenue it would likely produce till it died. This was unheard of in most 
American farming families where livestock - like slaves - were not imagined as financial 
instruments. Although tracts of land were commonly viewed as alienable pieces of property 
that could be bought and sold, they were rarely envisioned as pieces of capital that could be 
inserted into a profit-maximizing equation. As a result, while Americans may have known 
how much their entire farm was worth on the market, they could not inform Hamilton how 
much wealth it had annually produced. As with livestock and slaves, there was no ongoing, 
time-based measurement of productivity. Land remained a static, fixed piece of property 
rather than being transformed into a dynamic piece of income-yielding capital. Sure 
enough, when local communities administered their property tax, farms were assessed 
according to their (very vaguely) estimated market value, not their annual revenue. The 
same can be said of slaves. 
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The land:labor ratio in the United States played a significant role in the rise of 
patriarchal commercialism in America as opposed to English-like agrarian capitalism. In 
England, where labor was abundant and land scarce, laborers were often paid in wages by 
a farmer who rented the land from the landholder. Rent and wages: It was these two social 
processes which not only formed the basis of classical political economy but also allowed 
men such as William Petty and Adam Smith to conceive of labor and land as capitalized 
investments which secreted an annual flow of cash. When an enterprising investor sought 
to measure the value of a tract of land in England, for instance, he would come up with the 
“price of purchase” by calculating the future revenue stream he would receive in annual 
rents. Such annual rents were only available, of course, because wage workers did not own 
the fields they reaped.120  
In the United States, even amongst the wealthiest investors, such capitalization of 
land was rare. Due to the lack of labor, the best land speculators could usually hope for was 
to sell the land back to a farmer at an increased price. As eighteenth century Virginia 
planters knew all too well, getting white men in America to work land they did not own, be 
it by receiving wages or paying rents, was very difficult. In America, therefore, land 
remained only a piece of commoditized property, not a capital input. You could perhaps 
“flip” it for some handsome profits, but you could not continuously “squeeze” annual rent 
payments out of it. This is why Coxe never hit the proverbial jackpot: While he had hoped 
to rent his Pennsylvania lots to manufacturers and laborers, or slowly sell off his deposits 
of coal, in the end all he could do was sell the land to farmers (which, in his grandsons’ 
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opinion, he smartly refused to do.) This, as historians have convincingly shown, is also one 
of the main reasons why slavery came to the Americas: Unlike in England, the only way one 
could systematically control the labor of another in the New World was if one got married, 
had children or bought slaves. Hiring free, white wage laborers did not work since these 
men preferred going off and starting their own family farms.121 
Finally, as the disappointing responses which Hamilton received in 1791 reveal, 
most Americans could not supply him with the information he desired because the bulk of 
manufacturing was done either by “individuals,” “white females in poor families,” or “under 
the eye of the mistress…by female slaves.” The common link of all these social activities 
was that all were considered part of a household (even if it was not your own household.) 
As a result, these actions were not priced. Coxe and the 1810 manufacturing census 
marshals ran into similar difficulties. “Carriage makers, blacksmiths, hatters, shoemakers, 
tailors, domestic makers of garments and other manufacturers known to exist among 
recent improvers and in old establishments, are omitted, or did not appear to the officers,” 
Coxe complained to Gallatin.122 For Coxe, the notion that such productive behavior could go 
uncounted or un-priced was unfathomable. For most Americans, the exact opposite was 
true. A decade later, in the manufacturing census of 1820, the census planners sought to 
solve this problem by declaring that only data on “manufacturing establishments” would be 
collected, not “household production.”  Instead of lamenting over those things that could 
                                                 
121 On the need for slave labor due to the inability to hire white men, see Edmund Morgan, American Freedom; 
Gavin Wright, Cotton South; Kenneth Stampp, Peculiar Institution (New York: Knopf, 195); Sellers, Market 
Revolution. Betsy Blackmar, Manhattan For Rent.  
 
122 Coxe, A Statement of the Arts and Manufacturers, vi. 
   
88 
 
not be counted, the census leaders had internalized a rule that statisticians, by their very 
nature, are often forced follow: If you can’t count it, ignore it.123 
According to this capitalizing statistical approach, if you did not produce money you 
did not count – or get counted. While this led to a general critique of the yeoman or 
artisanal household, it put much of the onus for low cash revenues on women’s labor. In 
Hamilton and Coxe’s statistical vision, “homespun” domestic work remained statistically 
invisible as it usually did not produce many saleable commodities. Unsurprisingly, Coxe 
came to believe that the solution to United States’ low productivity rates was to send 
women to work in the factories where “the time of housewives and young women… could 
be profitably filled up.”124 Hamilton wholeheartedly agreed, arguing that the move to the 
factory would benefit everyone since the patriarch would “experience a new source of 
profit and support from the increased industry of his wife and daughter”.125 Perhaps they 
had been partially influenced by English political arithmetician Arthur Young, who in one of 
his many statistic-gathering tours of Europe, asked a farmer how the poor, wage laborer’s 
wives and children spent most of their days. “Drinking tea, he replied, and I cannot but 
remark that I found the custom almost universal.” Capitalizing everyday life, it appears, not 
only led to an erasure of women’s labor, but it caused Hamilton, Coxe and Young to 
                                                 
123 For Coxe’s erasure of work at home, especially that of women, see Jeanne Boydston, Home and Work: 
Housework,  Wages and the Ideology of Labor in the Early Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1990). 
 
124 Coxe, View of the United States, 55. 
 
125 Hamilton, “Report on Manufacturers,” 129 
 
   
89 
 
construct social narratives of the “unproductive housewife” that legitimized such glaring 
statistical absences.126  
Measuring Prosperity in Early America 
American farmers and artisans in the early republic did have a healthy appetite for 
statistics. Hungry for information that would enable them to gain a sense of what went on 
beyond their local “island communities,” even relatively poor farmers often owned at least 
one book of a statistical nature. The Ball family, for instance, worked a modest farm in the 
hill country of Vermont and only traveled to Boston once a year to exchange dairy products 
for some finished goods. Nevertheless, they owned a copy of Jedidiah Morse’s Geography, 
the leading statistical atlas of the early nineteenth century.127 Often brandished with titles 
such as “Picture of New York” or “a Statistical View of Maine,” such works suggested to the 
reader that through their statistics one could transcend space and catch an objective and 
disinterested glimpse of the larger world. Before the photograph, there was the statistical 
gazetteer and farmer’s almanac. With a potpourri of figures that might include the number 
of school districts or the year when carriages were first used in a town, these statistical 
“images” could enthrall American readers - but only if the numbers painted a picture that 
injected meaning into their lives. What Hamilton and Coxe had rudely discovered was that 
just as Americans did not view the annual cash revenue of their households as an accurate 
or useful gauge of their family’s prosperity, they did not feel it was a fitting economic 
indicator for the entire nation either. In their opinion, the goal of the American economy 
was not to maximize output but to produce and reproduce republican citizens. As a result, 
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the statistic yeoman Americans found most conducive to measuring national progress was 
first population growth and then, by the second decade of the nineteenth century or so, 
population density. 
On the most basic level, population growth symbolized survival. The years following 
the American Revolution were still a time of potential scarcity and Americans understood 
that high fertility and low mortality rates, especially amongst children, was evidence that 
their way of life was not in mortal danger. That said, the multiplication of peoples signified 
far more than just survival. “People increase,” wrote Benjamin Franklin in the first 
American stab at political arithmetic, “in proportion to the number of marriages, and that is 
greater in proportion to the ease and convenience of supporting a family.” Using local 
church and municipal records on birth and death rates, Franklin put forth a theory as to 
why the American people were multiplying so rapidly:  
Land being thus plenty in America and so cheap as that a laboring man that 
understands husbandry can in a short time save money enough to purchase a piece 
of new land sufficient for a plantation whereon he may subsist a family; such are not 
afraid to marry; for if they even look far enough forward to consider how their 
children when grown up are to be provided for, they see that more Land is to be had 
at rates equally easy, all circumstances considered.”128  
 
Encapsulated in this one seemingly simplistic statistic of population growth then, 
was an entire economic worldview. Based not on the tenets of profit maximization but 
rather social mobility, material equality, generational sustainability and propertied 
independence, Americans such as Franklin viewed rapid population growth as an effective 
indicator as to whether the American objective of “competence” – the ability to support a 
family comfortably without working for others – was being met. Arguing that “the demand 
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for men, like that for any other commodity, necessarily regulates the production of men,” 
Adam Smith had credited capitalist accumulation with population expansion.129 American 
statistical sources of the era, on the other hand, shared Franklin’s sentiment, linking 
demographic growth to the social values of American republicanism. Seeking to elucidate 
the state’s impressive population explosion, a statistical history of New Hampshire 
explained that “a young man who has cleared a piece of land, and built a hut for his present 
accommodation…attaches himself to a female earlier than prudence dictates.” David 
Ramsay of South Carolina associated population growth with economic and political 
freedom, noting that American reproduction rates “varied more or less in proportion to the 
degrees of liberty that were granted to the different provinces.” 130  
As a result, from their inauguration in 1790 the census returns published every 
decade became a moment to celebrate the American republican project. “Near what are 
called Middlebury falls, there was but 8 families; now there are 83” one newspaper gushed 
the day the 1800 census was released, adding that “what is now the center of a flourishing 
town, was then a hemlock forest.” Charts of population figures were tabulated so that 
schoolchildren could memorize each state’s population. In what might be the first board 
game in American history, an 1806 “statistical amusement” required children to learn the 
population in different counties and towns if they were to win the game.131  
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As population figures came to signify prosperity and the public good, they also 
became a symbol for patriotic pride. Following the very first census, the actual returns 
were placed in an exhibit hall in Philadelphia for all to see. In the run up to the contentious 
1800 election, an engraving was widely circulated in which the sixteen states of the union 
were depicted around President John Adams with the title “a display of the United States. 
Below each state’s seal lay a statistic of their respective population.  Save for presidential 
elections, the post office, the flag, Fourth of July celebrations or Hamilton’s dreaded 
Whiskey Tax, Americans had few national symbols or events which tied the disparate 
states together. In such a decentralized society, census statistics that enabled Americans to 
see beyond their local enclaves came to serve as social glue that kept Americans identifying 
not only with their local town or state, but the entire nation. As Benedict Anderson has 
argued, the printing press played a key role in the rise of nationalist sentiment as it enabled 
the invention of “imagined communities.” For Americans, the census served a similar 
purpose as it helped connect a disjointed United States into a single, coherent statistical 
community. As a result, people’s identities came to be molded not only by the tangible or 
the quotidian, but the abstract.132 
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Figure 3: An engraved portrait of John Adams. In this image, Adams is surrounded by the seals of the 
sixteen states which all include their exact population and Congressional representation. The image 
reveals the patriotic and democratic symbolism of population statistics in the early republic. Amos 
Doolittle, "A New Display of the United States," (New Haven:, 1799). 
To be sure, yeoman farmers and artisans were not the only Americans who saw 
population growth as a symbol of American affluence. For the economic elite which had 
funneled much of their excess capital into land speculation, a rising population had an 
added bonus: It made them money. Since, as we have seen, wealthy land investors could 
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not hope to rent out their land, any profits made would be determined by the market for 
settlers in search of land. As a result, American census statistics were feverishly collected 
and analyzed by American and foreign land speculators such as Robert Morris, Timothy 
Pickering and the members of the Holland Land Company. Arguably owning more land 
west of the Ohio River than any man alive at the time, it is not surprising then that George 
Washington wished Americans “fulfill the first and great commandment – increase and 
multiply.”133  
Due to a producerist belief in the labor theory of value population statistics were 
viewed not only as a measure of republican prosperity but also material wellbeing.  
Whereas English economic thinkers had divided the productive value of society into 
separate categories according to class relations (rent for landowners, wages for laborers, 
and profit for capitalists), most Americans spoke only of “the fruits of one’s labor” since the 
other economic categories did not, and could not, exist in a free-holding slave society 
where wage labor and land rentals were a rarity.  
Such an equation of people and wealth, in fact, was the initial motive behind the 
establishment of a census. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the census did not emerge out 
of the Constitution nor was it implemented due to a need for proportionate Congressional 
representation. Rather, the idea of holding a census was born in the Second Continental 
Congress of 1783 and was viewed not as a political mechanism but rather as an indicator of 
state wealth. Unlike in the later Constitutional convention, political representation was not 
an issue in the Articles of Confederation as it had been determined that each state would 
                                                 
133 George Washington quoted in Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth 
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950), 203. On land speculation in the early republic see Rohrbough, 
The Land Office Business. Evans, Holland Land Company.  
   
95 
 
receive one vote in the Continental Congress.  The problem of funding the national war 
debt, however, was far more complicated. State leaders agreed that the burden of war 
should be divvied up evenly and therefore each state should be taxed in proportion to its 
wealth. In 1781, the Articles of Confederation determined that all charges of war be paid “in 
proportion to the value of all land within each state.”134 As the years went by, however, 
American political leaders began to realize that a land census would be rather difficult to 
oversee. In 1783, the Continental Congress submitted an amendment to the Articles of 
Confederation stating that the war debt should be financed “in proportion to the whole 
number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants, of every ages, sex and condition, 
including those bound to servitude for a term of years and three-fifths of all other person, 
except Indians not paying taxes.” 135  
For a man who equated capital accumulation with wealth, Hamilton naturally 
thought this was a preposterous statistic for measuring wealth. “No man who is acquainted 
with the State of New York,” he decried in Federalist No. 21, “will doubt that the active 
wealth of King's County bears a much greater proportion to that of Montgomery than it 
would appear to be if we should take either the total value of the lands or the total number 
of the people as a criterion!”136 Although the always prudent James Madison agreed that 
population growth was “in no case a precise measure” of national wealth he supported its 
implementation in the Constitution a few years later since it had “obtained the sanction of 
America.” 137 In the end, Hamilton did not seem too upset over it being implemented in the 
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Constitution either, perhaps because he realized that such a measure led to a massive 
redistribution of wealth from farmers to the bondholders who owned the war debt.  
The basic unit in these early censuses was undoubtedly the household. Under the 
categorical aegis of the patriarch, nameless slaves, wives and children appear only as 
aggregated figures (see image below where men appear with their signatures while 
women, children and slaves appear as mere numbers).   
 
Figure 4: 1790 census page. A page taken out of the actual 1790 Census which reveals the patriarchal 
nature of America, both in the North and South. The signtatures are of the male household heads. All 
other family members, be they women, children or slaves, received only a number. 1790 Census, 
United States Census Bureau, National Archives.  
Nevertheless, in counting not just the paterfamilias but his entire household, 
Americans’ desire for economic indicators of wealth caused them, not completely unlike 
Hamilton, Coxe and Blodget, to begin to envision a nation of statistical individuals. This led 
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to conflicts that got at the core tensions inherent in a system of patriarchal commercialism. 
For instance, in arguing against the Constitutions’ three-fifths clause, Southern planter 
Pierce Butler concluded that slaves should be counted just like whites since the “labor of a 
slave in South Carolina was as productive and valuable as that of a freeman in 
Massachusetts.”138 Notions of productivity were causing slaveholders to begin to envision 
whites and blacks on an even statistical plane. Recognizing the dangerous ramifications of 
such an argument, however, the other southern delegates at the constitutional convention 
did not back Butler up on this matter despite the fact that it would have increased their 
Congressional representation and thus their political clout.139  
Enslaved labor was not the only aspect of the American economy that could dampen 
the celebrations surroundings the census returns. As farmers in New England were coming 
to recognize as early as the 1770s, a lack of arable land for their increasing offspring was 
beginning to seriously threaten the future of their republican way of life. One of their 
greatest fears was that when the United States would run out of land, the newer 
generations would be forced into factories like in England. “Let us never wish to see our 
citizens occupied by the work-bench,” Jefferson famously noted, as such dependence on 
others “begets subservience and venality” and “suffocates the germ of virtue.”140 So long as 
each American man, Franklin argued “can have a piece of land of his own, sufficient by his 
labor to subsist his family in plenty,” he will not be “poor enough to be a manufacturer and 
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work for a master.”141 Americans, therefore, began to use a new metric to measure the 
prosperity of their society - population density. Seen as one of the key ingredients in the 
four-stage theory of societal development that was all the rage in Europe, population 
density statistics illustrate how Americans took an economic indicator that already existed 
and radically altered its cultural meaning to fit American reality.142  
The conventional wisdom in Europe at that time was that as population density 
grew, society improved from a state of hunting, to that of pasturage, then agriculture, and 
finally, at the height of mankind’s progress, manufacturing. The density of population 
served as an engine for economic progress for a number of reasons: First off, once William 
Petty had priced the productivity of man at seven pence per day it became only natural to 
assume that more people meant more wealth. Statements such as “the more populous a 
country is, the richer it may be,” became truisms.143 More importantly, however, English 
elites realized that a rising population density meant that people would no longer be able 
to find employment solely on the land. Pushed off the farms and into factories, population 
growth would not only feed the manufactories’ insatiable demands for labor, but the 
constant increase in people would insure that wages did not rise.  “Numbers of people are 
the Wealth of a Nation,” one English thinker of the era noted “as where they are plenty, they 
must work cheap, and so manufacturers are encouraged for a foreign market.”144 This 
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mode of thinking did not pass Hamilton by. In expressing to the other shareholders why 
New Jersey was the perfect site for their manufacturing town, not only did he note that 
“provisions are abundant and cheap” but also that the state was “thickly populated.”145 
Most Americans agreed with the inherent logic of this analysis. For them, however, 
such population density became a sign of an oncoming nightmare – not ongoing progress. 
Statistics which calculated the number of Americans per square mile began appearing in 
American statistical gazetteers by the late eighteenth century. Projecting that in a century 
the rate of inhabitants for every square mile in America would unfortunately reach 100 – 
the same level as in England - Jefferson used population density statistics to challenge men 
such as Hamilton and Coxe’s desire to open the floodgates of immigration.146 Following 
each decennial release of the census returns, newspapers and gazetteers would often 
calculate population densities in order to see which states or counties had become “filled” 
or “universally settled.” What is more, statistical gazetteers such as Daniel Drake’s View of 
Cincinnati and Miami County used population density statistics in an attempt to lure the 
people of crowded New England to settle out West.147   
For yeoman Americans, in short, the rising density of peoples was not something to 
embrace but to fear. If this was material progress, they wanted nothing of it. While Adam 
Smith, Hamilton, Coxe, Blodget and others saw growth as the main goal of human society, 
Americans farmers began to understand that such developments were not necessarily to 
their liking. Seeing Europe not as the “Old World” but as the new, Americans came to 
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question the very notion of liberal progress and growth. More might not necessarily be 
better; the future might not necessarily be as bright as the present. To stem the tide of time, 
Americans feverishly sought to spatially expand westward. With population density 
statistics serving as their ideological compass, the yeoman farmer shifted his eyes not 
towards the future, but the frontier.   
Conclusions  
An analysis of the diverging statistical visions of capitalism and patriarchal 
commercialism have allowed us to uncover the contradictory ways different groups of 
Americans perceived the market, the household, women, property, time, money, wealth, 
the nation, nature, land, freedom and progress.  These indicators, however, also help to 
explain how American political economy developed in the early republic. Hamilton, Coxe, 
Washington and Blodget’s belief that the prosperity of a nation should be measured by the 
aggregate value of commodities produced caused them to critique the developing political 
economy of the United States and the notion that the dominant social model should be a 
spatially expanding nation of yeoman households. Since family farms did not produce 
exclusively for the market, Hamilton complained that their ongoing westward expansion, 
“diminishes or obstructs active wealth of the country” since it “not only draw(s) off a part 
of the circulating money and places it in a more passive state, but it diverts into its own 
channels a portion of that species of labor and industry which would otherwise be 
employed in furnishing materials for foreign trade.” Factories, Hamilton continued, would 
be far more productive than the American household because “labor employed in 
agriculture is in a great measure periodical and occasional, depending on the seasons, 
liable to various and long intermissions; while that occupied in manufactures is constant 
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and regular, extending through the year, embracing in some instances, night as well as 
day.”148 Similarly unhappy with American farmers’ productivity, Blodget noted that while 
6,000 fishermen managed to extract “three millions for exportation from the sea” which 
came to 500 dollars annually, the proceeds from agriculture “never yet furnished 25 dollars 
a head in any one year.”149 Tench Coxe tried to assure foreign investors that while it was 
true that “our planters’ and farmers’ sons are subdividing their lands or moving forward 
into far less populated scenes,” many immigrant “artificers and manufacturers… are taking 
their stations on the vacant lots in our old streets.”150  
Such a critique of American society was reiterated by planter George Washington, 
who quantified his plantation far more like a factory than a farm. In his many 
correspondences with famed English political arithmetician Arthur Young, who as author 
and editor of the Annals of Agriculture never met a farm he did not price, Washington 
lamented the fact that most small-scale American farmers did not see the world as wealthy 
planters did. “The system of agriculture (if the epithet of system can be applied to it),” 
Washington cynically quipped, “is as unproductive to the practitioners as it is ruinous to 
the landholders.” Requesting from Young a complete set of his statistic-filled journal, 
Washington was hopeful, however, that Young’s “annals shall be [the] guide” that in time 
will help American farmers keep far better accounts of their farming. Not unlike the 
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productivity data he collected on his slaves, Washington hoped that statistics could be used 
as a disciplining device that would turn family farms into profit-oriented plantations.151 
To conclude, statistics did shape the way Americans saw their material world in this 
period, just not in the ways Hamilton or Washington wanted. While such economic policies 
as free trade, a minimal sovereign debt and the Louisiana Purchase caused men like 
Hamilton, Coxe and Blodget to frown, it made patriarchal commercialism’s leading 
economic indicators, such as cheap land prices and low population density, shine. In the 
first few decades of America’s existence, it was this statistical vision that had won the day.  
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Chapter Three: 
Lots of Growth: Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine’s Frontier of Human Capital 
For the businessmen of St. Louis, June 19th, 1880 was a date that would live in 
infamy. That was the day the municipal results of the 1880 census were released and the 
prominent citizens of the River City discovered that, much to their horror, the population of 
their fair city had only increased from 310,804 in the 1870 census to 333,570. “The city,” 
the St. Louis Post-Dispatch noted, “is considerably agitated today over the apparent 
imperfections in the taking of the census.”152 “The public,” wrote St. Louis Globe-Democrat 
editor Joseph ‘Little Mack’ McCullagh, “seem to have grown somewhat restless concerning 
the results of the present census…and are beginning to be frightened that the figures will 
not reach, or at any rate go beyond, 400,000.”153 The result, the Illinois State Register added, 
“is alarming to the soul of the average citizen of the ‘Future Great’ and curses loud and deep 
are escaping the throats of the people.”154 
While these newspapers framed the census results as a crushing blow to “the city,” 
“the public,” “the average citizen,” and “the people,” in practice only the city’s newspaper 
editors, merchants, manufacturers, bankers and real estate owners seemed to be upset by 
this statistical development. One such businessman feared that the census results “will 
materially depreciate our real estate, and injure the trade and commerce of St. Louis as 
such an extent as will be felt by all classes of our citizens.”155 The editor of the Post-Dispatch 
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exclaimed that the census was “a libel on our growth”, and warned that St. Louis “will 
appear as a decaying, retrograding city,” the consequences of which would be disastrous: 
“It will dishearten our people. It will discourage capital. It will decrease the value of real 
property and choke up prosperous industries.”156 McCullagh explained to his readers that 
the disappointing population count “is not merely a sentimental grievance, it is a blow to 
the prosperity of St. Louis and to the welfare of every business interest. Our trade, our real 
estate, our railroads, our municipal and private credit, all are injured by a defective 
census.”157 
Less than a week later, the St. Louis bourgeoisie were dealt another devastating 
statistical blow: The results had been tabulated in Chicago, that arch nemesis to the north, 
and the Windy City had announced that it had surpassed the vaunted half-a-million mark. 
The businessmen of St. Louis were stunned: This is not how things were supposed to play 
out for an urban elite which had earnestly believed that continuous population growth 
would one day lead to St. Louis replacing Washington D.C. as the capital of the nation.  Only 
ten years before, in the census of 1870, they had ranked as the third largest city in the 
nation. A few months before the 1880 census, the St. Louis papers were still confident 
enough in their city’s growth to joke that “the newly appointed census taker for St. Louis 
should understand…that he must beat Chicago or leave town.” After the news of Chicago’s 
population explosion reached St. Louis, the mood was far more somber. The people of St. 
Louis, McCullagh decried, had been “hopeful of a showing in population that would cause 
Chicagoans to rush towards the Lake front with overwhelming unanimity to throw 
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themselves headlong into the water.” Instead it was St. Louis that “must take a back seat for 
the next ten years.” To make matters even worse, Chicagoans were reveling in their newly 
found statistical dominance, with Chicago papers arguing that perhaps the discrepancy 
between St. Louis’ outrageous boasts and their dismal statistical reality was due to a 
sudden loss of population caused by either death from the city’s stench or a massive 
migration of residents to Chicago. 
A few days after the bad news broke, a group of “prominent citizens” met at the 
Lindell Hotel to decide what to do about the census. Despite the fact that “the heat in the 
room was murderous,” the St. Louis hotel was packed with so many commission 
merchants, local bankers, dry goods wholesalers and other men of business that the crowd 
spilled into the hallway. As those present shouted out their grievances, a plan was hatched 
to send a coterie of leading businessmen to Washington to demand a recount from Francis 
Amasa Walker, the census superintendent. This was only the second census Walker had 
supervised yet he was already well-versed in these situations. In 1870, he had agreed to 
administer a recount in New York, Philadelphia and Indianapolis, while countless other 
cities and towns requesting the same had been denied. Meeting with St. Louis’ leading men 
in Washington, Walker agreed to call for a recount. After a month of tense waiting and daily 
coverage by the newspapers the new results finally came in: The census had been off - but 
barely. Instead of 333,570 people the new census counted 350,518. St Louis’ economic 
elites were crushed. 158  
Since St. Louis’ businessmen seemed to have been genuinely convinced that the 
initial census results were incorrect, it appears that they were less concerned with the 
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actual population growth of their city and far more with the abstract statistical image the 
census had produced. From their laments and frustrations, we can also surmise that their 
panic-stricken reaction to the 1880 census results stemmed from their assumption that a 
city’s perceived population growth had a direct effect on its ability to attract capital. As 
they noted, a disappointing census return would lead to injured credit, discouraged capital 
and deprecated real estate. We can also deduce that these population statistics were not 
serving as some tool that gauged the ability of hardy American pioneers to survive the 
harsh winters of the Midwest.  Despite the rather frantic tone of its businessmen, the city of 
St. Louis had not undergone some horrific calamity that had decimated the population. It 
even had grown - just not enough, apparently. No, this was not about survival, it was about 
business. Why did booming census figures serve as a magnet for attracting investors to a 
city? What was the connection between population gains and capital gains, human growth 
and pecuniary growth? In short, what did counting people have to do with counting profits? 
To answer these questions, this chapter argues that we must travel back a half-century 
prior to explore the statistic-laden pages of Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine, the first business 
periodical in American history.159  
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Seeking to rationalize capital investment into a “science of business” following the 
panic of 1837, this chapter traces how Freeman Hunt’s novel magazine transformed  
population statistics into an economic indicator that could help his international capitalist 
readership decide in which western American cities they should purchase urban lots and 
invest their capital. With the help of a western booster and a southern economist, Hunt 
inundated his readers with population figures that linked the spatial concentration and 
reproduction of the American people with future returns on westward-flowing capital. 
Before Hunt’s, businessmen rarely looked at statistics concerning the American people. By 
the Gilded Age, aggregated body counts could make or break any town, all the while helping 
to re-imagine the American people as potential sources of profit. Starkly different from the 
“myths and symbol” narratives of the West previous historians have emphasized, this 
statistical frontier taught the wealthiest and most powerful men in America and the world 
to recognize the vast profitability embodied in the labor and material needs of the 
American people, especially those urban dwellers who often did not own land, their home 
or productive property. Rather than celebrate the steady, Jeffersonian push of yeoman 
farmers westward, as Frederick Jackson Turner would later do, Hunt’s’ statistical image of 
the frontier, which quickly became an ubiquitous presence in American newspapers, 
extolled urban concentration and landless wage labor – not rural virtue or landed 
independence.160 
If explored at all, the story of America’s love affair with statistical growth has largely 
been seen as a twentieth century story. While the abstract and bureaucratic nature of GDP 
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statistics seems a far cry from the rugged frontier of antebellum America, this chapter 
argues that Hunt’s Merchants Magazine played a crucial role in sparking the slow, uneven, 
and oft-contested process that eventually led market productivity and economic growth to 
supplant proprietary independence and social equality as the most celebrated values of 
American life and the ultimate objectives of American society.  Only unlike the abstract 
economic growth figures of today, which aggregate the prices of all commodities produced 
and consumed, the first growth statistics in America were, quite literally, far more 
corporeal: They did not count money; they counted bodies.161  
Freeman Hunt and the Capitalizing of Urban Space 
 
Whilst working as a young reporter for the American Traveler in 1836, Freeman 
Hunt decided to take a tour of the Hudson River and send back to his editor “plain, matter-
of-fact epistles” on the region. In his first letter back to the editor, Hunt began not by 
describing the city of Poughkeepsie and its surroundings, but by pricing it.  “The gross 
products of the country, from its soil, its mines, and its manufactories,” Hunt noted, “are 
believed by persons qualified to judge, to approach five million dollars a year.” Hunt’s 
statistical narrative quickly got swept up in the speculative fever of the times. “Lots which 
were sold eighteen months ago for 600 dollars have been sold for 4000 dollars,” he wrote 
with exuberance, “while a farm in the vicinity, which was offered twenty months ago for 
22,000 has lately been sold for 68,000 dollars.”162  
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Most travelers’ literature of the era read nothing like this. The Fashionable Tour in 
1825 described Poughkeepsie simply by noting that “the village is about the same size of 
Newburgh, handsomely located, and a place of considerable trade.” It did not list land 
values or gross products but rather spoke of “the sublime and romantic scenery” of the 
Hudson River valley.163 Hunt’s letters replaced romanticism with numbers - even on the 
seemingly most romantic of subjects. “If you have any young men in your goodly city in 
want of wives…some of the fair are certainly very beautiful,” he reported. “I advise you to 
send them forthwith…as there are in the village, according to a census just completed, one 
thousand one hundred and thirteen unmarried young ladies.”164  
Self-conscious of his statistical ramblings, however, Hunt made a point to explain to 
his editor the reasoning behind his unique writing style.  “I consider the general diffusion of 
the statistical, commercial and geographical knowledge of interesting portions of our 
widespread republic,” he wrote, “of vast importance to enterprising Yankees.” On this trip 
along the Hudson River, Hunt had discovered his life’s calling: To assist American 
businessmen and financiers in their search for profits by serving them a healthy dose of 
facts, figures and charts.165  
It would take Hunt only three more years to transform this vision into reality. In 
1839 he began publishing Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine, a monthly periodical whose mission 
it was to supply American businessmen with all the information they needed to capture 
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new markets, assess their real-estate holdings, take advantage of novel financial 
instruments such as railroad securities or manufacturing stock, and, in short, maximize 
their profits. In the following two decades that ended with Civil War and Hunt’s untimely 
death (according to the New York Times obituary he had a “foible for the drink”), the 
Merchants’ Magazine became the journal no serious investor in America or Europe could 
afford not to read. And at the heart of this periodical lay not colorful anecdotes or 
moralistic catechisms, but statistical reports.166  
The fact that Freeman Hunt’s career began by visiting towns along the Hudson River 
is no coincidence. The Erie Canal, which had opened a decade prior and connected the 
Hudson to upstate New York and the Great Lakes, changed many things in America - 
including capital investment patterns. Until the canal opening, most eastern businessmen 
were merchants who focused on international imports and exports. Besides government 
bonds or the occasional short-term speculation in agricultural lands, the profits merchants 
earned were plowed back into further mercantile pursuits. Even when investing in bank 
stocks, a common practice amongst east coast merchants following the bank boom of the 
early 1800s, American capitalists were essentially still funneling their cash into mercantile 
endeavors since nearly all the money loaned out by the notoriously conservative banks of 
early America was in the form of 60 or 90-day “commercial paper” intended for 
merchants.167 
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The main reason early American businessmen invested mostly in mercantile trade 
was because they had few other options. Due to an assortment of reasons such as the 
abundance of cheap land, the dearth of cheap labor and the Republican desire to own 
productive property, American attempts to capitalize labor and land into a profitable 
investment as in England - that is by reaping consistent returns from tenant farming or 
wage-labor manufacturing – usually failed. Save for a few large-scale manufacturing 
enterprises in New England, capitalization of land and labor took hold only in the South, 
where planters were willing and able to enslave African Americans in order to transform 
staple farming into a capitalist enterprise that could yield a steady return on one’s 
investment in land and labor. In the north, both manufacturing and farming remained 
small, proprietary endeavors in which a wealthy capitalist could not directly invest, let 
alone profit. By the time Hunt took his tour of the Hudson River in 1836, however, the Erie 
Canal had triggered a sea change in the political economy of the north as millions of dollars 
in east coast and European capital had begun to flow westward into revolutionary new 
channels which included western banks, government canal bonds, farmer mortgages and 
urban space. For our purposes in this chapter, it is the latter that we must examine 
further.168 
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Cities are many things, but one way to characterize them would be to say that they 
are densely populated spaces in which, due to their concentrated nature, most residents 
own little or no land. This is how most yeoman farmers in early America viewed cities. With 
no land to make man virtuous and independent, cities were condemned as sites of 
“loitering” and “licentiousness.”  The widespread success of the yeoman political economy 
of landed independence in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, therefore, is reflected 
in the “scattered” spatial distribution of the American people: In 1820, only 6.7 percent of 
Americans lived in towns with over 8,000 people, and there were only 26 such cities. (By 
the 1880 there would be 286). The shift to widespread investments in urban space first 
began in large port cities such as New York City.  
As Elizabeth Blackmar has illustrated, by the early nineteenth century housing was 
slowly becoming a capitalized investment in Manhattan as the thriving international port 
transformed the city into a bustling metropolis that required a large influx of porters, 
clerks, retailers, merchants, sailors, artisans, wholesalers and domestic servants. In colonial 
times, Blackmar explains, artisan-builders had “created their product for a known 
customer” in “a local economy of simple commodity exchange.” In other words, the person 
who wanted a building hired someone to build it.  Housing was commodified in colonial 
New York – you paid someone to build you an alienable structure you could then use as 
your home or sell to someone else – but it was not a capitalized, income-yielding 
investment. By the early nineteenth century, as Blackmar documents, this began to change 
with the emergence of “speculative building”– a practice in which entrepreneurs built 
numerous houses even though they did not have a known seller nor did they intend to live 
in the homes themselves. “What determined [this] new construction,” Blackmar explains, 
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“was not the social need for housing but the rate and security of profits.”169 Few exemplify 
this critical shift in investment behavior better than John Jacob Astor. While Astor had 
begun as a merchant and made his fortune in the fur trade, by the 1830s he was one of the 
largest rentiers in New York City. For the first time in American history, capitalists were 
succeeding in turning urban space into a steady, income-yielding investment.170   
Astor and other rent-seeking speculators could profit nicely from urban space 
because the Erie Canal, having only one endpoint, had created spatial scarcity. Anyone who 
wanted to gain from the canals ability to cheaply ship or receive goods would have to pay 
dearly for spatial access to this unique service. In classical economics such an increase in 
the value of property solely due to its relative scarcity is called rent. (Earning rent from 
housing is, therefore, one form of rent in which the scare property happens to be space 
itself.). Whether the urban lots purchased by capitalists such as Astor were destined to 
become a warehouse, depot, dock, wholesale shop, retail market, lumber mill, factory, hotel 
or residential home made little difference – the canals’ ability to turn unremarkable slices 
of land into scarce resources allowed for profitable, rent-seeking investments. When New 
York real-estate mogul Samuel Ruggles agreed to sell five of his many houses on Third 
Avenue to a man by the name of Henry Betts, the capitalization of urban space by rent 
became tangible for it was precisely this rent that set the capitalized value of the buildings. 
As the contract signed by both men illustrates, Betts had agreed to purchase the lot for 
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$22,500 dollars largely because Ruggles had promised him that he could earn $2000 
dollars in annual rental fees. (At this rate Betts would earn back his money in roughly ten 
years and double it in twenty. This was a common “purchasing price” for capitalist space in 
the era.)171  
This rent-seeking spatial logic worked not only for canal endpoints, but the entire 
canal corridor. As a result, even before the Erie Canal had moved a single bushel of wheat 
the urban real estate business was booming not only in New York City but in urban lots 
from Buffalo to Brooklyn. By the time states such as Illinois and Ohio began planning their 
own canals to the Great Lakes in the 1820s, eastern investors were even more willing to 
funnel massive amounts of capital into potential cities along these future canal routes.172 
While in the east urban investment often meant constructing new buildings, in the west it 
meant constructing whole towns – at least on paper. After purchasing a swath of land with 
supposedly wonderful urban potential, investors would “plat” a city by drawing a map that 
divided the “town” into lots. Similar to the process of cadastral land surveying, once the 
plat had been drawn space could become a commodity (but not necessarily capital –that 
required the ability to extract steady, profitable rent). Using the plats as their guides, 
investors could buy or sell urban lots at will - and buy and sell they did. Thanks to the canal 
frenzy, lots in Chicago that had sold for $33 dollars in 1829 went for $100,000 in 1833. As 
these skyrocketing prices attest, within less than a decade investment in urban space went 
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from being a novel curiosity to an everyday event. Indicating how mainstream the 
investment in urban space was becoming, even previously conservative mercantile banks 
became far more willing to accept an undeveloped town lot as a security for a mortgage 
that would go to finance urban construction. With the bankers’ stamp of approval, urban 
space had officially been capitalized.173 
The Science of Business 
Freeman Hunt’s entrepreneurial instincts kicked in after his Hudson River letters 
were warmly received by Boston and New York’s economic elites. By 1837 he had devised 
a plan to edit and publish a monthly magazine intended specifically for capitalist investors. 
In 1838, he visited the New York Mercantile Association, an exclusive club for the economic 
elite of the city, in order to make his pitch. “There is at present no work to which the 
merchant can refer for a record of many facts that might be important aids to him,” Hunt 
told his audience. “Besides the information which he gathers from the columns of 
newspapers….there is a great deal to be collected from the Statistics of Commerce.” The 
board of directors of the New York Mercantile Library Association voted unanimously to 
“lend an individual and united support in recommending [Hunt’s magazine] to public 
patronage; and further that it may be as far as practicable the organ of this association.”174 
Their enthusiasm was not surprising, as American capitalists were hungry for data 
to help them manage this brave new investment frontier. Arthur Bronson, one of the 
biggest investors in urban lots in the country and a member of the New York Mercantile 
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Association, alwayed tried to find statistical information to help him make investment 
decisions. Yet when he set out for his western reconnaissance mission in 1833 to purchase 
urban lots, he had only a farmer’s “emigrant guide” at his disposal. While these books were 
sufficient for the yeoman farmer looking for a place to settle, their lack of statistical detail 
was a liability for the eastern capitalist looking for a place to invest. As a result, Bronson 
and his partner Charles Butler often were forced to estimate the population of the villages 
they visited by counting how many children were in the local school. With such a dearth of 
data, it is not surprising that stories abounded of investors who had purchased lots in 
towns they thought had buildings, paved streets and hundreds of residents but in reality 
did not even exist except in one convincing booster’s dreams.175 
The year 1839, of course, shared little resemblance to the year 1836 - when Hunt’s 
first travel articles were published. The rampant investment in city lots that characterized 
the roaring 1830s came to a crashing halt with the panic of 1837.  Unlike most business 
ventures, however, the panic was a boon for Hunt as he played on businessmen’s trauma 
from 1837. Stressing the need for a rationalized system of capital investment, he warned 
that “operations are often begun in a reckless spirit of speculation, and end, as might have 
been anticipated, in defeat, simply because some piece of information essential to the 
adventure, had, in the ardor of pursuit, been disregarded.”176  Chiding previous commercial 
newspapers with providing only “ephemeral accounts of the state of trade,” Hunt later 
proclaimed that the magazine’s goal had been to “construct the Science of Business” by 
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supplying the merchant with a diverse array of articles and statistics on “the study of the 
resources of nations, Commercial Geography, the processes of production, and the Laws of 
Wealth, or Political Economy.” It was, therefore, out of the ruins of the 1837 panic that 
Hunt’s statistical frontier would arise.177  
Turning business into a science, however, was not the sole purpose of Hunt’s 
magazine. He repeatedly reminded his readers that until his magazine appeared on the 
scene “there was not a single magazine…to represent and to advocate the claims of 
Commerce.”178 Besides statistics and other data-laden articles, Hunt’s extolled the general 
prosperity brought on by American businessmen, reminding his readers that “next to 
religion,” business was the most “active principle of civilization, of knowledge and 
refinement,” and “liberty has always followed in its steps.”179 Either in the pages of the 
magazine itself or in special supplements, subscribers to Hunt’s often were presented with 
hagiographic accounts of the lives of leading merchants written by Hunt himself. Decades 
before Haratio Alger, Hunt mastered the narrative of the self-made man - despite the 
uncomfortable fact that most of the American capitalists he chose to write about, such as 
Edward Everett and Amos Lawrence, were from the wealthiest families in America.  In an 
era when producerist sentiments still held a central place in everyday political and 
economic thought, Hunt’s stood as an unprecedented bastion of capitalist legitimacy. “In 
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society at large,” Hunt once noted with remarkable candor, “gradations of social position 
are measured by stock-certificates, rent-rolls and bank-accounts.”180 Rarely had previous 
American generations written so unabashedly about the virtues of capital investment. At a 
time when American elites were coming to view themselves not as genteel aristocrats but 
an enterprising bourgeoisie, Hunt’s led the way.  
Hunt’s novelty was also in that it was the first business-related journal to be of 
national scope both in its content and its distribution. Even the Economist, the British 
equivalent of Hunt’s, was only founded in 1843. Before Hunt’s, newspapers that covered 
important events in the business world were either local affairs, read mostly by the 
businessmen in the respective town they were printed in, or specialized papers meant only 
for certain types of businessmen. As a nationally distributed paper which covered not only 
mercantile issues but also such business interests as manufacturing, railroads, mining and 
land speculation, Hunt’s quickly became a forum where men from different regions and 
trades could unite together, under the banner of business, and share information. Do not, 
therefore, let the word “merchant” in the title of Hunt’s magazine deceive: As Phillip Foner 
has noted, by mid-nineteenth century New York “bankers, capitalists, brokers, commercial 
lawyers, railroad speculators and manufacturers referred to themselves as merchants”. As 
is often is the case in moments of great social transformation, Hunt continued to use terms 
such as ‘commerce’ and  ‘merchant,’ even though the meanings of such words were rapidly 
undergoing revolutionary change.181 
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Envisioning that his magazine would “form a connecting chain and become the 
repository of the various mercantile associations throughout the country,” Hunt recognized 
the potential his magazine had as a bridge that could help connect disparate men of 
business. Indeed, by the end of the 1840s Hunt’s self-conscious effort at class formation had 
borne fruit as all the most important Mercantile Library Associations of the nation, 
including the branches in New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, Louisville, Charleston 
and Cincinnati, all pledged allegiance to the Merchants’ Magazine and made Hunt an 
honorary member of their institutions. The New York, St. Louis and Cincinnati Chambers of 
Commerce, and the Baltimore, Chicago, Pittsburgh and Philadelphia Boards of Trade also 
passed resolves exclaiming the virtues of the magazine as well.182  
While no membership records survived, it appears that by the mid-1850s most men 
in the upper echelons of American society were reading Hunt’s periodical. The leading 
businessmen and politicians of the era such as Supreme Court Justice Levi Woodbury, 
Missouri Senator Thomas Benton, and Massachusetts capitalists Nathan Appleton and 
Patrick Tracy Jackson all had subscriptions to the magazine and some even contributed 
articles to the magazine. After commenting on how he read Hunt’s not only at home but on 
his business trips, Boston manufacturing magnate Abbot Lawrence deemed “this periodical 
of value not only to the merchant, but to the statesman, diplomatists, jurist, manufacturer, 
mechanic, agriculturalist, and national economist.”183 Henry Clay praised the magazine for 
collecting “a large amount of valuable statistical and other information, highly useful, not 
only to the merchant, but to the statesmen, to the cultivator of the earth, to the 
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manufacturer, to the mariner, in short, to all classes of the business and reading 
community.”184 Charles Sumner wrote that the paper was “as diversified as the important 
subjects it treats and tempered by the candor which is the companion of Truth.” Even 
American President Millard Fillmore commended the magazine as “one of the most 
valuable periodicals that were ever published.”185 
Newspapers heaped even more praise upon Hunt and his magazine, while noting its 
widespread circulation. In a special piece for Godey’s Magazine on “New York Literati” in 
1846, none other than Edgar Allen Poe devoted an entire article to Hunt. “The journal is 
regarded as absolute authority in mercantile matters,” Poe gushed, “circulates extensively 
not only in this country but in Europe, and even in regions more remote.” Not stopping 
there, Poe noted that Hunt’s was “regularly complimented by the English mercantile 
authorities, has every bank in the world for an eager subscriber, every consul, every ship-
owner and navigator; is filed away as authority in every library, and thought of in half the 
countries of the world as early as No. 3 in their enumeration of distinguished 
Americans.”186 Finally, when French engineer Charles Minard decided in 1844 that he 
wanted to create a global statistical map of cotton commodity flows, he derived the data for 
his map not from French or English periodicals but rather from Hunt’s.  Hunt’s, it appears, 
was not only changing the way American capitalists viewed the United States but 
influencing the vision of investors across the world as well.187  
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The expansion of Hunt’s content from strictly mercantile, mostly import/export 
pursuits to an array of domestic channels of investment was reflected in the statistical 
tables that appeared at the end of every issue. The early editions of Hunt’s were dominated 
by the more traditional mercantile statistics that assisted those invested in international 
commerce, bank stocks and government bonds. This included charts on global commodity 
prices, maritime insurance premiums, bank stock figures, gold quantities per country, 
public debt comparisons, import/export trade balances and foreign exchange rates.  Seeing 
the world more through the eyes of an importer than a manufacturer, in these early years 
Hunt published just as many statistical tables on European manufacturing than he did on 
American production. While Hunt did devote some space to statistics on Lowell mills’ 
dividends, urban real estate, Buffalo canal receipts and Cincinnati pork exports from the 
very beginning, these domestic investment figures were in the minority. In the first thirty 
volumes of the magazine printed between 1839 and 1843, nearly seventy percent of Hunt’s 
statistical tables can be labeled ‘mercantile’ in scope. By the early 1850s, however, Hunt 
had dramatically shifted the focus of his statistics to domestic investment channels. While 
mercantile statistics still appeared frequently, their proportion dropped significantly from 
seventy percent in the years 1840 to 1842 to forty-seven percent in the years 1850 to 
1852. During these years, there was a sharp increase in American manufacturing statistics 
as well as railroad and canal figures. 
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Hunt’s greatest statistical innovation, however, was his novel use of population 
figures. In early America, few merchants took much interest in population statistics. As 
opposed to the numerous commodity price currents published daily in papers such as the 
Commercial Advertiser, tables of census results were rarely seen.188 With their capital 
invested mostly in international trade rather than domestic expansion, American 
businessmen had little reason to examine such figures. Viewed mostly as a tool for 
determining Congressional representation, newspapers were far more focused on the 
political ramifications of census figures than their economic ones.  Statistical gazetteers of 
the time written explicitly for merchants, such as Timothy Pitkin’s Statistical View, were 
filled with pages of import and export data but included only a few, rather meager, 
population tables.189  
Hunt’s changed all this. From the very first volumes of the magazine, Hunt included a 
fair amount of population tables under the title of “miscellaneous statistics.” By the fourth 
volume, he had given population statistics its own segment in the statistical section of the 
magazine, alongside the figures on manufacturing, commercial and banking statistics. In a 
move unprecedented in commercial literature, Hunt sent a message to his readers that 
population figures mattered to businessmen. But this was only the first step in the 
education of America’s investors. To see how and why businessmen in the 1820s largely 
ignored population statistics while those in 1880 became obsessed with them, we must 
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shift our focus away from Hunt and towards two of the most important contributors to his 
magazine: Western booster Jesup Scott and Southern economist George Tucker.  
The Western Booster 
Born and raised on a Connecticut farm to a wealthy family of old New Haven stock, 
Jessup Wakemen Scott headed westward to Ohio in 1831 in order to oversee his father-in-
law’s investment in land on the southern shore of Lake Erie. In 1825, the Ohio state 
legislature had chartered the dredging of a canal that would link Cincinnati to Lake Erie 
and many speculators such as the Scotts had scrambled to buy up the land along the lake in 
hopes that, in the future, the canal’s terminus would fall upon their land. Along with a few 
other investors Scott helped plat the city of Toledo on the banks of the Maumee River.190 
Toledo was a capitalist enterprise from the start and even its name was chosen for 
marketing reasons; as one investor noted, it “is easy to pronounce, is pleasant in sound, and 
there is no other city of that name on the American continent."191 In an era Scott would 
later recall for its "memorable speculation in wild lands and wild cities,” he and his fellow 
Toledo inhabitants competed with other towns along the lake in the 1830s for the blessed 
canal’s endpoint in a political game of geographical roulette. 192 
                                                 
190 Jesup Wakeman to Jesup Scott, 1833?, Jesup Scott Papers, Toledo Public Library, box 1, folder 1; For Scott's 
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By 1836 the canal had not yet reached anywhere near the lake but Scott had still 
managed to accumulate $400,000 worth of real estate in northwestern Ohio. Or so he had 
thought at the time. When reality finally caught up to the runaway lot prices in the Panic of 
1837, Scott was forced to liquidate nearly all his holdings, including the family mansion in 
Connecticut. Still willing to take risks, however, Scott decided to hang on to his plots of land 
in Toledo. It was the right decision. In 1843 the Wabash-Erie Canal finally opened for 
business– with Toledo as its outlet to the great lake. If Scott could convince eastern 
capitalists that the Toledo canal was destined for greatness, he would become a very 
wealthy man. That year, he wrote the first of many articles for Hunt’s.193  
Like many men who invested in cities that mostly existed on paper, Scott’s desire to 
attract eastern capital turned him into a newspaper man. Shortly after he arrived in Ohio, 
he founded Miami of the Lake – the first weekly in northwestern Ohio. Later, he briefly 
became the editor of the Toledo Blade, the town’s leading daily paper.194 Throughout his 
career as newspaper editor, however, Scott’s imagined audience was never the local farmer 
but the eastern capitalist, as he hoped to convince them to divert their capital to the soon-
to-be global empire of Toledo by “disabusing the public mind at the east, if our sheet shall 
have the fortune to circulate there, of the numberless false impressions in regard to this 
section.”195  
                                                 
193See map in Scott papers which reveals exactly where he owned land in Toledo; Glaab, “Jesup Scott”; For a 
sense of the heated rivalries which emerged over land speculation and the canal end point see Scott, "Note in 
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As Scott understood, in order to convince eastern capital to invest in Toledo, he 
needed to reach into the investors’ homes, their sitting parlors, their inner circles. While 
the local newspapers he edited never reached New York, Boston or London, Scott 
succeeded in having his voice heard in the east and Europe by becoming a frequent 
contributor to Hunt’s. Beginning with his first article in 1843 and over the next decade, 
Scott published numerous essays praising the pecuniary potential of the western frontier 
as he carved out a niche for himself as the magazine’s expert on urban investment and 
westward expansion. While some town boosters of this era used geographical determinism 
to prove that the future capital of the American empire lay in Alton, Illinois or in Flat Rock, 
Michigan, Scott was one of the first town promoters to lean heavily on population statistics 
to further his arguments – and his sales pitch.196  
In his first set of articles for the magazine, Scott provided a lengthy analysis of urban 
population statistics that would become his trademark. In order to explain what the future 
held for the American people (and American capital), Scott began by quoting the census 
returns not of the United States – but of England. Pointing to the fact that “the proportion of 
people engaged in agriculture has decreased decidedly with every census,” Scott cited a 
report from England that concluded that “those engaged in manufacturing…as compared 
with the agricultural class, were 6 to 5 in 1801, 8 to 5 in 1821 and 2 to 1 in 1830.”197 By 
calculating the rate of increase in American urban populations with the help of the 1830 
and 1840 censuses, Scott then went on to prove that similar demographic patterns had 
                                                 
196 For perhaps the fullest and best example of Scott's sales pitch see "Jesup W. Scott's lecture read before the 
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already commenced in the United States and that in America - as in England - the 
percentage of people who worked the land was already dropping. 198  
As he did in almost all of his articles, Scott used his own state of Ohio as the best 
example for this rise in urbanization, illustrating that even though the entire Buckeye State 
had grown 62 percent in the past decade, population in its largest urban centers had risen 
by a whopping 138 percent.199 Projecting his calculations forward, Scott predicted that by 
the year 1890, only a third of the population would be farmers. In the future, Scott 
contended, there would be a complete division of labor in the west as most Americans 
would live in cities and work in manufacturing while the goods they produced would be 
exchanged with the minority of rural farmers still needed to produce the food and raw 
materials cities depended upon. Most Americans would no longer depend on the land to 
survive - but rather on the market. Instead of being scattered across the Great Plains, they 
would gravitate towards great cities. 
But where would these great cities be? “How are we to know beforehand with 
reasonable certainty,” Scott rhetorically asked, “which is to be the favored cities destined to 
show forth such wonderful augmentation?” Again, Scott’s answer lay in population 
statistics. “Of the sixty-nine cities…which doubled their numbers in ten years and under, 
sixty-one are in the Western plain,” Scott wrote, concluding that  New England’s 
“ascendency as a manufacturing region is temporary, waiting only the development of the 
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new country about the lakes and the upper Mississippi to be superseded.”200 Illustrating to 
the readers of Hunt’s that population statistics could be used to signal exactly where they 
should invest their capital, Scott’s articles often included charts such as the one below, 
which calculated the number of years it took for a city to double its population. Through 
statistical rankings such as this, Scott transformed urban population figures into an 
economic indicator, helping eastern investors to decide which regions to invest in by 
“indicating the direction to which the industry of our people tends, in those portions of the 
west, where population has attained a considerable degree of density.” 201  As William 
Cronon has pointed out, charts such as this were deceptive: the smaller the town, the easier 
it was for it to double its population. Such a table, however, provided Scott with just the 
statistical effect he desired as it put Toledo in the top ten most profitable cities in America, 
far above more accomplished cities in New England or the Atlantic coast.202  
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Figure 5: Jessup Scott’s growth chart. This typical chart by Jessup Scott transforms population growth 
into an economic indicator that can be used to decide in which city businessmen should invest their 
capital. Scott, “The Growth of Towns in the United States,” Hunt’s Merchants Magazine, 25 (1851): 562. 
Implicit in all of Scott’s statistical analyses was a simple argument: landless people 
made for big profits. By convincing his reading public that Toledo’s population was on the 
rise, that American yeoman would soon be moving in mass from country to city, that the 
new manufacturing centers of America would be out West, Scott hoped to prove to eastern 
investors that the West was not simply a land of self-sufficient farmers off of whom it 
would be impossible to reap sustained profits. On the contrary, Scott’s statistics 
demonstrated that there already existed a landless population out west that could be 
funneled into an array of manufacturing enterprises much like Lowell, Lynn or Liverpool. 
Thanks to these demographic changes, Scott argued, the time was fast coming when 
American capitalists could safely invest in western cities, knowing full well that the supply 
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of labor needed to construct buildings, man factories, dredge canals and fill the future 
urban tenements of the tomorrow would be available.203   
How different this worldview was from that of early America! Unlike Scott, agrarian 
republicanism had rued the day land would run out and a new breed of landless Americans 
would be forced to move into cities. So long as a man “can have a piece of land of his own, 
sufficient by his labor to subsist his family in plenty,” Benjamin Franklin had argued, he will 
not be “poor enough to be a manufacturer and work for a master.”204 Thomas Jefferson had 
been so sure that urban manufacturing “begets subservience and venality” and “suffocates 
the germ of virtue” that he took to calculating how long it would be until America’s 
population density reached that of England.205 (He calculated that it would take 95 years. 
The Louisiana Purchase, however, was designed to push the day of yeoman reckoning back 
even further.206) As we saw in chapter two, for these early Americans population growth – 
especially in cities – was not something to embrace but to fear. Scott, on the contrary, 
celebrated what was Jefferson and Franklin’s greatest nightmare: Population growth that 
would turn yeoman America into capitalist England.207 
Scott was not only presenting a dramatically different view of what American 
society should look like, he was also changing the way American citizens were being 
                                                 
203 Scott's need for new emigrants was also expressed in his other writings, including the Ohio and Michigan 
Register and Emigrants Guide, which he wrote in 1832 in order to attract immigrants to the area. The only 
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statistically perceived. In 1800, then-President Thomas Jefferson had requested that some 
more detailed population longevity statistics be added to the census. His reasoning behind 
this addition was that they could “determine the effect of the soil and climate of the United 
States on the inhabitants thereof.”208 As this request demonstrates, the American citizenry 
was at the center of Jefferson’s statistical vision, the purpose of numbers being to measure 
the effect certain social and natural phenomena had on people. With Scott’s statistical 
vision, on the other hand, the role of American citizens hand been reversed. Using 
population data to indicate the location of profitable investments, the American people had 
become a mere means to an end, a functionary of capital accumulation that could be 
plugged into profit-maximizing equations. Scott was not interested in measuring the effect 
capital growth had on people, but rather the effect people had on capital growth. For Scott, 
statistics were not to be used to measure the welfare of the American people, but potential 
profit.  American citizens were simply income-generating units of growth. They were 
human capital.209  
With the help of his population statistics, Scott also taught the American investor 
that picking a corner lot required far more than just knowing the location of the canal 
endpoint. It required knowing the “direction to which the industry of our people tends.”210  
Following canal flows was not enough - American capitalists needed to follow the spatial 
flow of people as well, statistically monitoring how they moved through space. As a man 
who thought he had made $400,000 only to see it dissipate in a moment’s notice, who had 
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won the game of canal roulette yet still owned a town that existed largely on paper, and 
who would only make his fortune if his lots became factories, warehouses and homes, Scott 
understood that the monopolization of space alone could not make him rich. What 
determined the value of urban spaces was not only their spatial scarcity but the potential 
profitability they held for the manufacturer, retailer or real-estate entrepreneur who 
intended to develop them into factories, shops or homes. Investing in urban space, Scott 
had come to realize, depended on the rise of an industrializing, capitalist society. You 
needed the labor power and material needs of people – and not just any people. You 
needed people who could work in factories and live in rented apartments. People who did 
not own productive property or their homes. In short, you needed a healthy dose of 
landless people. For urban lots to become long-term capital investments, Scott’s statistical 
message implied, the platted cities on paper would have to come alive – and the political 
economy of Jeffersonian America would have to go.  
The not-so-Southern Economist  
As Gilded Age institutional economist Richard Ely once noted, it was common 
knowledge amongst contemporary antebellum thinkers that “the South led the North in 
economics before the Civil War… and up to that time Virginia was ahead of Harvard.”211 
While this may seem unintuitive, it makes sense. For most of the Jacksonian and 
antebellum period, it was the South that was the more capitalist society, not the North. 
Based on a class division between landowners and laborers, the classical economic theories 
of Malthus, Smith and Ricardo which examined the developing capitalist relations in 
England were mostly irrelevant to the largely free-holding population in the northern 
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United states. Terms such as rent, wages and even profit would have been either 
incomprehensible or unacceptable to most Americans in the north who worked the land 
they owned, received no wages, paid no rent and invested no capital. Amongst plantation 
owners in the South, however, where agriculture was a slave-based capitalist enterprise, 
Ricardo’s theory of rent or Adam Smith’s theory of wages could, with some minor 
modifications, ring true. This is especially true of wage theory since in classical economics 
wages were defined as the amount of food you needed to give your laborers in order to 
keep them alive and productive. This, of course, dovetails nicely with the economics of 
slavery.212 
If what Ely said about Sothern superiority in the field of political economy was 
accurate, this would have made George Tucker – the first ever professor of political 
economy at the University of Virginia – one of the leading economists in the country.  Other 
historians of economic thought seem to think this was so, with one scholar arguing that he 
doesn’t know “of any American economists of the decades of the 30s and 40s who would be 
entitled to higher rank."213 Apparently Freeman Hunt did not either, as he filled the pages 
of his magazine with Tucker’s economic theories throughout the 1840s.  Beginning in the 
magazine’s second volume, Hunt tapped Tucker as his magazine’s “house economist” and 
published a chapter of Tucker’s The Laws of Wages, Profits and Rent each month.214 A few 
years later, Hunt also serialized Tucker’s study on the 1840 census’ population statistics. 
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This time, not only did Tucker’s manuscript appear, month by month, in the magazine but 
Hunt decided to publish it in book form himself.215 As the dominant voice of economic 
theory in the magazine throughout the 1840s and early 1850s, Tucker had a lasting 
influence on how Hunt’s readers conceived of the American economy. Since political 
economy was not yet a taught at most colleges or universities, an entire generation of 
American businessmen first encountered the classical economic theories of Adam Smith 
and David Ricardo through the writings of George Tucker in Hunt’s. And thanks to his near 
obsessive devotion to population statistics, Tucker too played a crucial role in transforming 
the way the readers of Hunt’s viewed the proliferation of the American people.216 
George Tucker lived in a slave-based society almost his entire life. Raised on a 
Bermuda sugar plantation his family had owned for nearly 200 years, he left for William 
and Mary College in 1787. For the rest of his exceptionally long life, Tucker practiced law, 
became a member of Congress, invested in canals, speculated in urban lots, taught 
economics and moral philosophy and never stopped writing. Aptly coined a “Hamiltonian 
in disguise” by historian Joseph Dorfman, Tucker was never your typical southerner. All 
throughout his life, his heart was set on transforming the south from an agrarian, slave 
society into a bustling metropolis with large cities, big factories, plenty of wage laborers – 
and no slaves. In all of his eclectic writings, which ranged from science fiction and 
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plantation romance novels to satiric humor and standard economic prose, he criticized the 
political economy of both yeoman freeholders and slave-owning planters.217  
In Letters from Virginia Translated from the French, an anonymous satire of the 
South, Tucker critiqued slavery’s “genteel laziness” and argued that canals would promote 
economic progress and urban growth in the south, especially in Norfolk. (Tucker was 
heavily invested in the Roanoke Canal and owned lots in – where else? - Norfolk).218  In The 
Valley of Shenandoah, the precursor to the American plantation novel, Tucker presented 
plantation culture and republican agrarianism as far too focused on virtue, honor and 
public spirit while lacking any prudent, rationalized, business sense.219 In Voyage to the 
Moon; with Some Account of the Manners and Customs, Science and Philosophy, of the people 
of Morosofia, and Other Lunarians, which appears to be the first science fiction book in 
American history, Tucker describes a utopian lunar civilization which began a lot like 
yeoman America in that it was highly equal but developed (thankfully in Tucker’s eyes) 
into an unequal, urbanized society where landholders earned “extraordinary profits.” 220 
It was, however, his writings on political economy for which Tucker became most 
well known. A Malthusian thinker who, as one historian has noted, tended to “out-Malthus 
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Malthus,” Tucker the economist was infatuated with population growth.221 In 1798, 
Thomas Malthus had famously argued that because people grew exponentially but food 
grew only geometrically, the niggardliness of nature would condemn mankind to a life of 
subsistence, poverty and want. Pursuing Malthus’ line of thought, Tucker agreed that as the 
population of a nation grew, wages would have to drop due to an “increased competition of 
the laboring classes in consequence of the increase in population.” Unlike Malthus, 
however, who painted an especially grim picture of mankind’s fate, Tucker celebrated these 
immutable laws of population because finally capitalists would be able to profit from the 
labor of Americans without having to enslave them.222  
To understand Tucker’s argument, we must begin with his view of yeoman America. 
In the New World, Tucker noted, since “land is plenty, and population thin, raw produce 
will commonly exchange for the amount of labor expended in producing it.”223 In other 
words, a low population density gave white American farmers the bargaining power to 
receive a full return for the fruits of their labor. As the population of the United States 
increased, however, this would come to an end as some farmers would be forced off the 
land and into cities, where they would see their wages drop due to competition. All this 
would be a boon for the owners of land and other means of production, as population 
growth would lead not only to diminishing wages but stronger demand for foodstuffs and 
other manufactured consumer goods. The profits generated from the emerging gap 
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between low wages and high commodity prices would “continue to rise with every 
successive increase of numbers.”224 Not only would this population growth lead to the 
profitable exploitation of free Americans, it would also end slavery. When “labor will finally 
attain a price so low, that the earnings of a slave will not repay the cost of rearing him,” he 
argued, “then, of course, his master will consider him as a burdensome charge rather than a 
source of profit.”225 Slavery would not end because it was exploitative, Tucker seemed to be 
saying, but rather because - compared to wage labor - it would not be exploitative 
enough.226  
When the 1840 census was published, Tucker quickly moved from theory to 
practice, as he began poring over census statistics in order to see what the future held for 
the fate of the American republic. The final outcome of this analysis was Tucker’s 300-page 
Progress of the United States Population and Wealth in Fifty Years, which appeared in its 
entirety in Hunt’s Merchants Magazine. (Hunt also made sure to publish it in book form). In 
this work, Tucker created a complex array of never before seen indexes and statistics, 
which compared the rate of increase in the American population by region, race, state and 
city. Like Scott, Tucker also compared the proportion of Americans laboring in agriculture 
to those working in manufacturing as well as those living in rural areas to those dwelling in 
cities in order to see if his theories were already bearing fruit and the number of urban, 
landless workers was rising. As the word progress in the title suggests, Tucker was pleased 
with the results:  Using such statistical indicators as the percentage of Americans who 
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worked on farms and lived in cities, he concluded that urbanization was on the rise. Soon, it 
appeared to Tucker, his utopian moon colony of city development, wage labor and large 
profits would become a reality on earth.227 Tucker, however, did not live to see the Civil 
War that would end slavery for him and propel wage labor to greatness. A slave-owner 
who sought to kill slavery with the mechanisms of the market in the end died at their very 
hands: On March 21st 1861, while waiting to board a steamboat in Mobile, Alabama, a bale 
of slave-picked cotton fell off the barge that was heading up river, striking Tucker in the 
head and killing him.228 
Growth: The Final Frontier? 
Scott, Tucker and Hunt were not the first Americans to realize that population 
growth was perhaps the most important indicator of future profit in urban investment. 
Unsurprisingly, New England textile manufacturers and New York real-estate developers – 
the first Americans to invest their capital in urban growth and successfully capitalize land 
or labor in the north – had reached this conclusion as well. Realizing that their textile 
manufacturing empire would never have bore fruit were it not for the rising population 
density and lack of available farm lands in Massachusetts, Boston capitalists such as Abbot 
Lawrence hated yeoman land policies which gave New Englanders and incentive to get up 
and leave the region. Linking people with profits, Lawrence told his Massachusetts 
constituents in an 1837 speech that those who sought to lower the price of western 
agricultural lands would “drain the [Bay] State of its population and wealth.”229  
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In New York City, real-estate man Samuel Ruggles, who among other things built 
Gramercy Park and the adjacent neighborhood, had been using urban population growth to 
calculate his future earnings as early as 1832. That year, New York Congressmen and 
Phoenix Branch Bank President Benjamin Tallmadge requested from Ruggles, a man 
known for his calculating character, “some statistics in regard to interests in the city of New 
York“ before the Albany legislature returned from recess. Ruggles replied with a lengthy 
letter that focused mostly on population figures, a report that gives us a rare glimpse into 
the calculating mind of one of the first real-estate capitalists in the country.230  
Comparing New York to London, Ruggles began by noting that “1000 acres will not 
accommodate more than 100,000 inhabitants.” Using this equation as is guide, Ruggles 
calculated that the southern-most wards of the city were almost full. Pointing to the streets 
south of 24th street, Ruggles concluded that “the whole of our next increase must be thrown 
upon this section.” Seeing as the streets south of 24th street were precisely where Ruggles 
had spent $180,000 to transform swampland into the new Gramercy Park neighborhood, it 
seems reasonable to assume that Ruggles had made these very population calculations 
prior to choosing a location for his investment in urban space.231  
This was not the only way Ruggles was using urban growth statistics to estimate 
future earnings. As Ruggles went on to explain to Tallmadge, New York City’s population 
was roughly growing at a clip of 15,000 souls per year. This meant that the city would 
require an additional 1500 houses a year, “which at 2000 dollars each will cost three 
million annually.” Continuing, Ruggles noted that most of the money for building 
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construction would have to be borrowed, and he noted that in New Orleans such financing 
was lent out at ten percent interest. As a banker, this information was probably not lost on 
Tallmadge, nor had it been mere trivia for Ruggles - throughout the 1830s, he made large 
sums of money helping other building developers finance their projects.232  
Yet despite these important precedents, it was the joint collaboration of Scott, 
Tucker and Hunt that first popularized, canonized and institutionalized the use of 
population statistics as indicators of future capital gains. They were the ones who turned 
Ruggles’ back-of-the-envelope calculations into a publically circulating form of knowledge. 
Newspaper coverage in the 1850s demonstrates that eastern businessmen began 
internalizing Hunt’s emphasis on population statistics well before the existential crisis that 
gripped the city of St. Louis in 1880. For example, in the lead up to the 1850 census the 
Ohio Daily Statesmen reminded its readers that population figures were “important,” since 
they “indicat[ed] the proper direction for the investment of capital.”233 After the results 
were in, tables upon tables of urban population statistics began to appear in dozens of 
papers across the old Northwest, as the booster-editors of every ramshackle town in Ohio 
seemed to be claiming that their town had grown the most rapidly. Perplexed by this burst 
of municipal patriotism, by the 1870s one onlooker puzzled over the “universal but after all 
inexplicable municipal pride which glories in a rapid growth of population above 
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everything else.”234 Scott’s population charts appeared often in other publications, 
including A Practical Guide on Business, maybe the first “how-to” book in American history 
intended for capitalist investors.235 Even in England, books on “the progress of America 
since Columbus” were publishing Scott’s writings on population.236 
 The most frequent table to appear in newspapers was a ranking of American cities 
by population.  Such growth rankings quickly became a decennial tradition as editors 
supplied the color commentary as to why Boston had fallen from third to fifth or Cincinnati 
had risen from twelfth to sixth. Often times these articles read more like exciting sporting 
events than bland economic statistics. “Cleveland, Columbus and Dayton started even in the 
race in 1840,” one Ohio newspaper pronounced. “Since that time each has more than 
doubled its population. The census of 1850 will soon determine their relative standing.”237 
Decades before the cities of the Midwest competed for the baseball pennant, they battled 
for growth. Comparing the latest census to the previous one, these “standings” almost 
always measured the percentage of each city’s decennial growth. Treating towns like 
corporations and humans like capital, an uninitiated reader might well have thought that 
Cleveland was not a city at all but rather a joint-stock corporation which had yielded 34% 
growth not in people but in profits, as the similarities of the tables below help illustrate.   
                                                 
234 Boston Daily Advertiser, Sept 26th, 1870. 
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Figure 6: Percentage of growth by city population.  
 
Figure 7: Percentage of dividend given by Boston banks. 
Conjuring up images of a collective race against other cities allowed newspaper 
editors to frame these growth figures not only as indicators of potential profit, but overall 
progress. As a result, in all these articles there existed an underlying assumption that the 
interests of urban residents and urban capitalists were synonymous. Seeking to transform 
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growth into a city-wide, cross-class goal, by 1880 St. Louis businessmen were typically 
equating the “prosperity” of the city with the “welfare of every business interest,” while 
assuming that the census results would not only “discourage capital,” but “dishearten the 
people.”238  
How successful was this paean to growth? While it appears that American 
“growthism” was spreading rapidly in the mid-nineteenth century, this was hardly an 
uncontested process. Besides Jeffersonian agrarian republicanism which, as we have seen 
previous chapters, rejected the simplistic linkage of growth with progress, the greatest 
threat to the rise of American growthism might well have been the nativist parties which 
took the political scene by storm in the 1850s. While most historians have focused on the 
nativists’ virulently racist and xenophobic attitudes – they were also one of the first anti-
growth movements in American history.  Take, for example, an 1844 political pamphlet by 
New York City’s American Republican Party, the precursor to the Know-Nothing Party:  
It is the whim of the enthusiast that delights many of our countrymen at seeing our 
country filling up with such rapidity and our public lands absorbed by foreigners, 
the exclusion of our sons, who are thus cheated out of every foot of good soil for 
their industry and of their political rights and privileges. It is a whim, we say, to be 
thus delighted with the idea of numbers and with the latitude given for boasting our 
numerical strength.239  
 
Even by 1880, American growthism had hardly become mainstream. In the midst of 
his distress over the census results, St. Louis editor Joseph McCullagh pointed to the 
businessmen of the city and admitted that “most of the complaints against the present 
enumeration come from this class of citizen.” He then went on to pin the disappointing 
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239 “The Crisis!: An Appeal to Our Countrymen, on the Subject of Foreign Influence in the United States,” (New 
York, 1844) 23. Italics in original. The anti -growth ideology was already apparent in New York City by the 
1820s. See, for instance, William Jackson’s letter to the Working Man’s Advocate against the city’s population 
growth. Jackson’s letter was reprinted in The Free Enquirer (New York), Jun 12th, 1830.   
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results on the majority of St. Louis residents, who for some odd reason, did not care about 
the census nearly as much as the city’s elites. “Thanks to the absence of any public-spirited 
zeal or interest in the affair,” he snapped, “the reported population is from fifty to a 
hundred thousand less than the real population.” 240  
While this chapter has argued that Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine’s population 
statistics played a crucial role in setting the groundwork for the rise of America’s love affair 
with economic growth and the conceptualization of American citizens as human capital, the 
next chapter reveals how it would take far more than a business magazine to convince 
most Americans that capitalized growth was the most important goal of American society 
or that their mission in life was to produce as much cash-income as possible for “the 
economy.” As we shall see in chapter four on the rise of moral statistics in Jacksonian 
America, most Americans did not measure progress in the 1830s and 1840s like Freeman 
Hunt, Jessup Scott or George Tucker. And as we shall see in chapters five and six it would 
take far more than urban population statistics to make most Americans believe the implicit 
message that undergirded all of Hunt’s capitalizing statistics and pro-growth arguments: 
That what was good for capital investors was good for America. 
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Chapter Four 
An Asylum in Numbers: The Rise of Moral Statistics in Jacksonian America 
On a chilly February day in 1844, a heated argument erupted on the floor of 
Congress regarding a letter that Secretary of State John C. Calhoun had sent to British 
diplomat Richard Pakeham a few months prior. “So far as that letter goes to impute to the 
people of the Free States a desire to oppose the progress of human rights,” Ohio 
Representative Joshua Giddings declared, “I regard it as a base slander upon Northern 
character.”  At that moment, Giddings was interrupted by South Carolina representative 
Armistead Burt: 
Mr Burt: I want to know if the member from Ohio meant to say that the Secretary of 
State has done, or is capable of doing, anything base? 
Mr Giddings: I am a little surprised at your question.  
Mr. Burt (much excited): That was your language. 
Mr. Giddings: I hardly know how to understand this southern dialect. 
Mr Burth: (amid cries of order, and the rapping of the chairman’s mallet). Do you 
understand your own language? 
Mr. Giddings: If gentlemen will keep cool I shall soon be through my hour…I was 
humbled and mortified at seeing a weak and loosely penned lecture in favor of 
slaveholding made the subject of an official communication to the British 
government by an American Secretary of State; particularly as the whole argument 
against human liberty was based upon errors in our late census, which were 
palpably obvious to any person who would examine the official returns. Those 
errors relate to the numbered of insane colored persons reported to be in our free 
states.241 
 
 In the letter to Parkeham which triggered this angry exchange, Calhoun had argued 
that “in all instances in which the States have changed the former relation between the two 
races, the condition of the African, instead of being improved, has become worse.” 
Continuing, Calhoun argued that blacks which had been given freedom had “invariably 
sunk into vice and pauperism, accompanied by the bodily and mental inflictions incident 
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thereto – deafness, blindness, insanity, and idiocy – to a degree without example.” Calhoun 
then went on to substantiate his argument with an array of statistics. These figures showed, 
for instance, that the proportion of Northern blacks “who are deaf and dumb, blind, idiots, 
insane, paupers and in prison” was one of six while in the South it was one of 154.”242  
 This was neither the first nor the last instance in which statistical data would be 
used in a sectional dispute over slavery. In the 1840s, as Calhoun’s letter demonstrates, the 
statistics most often used in such debates were figures on insanity, education, mortality, 
idiocy, crime and pauperism. Using a term that had recently been made popular in Europe, 
contemporary Americans often referred to these types of figures as “moral statistics.”243 
Viewed by both sides as central measures of progress and prosperity, northerners and 
southerners alike cited these moral statistics in order to prove the superiority of their 
respective society. Senator Giddings, therefore, was not upset that Calhoun had chosen to 
use such statistics as a litmus test for the worthiness of southern and northern society. 
Quite the opposite. He was upset because while he had a great deal of respect for the ability 
of moral statistics to gauge the wellbeing of American society, he believed that there 
existed grave errors in the 1840 census figures regarding the propensity for insanity 
amongst free blacks in the north.  
                                                 
242 Calhoun’s letter to Pakenham can be found in “Proceedings of the Senate and Documents Relative to 
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 In her work on numeracy in Early America, Patricia Cline Cohen devoted an entire 
chapter to the heated battle that ensued over the supposed errors that were found in the 
African American insanity statistics of the 1840 census. While Cline Cohen did a masterful 
job of recreating this statistical spat, a crucial question was left largely unexplored: Why 
did the 1840 census collect, for the first time, insanity statistics and why were these figures 
taken so seriously by the American public? 244 The debate over insanity figures was only 
one manifestation of a much larger cultural phenomena: the meteoric rise of moral 
statistics in Jacksonian America. From Boston medicine journals to Southern literary 
magazines, statistics of insanity, education, literacy, longevity, idiocy, crime, imprisonment 
and pauperism were wielded by both Northerners and Southerners eager to prove the 
“superior morality” of their society. Why? 
 Looking at census compilers, moral reform associations, statistical societies, insane 
asylums, financial journalists and many other people and institutions that played a key role 
in Jacksonian America’s statistic-filled discourse, this chapter examines the social forces 
behind the rise of moral statistics in the 1830s and 1840s. Both the bureaucratic collection 
as well as the cultural ascendance of moral statistics, this chapter argues, was part and 
parcel of the social revolution that took Jacksonian America by storm in the 1820s and 
1830. Much like the sudden burst of evangelical millennialism that rocked the nation at this 
time, the rise of moral statistics was triggered by the massive social changes underway in 
the United States at that time. Be it due to urban industrialization or the internal slave 
trade, at the heart of this social revolution was the breakdown of the early American 
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patriarchal-commercial order and the family household which undergirded it. The 
collection of prostitution figures, insanity statistics, pauperism rates and other moral 
statistics was a response to this dramatic development as moral reformers, physicians, 
wardens, superintendents of the poor, and clergymen sought to bring order and discipline 
to a society which was no longer organized by the hierarchical, customary and patriarchal 
relations of the small American village.245  
As the binds of the patriarchal household and the communal village fell apart, and 
the American people rushed pell mell into a brave new world, a strong need emerged 
amongst elites for statistics that could transform these suddenly free-floating human 
beings into quantified objects that could be observed, monitored and, hopefully, controlled. 
Moral statistics, therefore, marked the birth of a new epistemological era that Michele 
Foucault has referred to as “biopolitics” due to its statistical objectification of the individual 
and society into “population.”246 At the heart of this new statistical order, lay two novel 
social institutions – reform organizations and asylums.  Trace most Jacksonian moral 
statistics back to their creator, and you will almost always discover an annual report of a 
prison, an insane asylum, a poorhouse, a temperance society or some other moral reform 
association.  
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In colonial America and the early republic, these institutions – and therefore moral 
statistics – were a rarity. There are two main reasons for this. First, eighteenth century 
Americans did not view poverty, crime, insanity, or intemperance as an indicator of a 
society’s moral failure. Steeped in a Calvinist theology which centered on the depravity of 
man and God’s deterministic will, most colonial Americans did not devote much time or 
effort to moral statistics since social phenomena such as poverty and crime were 
understood to be perfectly natural, unthreatening and, most importantly, unavoidable.  
Secondly, the basic premise behind Jacksonian statistic-generating asylums – be 
they prisons, almshouses, workhouses or institutions for the insane – was that social 
deviants and dependents must be isolated, disciplined and controlled. Colonial Americans, 
however, believed that those in need of social assistance should receive such aid within the 
framework of a patriarchal household and that there was no need to isolate, penalize or 
discipline them. While public funding for a community’s poor, handicap or insane was 
surprisingly robust in colonial America, such people were usually sent to live in a relative 
or neighbor’s home while the community paid for their basic needs. The few almshouses 
and asylums that did exist were seen as last resorts in which only those who posed a direct 
physical threat to their community should be kept. Furthermore, these houses were run 
more like households than reform institutions. There was little regimented scheduling of 
the inmate’s day and few statistical reports were ever generated.247  
With the crumbling of the Jeffersonian patriarchal order came the Jacksonian rise of 
the asylum and the reform association. The first state prisons, for instance, opened in New 
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York in 1823, in Pennsylvania in 1826, in Massachusetts and Maryland in 1829, New Jersey 
in 1830, Tennessee in 1831, Georgia in 1832, Louisiana in 1835, Alabama in 1841.248 
Jacksonian America was also the heydey for the construction of insane asylums, houses of 
correction, and other forms of poorhouses. In 1830 there was one public insane asylum in 
the entire country. By 1860, 28 of the 33 states had public institutions for the insane. 
Between 1820 and 1840 some sixty towns in Massachusetts constructed new almshouses. 
One in-depth statistical study on the poor in New York State done in 1824, a study that 
never would have been undertaken a few years prior, demonstrated that only 30 in a 
sample of 130 towns had an almshouse. By 1835, 51 out of 55 counties had at least one. 
Finally, the 1820s and 1830s were the same decades in which the number of temperance, 
anti-prostitution and other moral reform societies across the nation exploded in number as 
well. 249  
While the crumbling of a patriarchal social order was undoubtedly the trigger of this 
institutional revolution, the political, cultural and intellectual forces that led to the creation 
and subsequent cultural dominance of moral statistics were uneven and somewhat 
contradictory. Perhaps the best way to get at these issues is to pose two distinct yet related 
questions. What was the relationship between the rise of moral statistics and the 
emergence of capitalist relations? What was the relationship between the rise of moral 
statistics and the emergence of Jacksonian democracy? It is these two interrelated 
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questions that this chapter will explore in-depth. To do so, however, we must first take a 
closer look at the moral statistics themselves. 
From Paupers to Prostitutes: Moral Statistics in Jacksonian America 
As Cline Cohen succinctly noted in her work on numeracy in early America, there 
existed in Jacksonian newspapers and almanacs a “keen popular concern to know how 
many paupers and how many millionaires there were, how many drunks and how many 
prostitutes, how many scholars and how many lunatics, how many Democrats and how 
many Whigs.” While the voting figures of Democrats and Whigs which emerged out of 
democratic party politics were not viewed as moral measures of societal wellbeing, the 
other social phenomena on Cohen’s list - paupers, millionaires, drunks, prostitutes, 
scholars and lunatics– undoubtedly were.  Along with mortality and crime statistics, they 
made up the central “moral statistics” of the age. To get a better sense of how and why 
these moral statistics were collected and disseminated, and to see how they were often 
used in contradictory ways by a very different set of social actors, let us briefly address 
them one at a time.250 
 Paupers. In 1836, the first ever pauperism statistics appeared in the best-selling 
American Almanac, the leading statistical compendium of the day whose professed goal was 
to “advance the moral civilization and improvement of the country.” Demonstrating how 
moral statistics were making their way across the Atlantic, the initial figures the almanac 
cited were from Europe. They showed that the proportion of paupers in Great Britain was 1 
in 6, in Holland and Belgium 1 in 7, in France 1 in 20 and in Prussia and Spain 1 in 30. By 
1838, however, the Almanac had added the number of American paupers to the statistical 
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tables it collected on each state, reaching the final conclusion that “paupers in all the States 
are few, compared with the number found in most European countries.”251 
 American towns had been collecting information on the number of those in need 
and the cost of helping them since colonial times.  Since pauperism, however, was not seen 
by most colonial Americans as a general indicator of social failure, colonial reports only 
kept track of the number of paupers and their overall expense. They lumped together all 
those in need, be they orphans, widows or invalids. Often the only distinction they made, 
which demonstrates the communal life of colonial America, was whether the person in 
need was a stranger to the town or not.252 Only in the 1820s, when pauperism became a 
widespread statistical indicator of societal wellbeing, did new statistical categories begin to 
emerge in local town and city reports which looked to track why one was a pauper. The 
reasons given were various and included “Ignorance, Idleness, Intemperance., want of 
economy, imprudent and hasty marriages, lotteries, prostitution, charity.”253  
While a wide swath of the American public in Jacksonian America was in agreement 
that pauper statistics should serve as a central measure of social progress, they were doing 
so for a very different set of reasons. For many urban elites, especially those tied to 
manufacturing interests, pauperism statistics were about creating a divide between the 
deserving and undeserving poor. “But what is meant by pauperism?” the first volume of the 
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Bostonian American Magazine of Useful and Entertaining Knowledge rhetorically asked in 
1835. “Not poverty merely. For poverty, joined to physical disease and debility, so as to 
disable a person wholly for labor, must be provided for in some way.” Continuing, the 
magazine explained how “all English writers distinguish between poverty of the last kind 
and pauperism, which consists in want, idleness and crime united.”254 Taking their cues 
from the English and their poor laws, pauperism statistics came to be used by many elites 
to foster an industrial work discipline amongst the ever increasing masses of immigrants 
and impoverished people they hoped would make up their work force. By 1849, statistician 
Nahum Capen - whose family owned more land in Dorchester, Massachusetts than any 
other – wrote a letter to Census Committee head John Davis, suggesting that pauperism 
statistics which separate those with “physical disability,” and those with “bad habits” 
should be added to the 1850 census.255  
 Many Americans, however, did not view pauperism figures in such a way. In their 
hands, pauperism underwent a republican transformation. “I should be very unwilling to 
make the British Government a model for our legislation in republican America,” declared a 
young James Buchanan in Congress of 1839, “the main scope and principal object of their 
legislation was to promote the great landed interests, that of the large manufacturers, and 
the fund holders of a national debt.” Continuing, Buchanan asked a very different rhetorical 
question than the bourgeois American Magazine yet one that was, it appears, just as typical 
of the age: “Where is the country beneath the sun in which pauperism prevails to such a 
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fearful extent?”256 Using England as a euphemism for capitalist relations, rather than an 
exemplar of social reform and discipline, Buchanan transformed the breadth of English 
pauperism into a republican indicator of societal wellbeing. He was not alone. In 1834, for 
instance, a popular labor newspaper edited by the Workingmen’s Party’s George H. Evans, 
echoed Buchanan’s argument regarding the degradation of American society by showing 
how in one American city of 80,000 people there were over 5000 paupers. 257 Embedded in 
this view of pauperism statistics was a proto-Rawlsian theory of justice: A society should 
not be judged by its aggregate wealth but rather by the fate of its poor. 
What is more, American producers - be they farmers, artisans, small manufacturers 
or petit-bourgeoisie shop owners – often tended to blur the lines between pauperism and 
wage labor. In this uniquely American, “free labor” vernacular, a pauper was also someone 
who worked for wages his entire life and never reached the vaunted status of propertied 
independence and self employment. One of the last vestiges of a Jacksonian social vision, 
such a linkage between pauperism and wage labor can still be found in the 1860 census, 
where the compiler of the census placed crime, paupers and wages under the same 
statistical table.258 By 1870, however, the two topics would be completely separated as 
permanent wage labor had been reframed as a socially legitimate life path.  
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Figure 8: Pauper Statistics.  A page from the 1860 census reveals how pauperism and wages were 
tightly linked in the minds of antebellum Americans. United States Census, Eighth Census, 512. 
Millionaires: While statistics regarding the super-rich many not seem like they fit the 
category of moral statistics, in Jacksonian America they were often framed as such. What is 
more, they usually took the same route as pauper figures: a nascent capitalist elite used 
them in one way, while republicanist, “free labor” producers in quite another. Moses Yale 
Beach, a cabinetmaker turned manufacturing mogul, began publishing a yearly pamphlet in 
the 1840s detailing “an alphabetical arrangement of persons estimated to be worth 
$100,000 and upwards” in New York City. Linking capital gains to moral self-worth, Beach’s 
precursor to the Forbes 500 added brief biographical sketches of “the more remarkable 
men and families in this community…who by honest and laborious industry have raised 
themselves from the obscure and humble walks of life, to great wealth and consideration.” 
In his concluding statement, Beach noted that “in a country where money, and not title, is 
the standard by which merit is appreciated, it is desirable to adjust the standard with as 
much exactitude as possible.”259 
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In an attempt to smooth over the class conflicts of the age, however, Beach made 
sure to add that “the public” could use these statistics to critique certain forms of wealth by 
distinguishing those “whose fortunes have been acquired in a more equivocal manner.”260 
Beach had good reason to infuse some populist ethics into his statistical list. He must have 
been aware of the fact that many New Yorkers did not view millionaires in the same 
effusive manner he did. “Power and wealth are continually stealing from the many to the 
few,” Locofoco leader William Legget pointedly noted a few years prior.261 “With every year 
the state of society in the United States will more approximate to the state of society in 
Great Britain,” argued anti-banking advocate William Gouge. “Crime and Pauperism will 
increase. A few men will be inordinately rich, some comfortable, and a multitude in 
poverty.”262  
Mainstream political leaders outside of New York City contrasted the rise of great 
wealth and great destitution as well. In his tirade against the national bank, for instance, 
Missouri Senator Thomas Hart Benton noted how it “tends to aggravate the inequality of 
fortunes, to make the rich richer and the poor poorer; to multiply the nabobs and 
paupers.”263 Adhering to the tenets of patriarchal commercialism, farmers, artisans and 
other petty commodity producers viewed the number of millionaires as a negative social 
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indicator because they saw equality as the ultimate measure of a thriving society. 
According to the zero-sum rules of this economic ideology, if men were becoming 
millionaires this could only be because they had exploited others, or had received 
“monopoly privileges.” A belief in the equivalence of trade and the labor theory of value 
simply left no room to explain massive accumulation of wealth in any other way.264 
This was not the only reason many Americans disliked the use of millionaires as a 
benchmark of progress. Equating capital gains with self-worth, Beach had turned money 
into the basic “standard by which merit is appreciated.” In Jacksonian America, however, 
many farmers, journeymen and yeomen were distancing themselves from the very notion 
that money somehow reflected true, intrinsic value. In previous chapters, we saw how 
early American artisans and farmers such as Ben Franklin, George Logan and Thomas Paine 
sincerely believed that, thanks to the equivalence and justice inherent in market exchange, 
money prices served as a direct reflection of the amount of labor that went into a 
commodity. Thanks, however, to sharp inflation on basic goods and housing costs, 
depreciating bank notes, meager wages, bubble land prices and a monopolistic national 
bank, by the 1830s many Americans were quickly losing faith in the free market and with it 
the notion that money was a just representative of value.265 Rejecting the wages that the 
supposed free market offered them, urban labor leaders such as Langdon Byllesby began to 
organize voluntary labor unions in an attempt to fix wages “according to the average time 
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required for the making of an article.”266 Anti-banking men such as Gouge came to question 
Beach’s argument that priced wealth equaled social progress. “Men are brought to consider 
wealth as the only means of happiness,” he lamented. “Hence they sacrifice honor, 
conscience, health, friends, everything to obtain it.” Continuing, he compared New York 
businessmen to “the magpie, [who] in hiding silver spoons in its nest appeared to act with 
as much reflection as they do in piling money-bag on money-bag. They have no object in 
view beyond accumulation.”267 Gilbert Vale, a fellow New York reformer, also concluded 
that the government “should regard the happiness of the people, while political economy 
only regards the wealth of the nation.” Vale urged American economic thinkers to not 
“merely regard the accumulation of wealth at the expense of moral principles, health or 
rational refinement of the family.”268 
Drunks: When the temperance movement took off in the late 1820s, so did 
intemperance statistics. Much like the temperance movement itself, this was not an entirely 
novel affair. In the 1790s, physician and temperance advocate Benjamin Rush drew a 
broadside of a “moral and physical thermometer” which charted the “scale of the progress 
of temperance and intemperance.” Much like future moral statistics – and Rush can be seen 
in many ways as the father of American moral statistics - the categories on Rush’s 
thermometer focused on physical, social and mental well-being. Those who drank water or 
even beer had “health and wealth” which was defined as “serenity of mind, reputation, long 
life, and happiness.” On the other hand, those who drank heavier liquors fell victim to 
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idleness, gaming, fighting, lying, sickness, debt, jail, black eyes and rags, madness, despair 
and, finally, the gallows.269  
By the late 1820s, Rush’s thermometer was being supplanted with, as one historian 
of moral reform has noted, a “striking” amount of intemperance statistics.270 Amherst 
College President Heman Humphrey, for instance, used statistics to prove that the 
prevalent use of ardent spirits in the United States was “a worse evil at this moment than 
the slave-trade ever was, in the height of its horrible prosperity." Seeking to compare the 
“aggregate of misery” brought on by intemperance and the slave trade, Humphrey filled 
numerous pages with complex calculations based on intemperance data mostly taken from 
Unitarian minister John Gorham Palfrey’s Brattle Square Church sermons. In doing so, 
Humphrey reached the conclusion that while the slave trade brought twenty five to thirty 
thousand people “into bondage,” intemperance brought thirty six thousand. Continuing, he 
cited mortality statistics in order to argue that while ten to fifteen thousand had annually 
died due to the slave trade, thirty six thousand lost their lives to alcohol each year. “Thus, 
where the slave trade opened one grave,” Humphrey concluded, “hard drinking opens 
three.”271 
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Figure 9: Benjamin Rush's Moral and Physical Thermometer. Benjamin Rush, An Inquiry in the Effects 
of Spirituous Liquors on the Human Body (Boston, 1790). 
Humphrey’s calculations were hardly unique. At some point in most temperance 
sermons or organizational reports of the era, statistics were cited. In 1831, for instance, 
religious leaders in Boston created a table seen below which tracked the number of 
members that had been ex-communicated by their respective congregation due to 
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intemperance.272 In 1832, moral reformer Theodore Dwight Weld displayed the full gamut 
of moral statistics in a single sermon by pulling out of his pocket, mid-speech, a series of 
statistics he had created by extrapolating onto all of American society the statistical 
findings of a single city. Reading from his back-of-the-envelope calculations, he declared 
that of the 300,000 drunks in America, 30,000 would die every year; that of the 200,000 
paupers, half had alcohol to blame for their problems; and of the 30,000 committed to 
insane institutions, half had gone crazy due to drinking. Finally, he noted that "an inventory 
of all the murders committed in the land for a single year" revealed that "99-100th of them 
were committed by intoxicated men."273 
 
Figure 10: Church temperance statistics. This table from Boston depicts the number of intemperate 
members at different church and how many confessed or were ex-communicated by the community. 
Barbour, Influence of Intemperance on the Churches, (Boston, 1831). 
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Temperance statistics were undoubtedly intended to instill within urban 
journeymen and laborers, who no longer lived or worked along side their bosses, the same 
industrial and capitalist discipline that their masters-turned-manufacturers had begun to 
internalize in the 1820s.274 Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the focus of these 
statistics – much like Rush’s thermometer - remained squarely on the well-being of the 
drinker himself. While these moralizing temperance figures dominated the scene in the 
1830s, a look at an alternative type of temperance figures emerging in this era allows us to 
see the crucial differences between moralizing statistics and capitalizing ones.  
In 1830, the newly founded New York State Temperance Society, which was led not 
by religious figures but rather wealthy Albany businessmen like Edward Cornelius Delavan, 
articulated the social damage wrought from drinking, not by detailing the fate of the 
drinkers themselves as most temperance figures of the era did, but rather by pricing the 
overall cost drinking would have on society writ large. “There cannot be a doubt,” the 
society’s first report concluded, “that the city suffers a dead yearly loss of three thousand 
dollars” from “time spent drinking,” “expenses of criminal persecutions,” and “loss to the 
public by carelessness” of the drunkards. Treating the consumption of alcohol as a social 
tax, these Albany businessmen, who had made much of their fortune from urban land 
markets, used temperance figures to do what they did best: capitalize space. “At the present 
value of money,” they argued, “the tax the city of Albany pays to alcohol would pay the 
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interest on six million of dollars yearly; would build 200 houses each year costing 1500 
dollars each; and rent 2000 tenements at 150 dollars rent per year.”275  
Transforming people into income generating units of cash, into human capital, these 
temperance statistics serve as a bellwether for the capitalizing statistics that would take 
America by storm in the 1850s.  Drinking became bad not because it was immoral and 
ruined lives but rather because it was unproductive and ruined market maximization by 
cutting into a society’s bottom line. By the late 1840s, when moral statistics had begun, as 
we shall see, their precipitous cultural decline, these capitalizing temperance statistics 
began moving from the fringes to the mainstream. In 1846, for instance, the businessmen 
of the booming manufacturing town of Portsmouth, New Hampshire calculated that “the 
time lost by the purchasers [of whiskey], including years of the latter part of their lives in 
which they generally are perfectly useless” was equal to $26,292. 276  Others of the era even 
capitalized drinking on a national scale, calculating that the $9 million lost to drinking 
“would buy up all the houses, lands, and slaves in the United States every five years.”277 
Prostitutes: In 1830, Reverend John McDowall moved to New York City to do 
missionary work in the slums of Five Points. Going from brothel to brothel, he began to 
collect statistics on the number of prostitutes. At the end of the year, McDowall founded the 
New York Magdalen Society and published his findings, which claimed that there were an 
astonishing 10,000 prostitutes in the city and that their clientele consisted of some of New 
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York’s finest gentlemen.278 While the controversy over McDowall’s figures led to the closing 
of his society, his report became the opening drop in a torrent of Jacksonian prostitution 
statistics. A “census of prostitutes,” became a frequent occurrence in growing Jacksonian 
cities such as New York, Cincinnati and Philadelphia, whether they were conducted by 
government institutions like the New York Board of Alderman, moral reform organizations 
like the Magdalen Society, local police departments, magazines such as the Journal of Public 
Morals, sensational journalists or crusading individuals such as John McDowall.279  
For the staid and elite reformer, prostitution figures were often viewed simply as 
indicators of “licentiousness” and “moral depravity,” and the women themselves were 
usually blamed for having “fallen.” Depicting prostitutes in his diary as having “thief 
written in their cunning eyes and whore on their depraved faces,” wealthy men like George 
Templeton Strong tended to explain the rise of prostitution with arguments that focused on 
the intrinsic weakness of women of the lower classes.280 Other New Yorkers, however, 
viewed prostitution as a structural, economic problem. After reading McDowall’s stunning 
statistical reports, for instance, The Sun linked sexual exploitation to economic exploitation, 
noting that the increase in “licentiousness” was due to the low wages of female servants 
and the “unjust arrangement of remuneration for services performed.” In his sensational 
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book New York Naked, George G. Foster voiced the same conclusion, noting “female 
prostitution is the direct result of the inadequate compensation for female labor.”281  
The idea that prostitution could serve as an economic indicator of societal wellbeing 
led some reformers to greatly expand the scope of McDowall’s initial project, in hopes of 
uncovering the reasons behind the social phenomenon.  Written as an official report to the 
New York City Board of Almshouses Governors, William Sanger’s mammoth History of 
Prostitution included a wide-ranging statistical survey which included data regarding 
prostitutes’ health, literacy rates, age, life expectancy, place of birth, average weekly 
earnings, their trade or calling prior to prostitution, and even their father’s occupation or 
business. In Sanger’s narrative, intrinsically good yet poverty-stricken women had been 
forced into prostitution due to outside influences, as the “last spark of inherent virtue 
flickers and dies in her bosom,” and the prostitute’s “mind becomes tainted with the moral 
miasma in which she lives.”282 
While Sanger mentioned religious and social causes as well, his statistical analysis 
mostly blamed economic developments for the rise of prostitution in New York. He 
discovered, for instance, that roughly 85 percent of the women he spoke with noted that 
prostitution was their “only means of support,” and that roughly half had been working as 
domestic servants beforehand, under conditions that “would bring a blush to the cheek of 
the southern slave driver.” Like those who looked at pauperism as a republican gauge of 
societal wellbeing, Sanger placed the brunt of the blame for prostitution on the importation 
of English forms of social relations to America. “Study the moral statistics of any of the 
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manufacturing towns in Great Britain or on the Continent of Europe,” he concluded, “and 
the same results are presented, but in more alarming degree.”283 
Scholars. In 1840, education statistics appeared in the census for the first time. The 
census marshals were instructed to count the number of students and scholars in primary, 
grammar and common schools as well as universities, colleges and academies. Along with 
literacy rates, these education figures were fast becoming a central benchmark for 
measuring a society’s progress. For example, The Liberty Almanac, a key source of anti-
slavery statistics in the Jacksonian era, made sure to point out in an article titled “Slave 
Power – Morally” that in Connecticut 1 out of 568 persons was illiterate while in Virginia it 
was 1 in every 12.5. “Ohio alone had 51,812 scholars - more than are to be found in thirteen 
Slave States!” the almanac continued, adding that “her neighbor Kentucky had 429!!” 284 
What the almanac did not point out, however, was that literacy and education data had only 
been collected on whites. Apparently, no one in the census bureau had felt the need to 
check the educational status of African-Americans – be they free or enslaved. 
A main stimulus for the rise of education statistics was undoubtedly the work of 
Boston education reformer Horace Mann, who in 1837 was appointed the secretary of the 
newly created Massachusetts Board of Education - the first such institution in the United 
States. With no real regulatory or funding power, yet required to submit an annual report, 
Mann turned to statistics. Traversing through the state, he counted the number of libraries, 
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mechanics institutes (and whether they had reading rooms), lyceums, literary societies and 
the associations that gave public lectures.285  
Circulated widely in the United States, Mann’s reports became the bureaucratic 
foundation for modern education reform in the United States. The values which shaped 
these statistical reports were varied if not contradictory. On one hand, when seeking to 
define the standards with which progress should be measured, Mann’s reports contained a 
clear critique of a capitalist worldview. “Let us thank heaven,” he noted in his twelfth 
report, “that there are other standards of greatness besides vastness of territory and other 
forms of wealth besides mineral deposits or agriculture exuberance.” Criticizing those who 
focused only on the “resources” of a nation, he noted that unlike material wealth, “the 
realm of intelligence, the sphere of charity, the moral domain in which the soul can expand 
and expatiate, are illimitable.”286 Mann often took shots at how classical economics’ 
“heathen standards” measured “human welfare,” while stressing his own emphasis on 
equality: 
According to the European theory, men are divided into classes – some toil to earn, 
others seize to enjoy. According to Massachusetts theory, all are to have equal 
chance for earning and equal security in the enjoyment of what they earn. The latter 
tends to equality of condition, the former to the grossest inequalities. Tried by any 
Christian standard of morality or even by any of the better sort of heathen 
standards, can any one hesitate, for a moment, in declaring which of the two will 
produce the greater amount of human welfare?287 
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Mann also wielded pauperism statistics much like the Jacksonian masses. “The 
brilliant conception which symbolizes the nation of Great Britain as a superb temple,” he 
contended, “is turned into a loathing scorn when we behold the five million paupers that 
cower and shiver at its base.” Continuing, he channeled the anti-growth sentiments of 
Jefferson and Franklin by using population density statistics to argue that school reform 
was crucial in the Bay State because Massachusetts was “four or five times more dense than 
the average of all the other states, and density of population has always been one of the 
proximate causes of social inequality.”288 
Yet in the very next passages of his twelfth report, Mann presented a set of very 
different reasons as to why his education statistics should serve as indicators of American 
progress. Here, we see not Horace Mann the moral reformer but rather Horace Mann the 
booster who had been one of the leading figures in lobbying for railroads in the 1830s. 
“Beyond the power of diffusing old wealth,” Mann begins, “[education] has the prerogative 
of creating new [wealth]…and adds a thousand fold more to a nation’s resources than the 
most successful conquests.”289 Such statements can be read as the inchoate seeds of 
modern “human capital” theory: Education is important not because it levels the playing 
field or creates better citizens but rather because it boosts market productivity. Not 
stopping here, Mann backed up his argument with a statistical observation: In 1740, the 
whole amount of iron made in England and Wales was 17,000 tons while in 1840 it was 
over one million. This magnificent growth, Mann suggested, was largely due to the fact that 
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the British workforce of today is far more educated, and therefore productive, than that of 
yesteryear.290 
Lunatics: The biggest scandal in the history of the American census was in the 
1840s, and it was over how many African American lunatics there were in the north. That 
lunacy rates were at the center of such a political firestorm should not be surprising since 
mental health was of the most burning issues in Jacksonian America, as the establishment 
of dozens of insane asylums across the nation suggests. The story behind the scandal is 
straightforward enough: Edward Jarvis, a struggling physician from Massachusetts with a 
penchant for statistical analysis, published an article in a leading medical journal in 1842 in 
which he revealed that according to the 1840 census the proportion of blacks suffering 
from insanity was far higher in the North than in the South.291 In Maine, for instance, a 
stunning 1 out of 14 African Americans was listed as insane or idiotic while in Louisiana it 
was 1 out of 4,310. At first Jarvis accepted these figures and explained them by noting that 
“slavery has a wonderful influence upon the development of moral faculties and the 
intellectual powers” of blacks since it insulates such feeble minds from the “responsibilities 
which the free, self-thinking and self-acting enjoy and sustain.”292 Apparently, however, 
Jarvis was still unconvinced that such striking differences were accurate. He decided to go 
over the actual census marshal reports that had been created before the figures were 
aggregated into statistical tables in Washington. Much to his surprise, Jarvis discovered 
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enormous discrepancies. He quickly published a second article, in the same journal, and 
announced that the figures were all wrong. By then, however, it was too late.293  
Recognizing the powerful sway that moral statistics had in both the North and in 
Europe, and as avid collectors and disseminators of moral statistics in their own right 
Southerners did not miss an opportunity to stake a claim for the moral superiority of their 
peculiar institution. First, an anonymous writer sent a short article to Hunt’s Merchants 
Magazine revealing the stunning discrepancies in northern and southern black insanity 
statistics. (The fact that a business magazine was interested in such figures is further 
evidence of the widespread authority moral statistics had in the early 1840s.) Then, in the 
summer of 1843, the Southern Literary Messenger published a detailed article that reveled 
in these statistical findings. “Insanity arises,” the journal argued, “most frequency from 
moral causes.”294 After citing some examples from Germany, England and France on how 
insanity rates jumped during the Napoleonic Wars, the article carefully went over the 
statistics generated by lunatic asylums in Massachusetts, Ohio and Virginia which had 
appeared, as moral statistics often did, in the 1843 edition of the American Almanac. These 
statistics, which were typical of Jacksonian insane asylums, demonstrated that of the 1284 
men and women who had been committed, 879 had been driven insane from “moral 
causes” which included “domestic affliction, religious feeling, grief for loss of property, 
fright, disappointed affection and jealousy.” Convinced that they had effectively linked 
insanity to morality, the article returned once more to the 1840 census results. “Dreadful 
indeed are the evils,” the article concluded, “that produce a maniac in every 34 of the 
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population.” The same figures, the article continued, prove that blacks are “not only 
happier in a state of slavery than of freedom, but we believe the happiest class on the 
continent.”295 
The seemingly objective conclusions of the Southern Literary Messenger 
reverberated through American society like a tidal wave. From that point on, southern 
leaders such as John Calhoun would endlessly cite the 1840 census insanity figures while 
Northerners like Edward Jarvis and John Quincy Adams, as well as the newly founded 
American Statistical Association, battled tirelessly to have the errors of the census officially 
acknowledged.  What is evident from this statistical spat is how both Northerners and 
Southerners deeply believed in the ability of moral statistics such as insanity rates to serve 
as the benchmarks for societal progress. A closer look at why these insanity statistics were 
so widely respected reveals the anxieties that existed in Jacksonian America regarding the 
rise of American capitalism.296   
Much like poverty, colonial Americans did not spend much time worrying about 
mental health. They believed that God’s will, not society, had driven certain people to 
madness. By the 1830s, however, there was widespread agreement that mental illness – as 
well as most other diseases – were often brought on by social forces of moral corruption. In 
an era before the germ theory became hegemonic, the causal linkages between disease and 
society, health and culture, as well as wellbeing and morality were believed to be very 
strong.297 As a result, physicians saw themselves not only as doctors but also as moral and 
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social reformers whose job it was to improve the conditions under which Americans lived. 
Along with Jarvis, who ran a private asylum in Boston, Samuel Woodward - head of the 
Worcester Lunatic Hospital - was the leading expert on insanity in America. His statistical 
calculations led him to conclude that the United States was ranked fourth among all the 
countries in the world in the proportion of lunatics.  Why was America ranked so high? 
Writing in the aftermath of the panic of 1837, for Woodward the answer was clear: 
“Overtrading, debt, bankruptcy, sudden reverses, disappointed hopes.”298  
Jarvis argued for similar causes. Recall that he had initially thought that it was 
utterly plausible that black insanity rates in the North would be much higher than in the 
South since southern slaves (according to Jarvis) lived in an old, paternalist, and patriarchal 
world while northern free blacks were forced to deal with the freedom that comes along 
with the rise of wage labor and the destruction of a hierarchical social order. “In this 
country,” Jarvis once noted, “where no son is necessarily confined to the work or 
employment of his father, but all the field of labor, of profit, or of honor are open to 
whomever will put on the harness, all are invited to join the strife for that which may be 
gained by each.”299 As the theories of Woodward and Jarvis reveal, every time insanity 
statistics were cited, mentioned or used, a powerful cultural argument was brought to the 
fore: capitalism was stressful, and it could drive you crazy.  
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A Shopkeeper’s Statistics: Lemuel Shattuck and the American Statistical Association 
"This day 19 years ago I was born into this world a sinner, possest of that principle 
which is opposed to God and his government; totally depraved in all my actions, desires 
and affections.” That is the opening line of the diary of Lemuel Shattuck, founder of the 
American Statistical Association and the man who did more to spread the gospel of moral 
statistics in America than anyone else. Like many Americans of his day, by the 1830s 
Shattuck had undergone a religious transformation: No longer did he focus on the 
depravity of mankind but rather on its potential for perfectibility. A do-gooder who 
harnessed moral statistics for an array of different social causes, to understand Lemuel 
Shattuck is to understand the conflicting social forces that made moral statistics the most 
widespread measures of social progress in Jacksonian America.300   
Shattuck grew up in the town of New Ipswich in rural New Hampshire, where he 
lived until 1816.  After leaving home, he headed west and earned a living as a teacher in 
Troy, Albany and the frontier town of Detroit. While in Detroit, he did what many moral 
reformers of the age were doing and organized and ran the first Sunday school in Michigan. 
In 1823, however, he returned to New England to join his brother in running a general 
store in Concord, Massachusetts. After doing quite well as a storekeeper and book 
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publisher, Shattuck retired in the 1830s, moved to Boston, and began his long and 
illustrious career as the undisputed father of moral statistics.301  
A man with, as one friend once noted, “an incipient taste for antiquarian matters,” it 
was Shattuck’s work as Concord’s local historian which first led him into the world of 
numbers and statistics.302 While writing and researching on the history of Concord, 
Shattuck became interested in the emerging world of “vital statistics” after he discovered 
that the local government’s registration of births, deaths and marriages was entirely 
inadequate. Aware of the fast-developing field of vital statistics on the other side of the 
Atlantic (between 1825 and 1838 societies for the collection of vital information were 
founded in eleven English cities, six French ones and countless others across Germany and 
Scandinavia) Shattuck reached out to a number of statisticians in Europe, including the 
Register General of England and the Statistical Society of London, for assistance in creating 
a “new system of registration” in the United States. This was the beginning of a long 
friendship with many European statisticians. Corresponding over the next decade with 
physicians in Hamburg on bills of mortality, bureaucrats in Belgium about census 
questions, and the world famous statistician Adolphe Quetelet regarding cholera maps and 
public hygiene, Shattuck continued to be greatly influenced by the data being collected on 
the other side of the Atlantic.303  
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Inspired by the goings-on in Europe, Shattuck helped found the American Statistical 
Association (ASA) in 1839 with four other Bostonians. Among them was the physician who 
founded the Perkins School for the Blind, the Massachusetts Registrar of Probate, and a 
clergyman interested in genealogical affairs. Along with Edward Jarvis, who would serve as 
the President of the ASA for 31 years, Shattuck set the tone for the American Statistical 
Association through the 1840s as it focused most of its energies on the collection of vital 
and moral statistics.  Mixing an antiquarian’s interest in genealogical information, a 
physician’s interest in public health and a clergyman’s moralizing concerns, the primary 
goal of the ASA was, as one leading member noted, to examine "the physical condition of 
the people, their morals, their education, their civil institutions, and their future 
prospects.”304 Except for a few representatives from the emerging life insurance business 
who immediately saw the great pecuniary potential mortality statistics could have on their 
precious life tables, the men who patronized the ASA did not try to turn their statistics into 
money-making tools. The first-ever lecture, given by Shattuck, was on the vital statistics of 
Saxony. Another early talk was on the number of carriages in Massachusetts in 1756. 
Besides sending a memorial to Congress regarding the errors in the 1840 census, the ASA 
also lobbied for better hospital statistics, a state committee to improve the collection of 
vital statistics, a sanitary commission to improve Boston's public health and a decennial 
city census for 1845. 305 Shattuck soon discovered that the city of Boston was more than 
willing to grant him his wishes. In 1845 he was chosen to execute a city census. In 1850, he 
headed a commission on the public health of Boston.  
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Shattuck's 1845 city census became the standard upon which all city censuses in 
America were judged. Other cities, even Charleston and New Orleans in the South, soon 
recreated near carbon copies of his census in their own towns.306 Shattuck's greatest 
innovation in the 1845 census was his decision to make the individual – not the family – the 
basic unit of analysis. For the first time ever, Americans who opened the door to the census 
marshal were required to answer a series of questions not only regarding the paterfamilias, 
but all those who resided in the home. Such an emphasis on the individual was no 
coincidence. Moral statistics placed the individual - be it a pauper, prostitute, convict or 
scholar - at the center of society. Here we see strong evidence that Michele Foucault’s 
theory on the rise of “biopolitics” was spot on - only when the family household broke 
down did the human subject become the central statistical object of society.307  
While Shattuck’s novel focus on the individual may appear to be the work of an 
atomizing capitalist society, this was not entirely the case. It is true that capitalist relations, 
such as wage labor, played a crucial role in the break up of the patriarchal society and the 
emergence of a free floating society of “individuals.” That said, however, we must not rush 
to conflate capitalism with individualism. First off, as we shall see in the following chapter, 
the basic statistical unit for those who internalized a capitalist worldview in this era was 
not the individual, but rather the dollar. Secondly, and crucially, capitalist economic 
indicators did not place the individual at the center of their quantitative vision but rather 
aggregate market output and priced productivity. Even when the individual did serve as 
the unit of measure, like in per capita productivity statistics, human beings were still being 
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quantified as inputs of production, mere functionaries to society’s main goal of capital 
accumulation and market growth.  
In looking for the social forces behind Shattuck's decision to individualize the 
census, therefore, we must not only focus on the rise of wage labor but also turn our 
attention to the emerging culture of democracy and equality that was coming into its own 
during the Jacksonian era. Much like the wave of populist sentiments washing over the 
nation, Shattuck's decision to make the individual the basic unit of his moral statistics 
contained within it the rather radical notion that all men, be they paupers or millionaires, 
artisans or journeymen, patriarchs or laborers, were created equal. Shattuck's belief that 
statistics should first and foremost count people and not monied output was evident 
throughout the 1845 census. Take, for example, what Shattuck wrote in the section on 
public health after he had revealed the stunning fact that in one city ward the average 
house contained 37 people:  
Others have objected to any investigation which might show one section of the city 
to be more unhealthy than the other, because it would impair the value of real estate! 
It has however appeared to us that if facts do exist, which show any section to be 
unhealthy, they should be made known, that the lives, the health and the happiness 
of our fellow beings may be preserved; and that the suffering, and the public and 
private burdens which their premature sickness and mortality occasion, may be 
averted. In proportion as we view human life, with all the manifold consequences of 
its perseveration, to be more valuable than the few dollars and cents, more or less, 
which a landlord may receive from a tenant in an unhealthy locality…. The private, 
social or public consequences of sickness and mortality cannot be measured in 
money. This is a matter of great magnitude, compared with it, all other 
investigations are unimportant.308 
 
There were many other instances in his census where Shattuck did not shy away 
from statistics that likely made the economic elite in Massachusetts cringe due to their 
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emphasis on individual equity and justice. By the 1840s, as we saw in the previous chapter, 
urban population growth statistics were crucial economic indicators for businessmen 
because they attracted capital from wealthy investors. This fact, however, did not stop 
Shattuck from openly criticizing the massive influx of immigrants flowing in to Boston as he 
argued that many of the immigrants being squeezed into the suffocating density of the 
eighth ward were purposely “deluded from their homes by wrong impression given them” 
regarding job prospects in Boston. Shattuck also went out of his way to prove that Boston's 
impressive results in the 1840 census – a precious figure for local real estate owners, 
railroad investors and urban boosters and one which they often flaunted in the national 
press - had in fact been too high since the marshals had counted all the sailors in town 
rather than just the ones who lived there. Finally, Shattuck scandalized the well-respected 
education system in Boston when he revealed, to the surprise of many, that a quarter of the 
children in Boston didn’t go to school at all and that “the number of students in proportion 
to the population has decreased since 1825.”309  
 Shattuck's use of Boston's tax returns also demonstrates his typically Jacksonian 
era emphasis on inequality. In the same year as Shattuck’s census, a Whig journalist 
published Our First Men: A calendar of wealth, fashion and gentility which listed those 
Bostonians who were “credibly reported to be worth one hundred thousand dollars.”310 
The pamphlet not only extolled the virtues of these men, but also portrayed such wealth 
statistics as the ultimate measure of Boston’s rapid progress. Shattuck, on the other hand, 
used the same tax returns in a very different way. As we can see in the chart below, 
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Shattuck turned the city’s tax returns into a table which quickly allowed the reader to see 
the uneven, pyramid-like, distribution of wealth in Boston. Not allowing for any 
misunderstandings, Shattuck then added a short analysis at the bottom of the table that 
illustrated how those men without property in Boston (who therefore paid only the poll 
tax) increased from 22 percent in 1820 to 48 percent in 1845.311 
It is important to note that Shattuck did not focus on wealth statistics solely in order 
to point out the dramatic inequalities emerging in the Boston. His chapter “Progressive 
Wealth” also included a number of detailed charts on railroad dividends and savings banks. 
Shattuck believed capital accumulation was important, but he also believed that it was only 
a means to an end – not an end in itself. This is why only 15 of the 178 pages in his census 
were devoted to wealth. Like the other topics to which Shattuck devoted chapters, such as 
public health, water supply, religious institutions, pauperism, dwelling houses, public 
charities and education, he viewed capital accumulation statistics as yet another 
instrument which could be used to improve people’s lives.312 
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Figure 11: Shattuck's Wealth Pyramid. A graph from Lemeul Shattuck’s 1845 census of Boston which 
reveals the unequal, pyramid-like distribution of wealth in Massachusetts. Shattuck, Census of 1845, 
95. 
And yet, even though Lemeul Shattuck was clearly no businessman, and even though 
he was openly critical of a capitalist worldview, we must not ignore the cultural and 
intellectual impact that industrial capitalism and wage labor had on in his census.  It is 
almost impossible to escape the milieu one is born into, and the economic elites in 
Shattuck’s Boston were fast becoming dependent not on mercantile pursuits but urban, 
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wage-laboring manufacturing.313 Just as local economic thinkers in this era were switching 
their allegiances from free trade to protectionism, Shattuck – who as a well-respected 
moral reformer had no interest in becoming a social outcast amongst Boston’s bourgeoisie 
– clearly allowed his statistical analyses to be influenced by the interests and values of a 
nascent manufacturing elite. As a result, the need for industrial discipline and new sources 
of authority for the ever-growing mass of city wage laborers played a crucial factor in the 
shaping of Shattuck’s moral statistics. In his tables on pauperism, for instance, Shattuck 
clearly saw the poor as potential sources of profitable employment and chose to classify 
them according to whether they could work or were “unable to labor.” He also went on to 
compare how much pauperism cost the city with how much was earned by the “House of 
Industry” where poor people were forced to internalize an industrial discipline through 
factory labor which paid for their sustenance.314  
When explaining the increase in crime in Boston, another popular moral statistic of 
the day, Shattuck revealed how the fast-expanding Massachusetts penal system was 
intertwined with the state’s rampant industrialization. Citing data from the directors of the 
Massachusetts “House of Reformation,” Shattuck legitimized the disciplinary powers of the 
nascent penal system and its relationship to wage labor. Of the 685 boys and 128 girls 
committed to the House of Reformation since 1826, Shattuck noted that 323 were 
sentenced for “theft or petty pilfering”, 216 for being “stubborn and disobedient,” 191 for 
“vagrancy” and 45 for being “idle and dissolute.” Thanks to the disciplining work of the 
House of Reformation, Shattuck proudly revealed that of these 800 plus criminals, 442 had 
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successfully been “indented to farmers, seamanship and various trades” with “girls 
instructed in housekeeping.”315 Prisons and other institutional asylums, Shattuck implied, 
were successfully turning those who challenged property rights or an industrial work ethic 
into disciplined, wage-laboring employees.316  
Bostonians’ response to Shattuck’s work reveals that the worldview inherent in his 
work was an accurate reflection of public opinion. Except for a few important exceptions, 
Shattuck’s census received positive reviews in the city press. “The fruits of Mr. Shattuck’s 
labors,” the Boston Evening Traveller noted, “realize the true idea of a census, namely such a 
minute survey of the people as shall develop and exhibit their actual condition as well as 
their numbers – their employments – their political, physical, moral and religious character 
– their advantages for moral and mental culture – their position for internal and foreign 
trade and commerce.”317 Not everyone, however, was happy. For some, Shattuck’s 
individualistic inquiries were hard to swallow. In a letter to the Boston Transcript, one 
Boston resident attacked Shattuck’s personalized census, noting that it had included 
“impertinent inquiries” that not only “would get even Paul Pry to blush” but “could be of no 
kind of service, except to gratify the whim of some foolish old woman in the disguise of a 
man.” The Transcript editors heartily agreed with this reader, adding that answering 
Shattuck’s census questions would be “obeying the will of a tyro.“318 Such criticisms, 
however, were rare. Of the 19,175 Bostonian households that were inquired, only 56 were 
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unwilling to give information.319 Apparently, the people of Boston were more than ready 
for a society based not on the patriarch but the individual.  If anybody was having 
difficulties with this new social order it was the men. In a piece of information that received 
quite a lot of press in the city, Shattuck revealed that Boston’s men had been far more likely 
to refuse to answer one of the marshal’s questions than women.  
Some of the city's leading businessmen, however, were not as pleased with 
Shattuck's work as most Bostonians. The Boston Daily Whig “was unable to find anything in 
[the census] sufficiently valuable to compensate for the expense of collecting and printing.“ 
The paper went on to mock Shattuck’s rather antiquarian ways, adding that “those who are 
curious to know how many square inches of newspapers are printed in this city are 
referred to page 78.” In many ways, the Daily Whig was right. For capitalists and financiers 
seeking information that would assist in their investment decisions, Shattuck’s census was 
largely worthless. In a not-so-subtle criticism of the kind of investment-based statistics that 
were printed in periodicals like Hunt’s Merchants Magazine, Shattuck himself made this 
point perfectly clear in his letter to a local Boston editor: 
We collect facts on almost every subject, excepting our own lives, our health and 
what would be important to be known to make us better, healthier, and happier. As 
strange as it may seem, the statistics of human life , which should be regarded as 
more important than any other, are considered by some minds as less important 
than those relating to our cattle, or our hogs!”320 
 
Here again, we see the main message of Shattuck’s moral statistics. Human beings – not 
economic growth or market productivity – should be at the center of the American census.  
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The South and Moral Statistics 
Northerners were not the only ones in Jacksonian America transforming moral 
statistics into the dominant social indicators of their times. Moral statistics such as 
pauperism, mortality, insanity and crime also played a central role in southern culture as 
well. George Fitzhugh’s incisive attack on capitalist societies demonstrates this fact. 
Reiterating the mantra of “pauper slavery” again and again, by the early 1850s Fitzhugh 
was pointing to “the nomadic beggars and pauper banditti of England” in nearly every 
speech or work. By the time Cannibals All! was published in 1857, Fitzhugh had added the 
leading statistical studies from Europe to his diatribe, noting that of the “1600 [pauper 
children in London] who were examined, 162 confessed that they had been in prison…116 
had run away from homes.; 170 slept in the lodging houses, 253 had lived altogether by 
beggary; 216 had neither shoes nor stockings, 280 had no hat or cap or covering for the 
head, 101 had no linen, 349 had never slept in a bed; many had no recollection of ever 
having been in a bed, 68 were the children of convicts.” Citing an English work titled “The 
Physical and Moral Condition of Children,” Fitzhugh also attacked industrialization by 
demonstrating how the English boys who worked in mines were on average three inches 
shorter than the ones who worked on farms.321 
In a chapter of Cannibals All! titled “national wealth, individual wealth, luxury and 
economy,” Fitzhugh directly addressed those who aggregate personal wealth statistics in 
order to measure the prosperity of a society. While “it is common theory with political 
economists that national wealth is but the sum of individual wealth,” Fitzhugh wrote, “we 
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think this theory false and pernicious“ because “it requires a thousand pauper laborers to 
sustain one millionaire, and without them his capital will produce no profit.” In a scathing 
critique of those who saw capitalist accumulation as the ultimate measure of social 
progress, Fitzhugh continued his attack, arguing that “half the boasted capital of England, 
probably two-thirds of it, is but a mortgage of the bones and sinews of the laborers, now 
and forever, to the capitalists. The national debt, stocks of all kinds, money at interest, and 
indeed all debts, represent this sort of private wealth, which is national poverty.”322 
As we shall see in the following chapter, by the late 1850s Fitzhugh’s anti-capitalist 
statistical arguments were not very popular amongst southern leaders. But return to the 
1840s, and it becomes clear that Fitzhugh was the final act in a long tradition of southern 
moral statistics.  There is no better way to get at the cultural authority of moral statistics in 
the South than by returning to the scandal over the 1840 insanity statistics. Recall that it 
was the Southern Literary Messenger, a Virginian magazine for southern elites, which had 
first turned Jarvis’ discovery from an observation in a little read medical journal into a full-
blown sectional conflict that made national news. The Messenger article, however, did not 
only focus on the stunning insanity statistics of the 1840 census but revealed that the 
editors of the magazine were up to speed on other moral statistics as well. Shifting away 
from insanity figures midway through the article, the magazine turned to crime statistics. 
“Of every nine convicts in the eastern penitentiary [in Philadelphia] in 1831,” the magazine 
noted, quoting the Presbyterian Advocate in Pittsburgh, “four were negroes; of every nine in 
1841, seven are blacks!” Comparing these figures to Virginia Penitentiary, where there 
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were “nearly three times as many whites as colored,” the article concluded that black slaves 
“are a more respectable class than persons of their race in the free states.”323  
A reading of the Southern Literary Messenger in the 1830s and 1840s reveals that 
the magazine’s editors were not simply jumping on the moral statistic bandwagon when it 
suited their pro-slavery narratives. In another volume, the Messenger praised the figures 
included in the American Almanac, “especially the account of the principal benevolent 
institutions in the United States.” In an article on education the paper cited a Virginia 
legislature report which was very much disturbed by the fact that Virginia had 58,787 
illiterates while Massachusetts only had 4,448, and that Massachusetts had 160,257 
scholars attending primary schools while Virginia only 35,321.  We should, therefore, not 
be surprised that Francis Lieber, Professor of History and Political Economy at South 
Carolina College, wrote a memorial to Congress in the 1830s suggesting that the moral 
statistics section of the census be dramatically expanded.324 
As the scandal surrounding the 1840 census got uglier, Southerners exhibited their 
proficiency in moral statistics more and more. After Jarvis and the ASA wrote a memorial to 
Congress arguing that the 1840 census was filled with errors, William Weaver –
superintendent of the census and a proud Virginian– provided Congress with a lengthy 
response. Besides questioning Jarvis’ calculations, Weaver also looked to legitimize his 
findings by supplying Congress with even more statistics comparing the North and South. 
Painstakingly gathering data on “the keepers of jails and houses of correction” as well as 
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the number of “inmates in the houses of industry or almshouse,” Weaver calculated that the 
percentage of “confined” blacks in Boston was 6 percent, in New York 4 percent and in 
Philadelphia 3.35 percent. Shifting to the South, Weaver then showed that the number of 
“confined” blacks in the Richmond was 2 percent and in Charleston 1.57 percent.325 
 Today, the very notion that a slave society that whipped, raped, commodified and 
imprisoned its subjects on forced labor camps called “plantations” would dare brag about 
the low number of convicts in their midst seems utterly obscene and ridiculous. We must, 
however, recall the cultural meaning of moral statistics in Jacksonian America. Above all 
else, these figures – and the asylums that generated them – emerged as a reaction to the 
deteriorating patriarchal order. When Southerners, therefore, boasted about how few black 
paupers, convicts and lunatics they had amongst them, they revealed that they shared some 
of the same social values regarding the disruption of the old Jeffersonian order as most 
Northerners. The construction of asylums in the South further proves this point. Virginia 
had built the first lunatic asylum in the United States in 1773, and in 1825 they began to 
build a second. South Carolina legislated for a state asylum in 1821, Georgia in 1837, 
Louisiana in 1847 and North Carolina in 1848 – the final of the thirteen original colonies to 
open a state asylum for the insane.  
Southern interest in the very same moral statistics as northern elites begs one to 
ask: If the major social forces which led to the emergence of moral statistics in the North, 
such as industrializing, urbanization, immigration and wage labor, were not nearly as 
widespread in the southern states, why the shared interest in moral statistics? A closer 
look at the social changes at work in the Jacksonian South, especially in such states as 
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Virginia where moral statistics seem to have held the most sway, reveals that while the 
economic and social dynamics at work in the South were very different, the end result was 
fairly similar: social dislocation wrought by the deterioration of a patriarchal social order. 
In the North, it was urban industrialization and Jacksonian democracy which began to tear 
the patriarchal order apart. In the south, on the other hand, it was the internal slave trade.  
The internal slave trade really ramped up following the War of 1812, as the native 
inhabitants of the Mississippi Valley had been either eradicated or removed and the land 
had become available for cotton planters and their slaves. Between 1790 and 1810, Virginia 
exported roughly 64,000 slaves. Between 1820 and 1840, they exported 200,000.326 The 
effect this uprooting of slave property had on southern life was enormous, as it tore 
asunder the patriarchal society of the South in ways not completely unlike what 
industrialized wage labor was doing in the north. Until the Jacksonian era, slavery was, in 
many ways, the kind of patriarchal and paternalist institution most convincingly depicted 
by Eugene Genovese. Once slaves had been initially purchased, they were not sold with 
particular frequency. Families were rarely split up and the relatively high rate of 
manumission before 1830 proves that enslavers were not looking to sell their slaves for 
profit. As a result, planters partly legitimized the horrific brutality of slavery by convincing 
themselves that they were paternalist patriarchs who looked out for their black “children” 
just as much as they looked out for their white ones.327  
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The internal slave trade, however, destroyed not only hundreds of thousands of 
slave families but also the planter’s own self-conception of who they were. Moral statistics, 
therefore, were one way in which southern elites’ dealt with these social changes. Proving 
that the number of paupers, lunatics, prostitutes or criminals was still higher in the north 
allowed them to soothe their troubled conscience, while still giving them a sense that they 
had not lost control or authority over their society, despite the fact that their patriarchal 
household, and the source of their own social identity, had been shattered by market 
expansion.328 
 This, however, is not to say that moral statistics were being used in the same ways 
in the North and South. To get a better sense at the similarities and differences, we must 
turn to the southern equivalent of Lemuel Shattuck – Dr. Josiah Nott of Mobile, Alabama. 
Today, Nott is mostly remembered for his polygenesis racial theories which contended that 
blacks and whites were not of the same race. In the 1840s, however, Nott was a respected 
physician as well as the leading figure in the collection of southern morality statistics. He 
was in correspondence with Lemeul Shattuck and clearly was influenced by his work, 
especially his 1845 city census, as well as the writings of Europeans moral statisticians 
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such as Quetelet and Farr, whom he often cited. Despite the clear parallels, however, 
Shattuck and Nott’s statistical visions were, in many ways, very different.329 
 In 1847, Nott wrote an article in De Bow’s Review that openly attacked Shattuck’s 
statistical work. Much like other southerners had done with insanity and crime statistics, 
Nott wanted to compare the mortality rates of northern blacks to those of southern slaves. 
In Philadelphia, he managed to collect some information, which he happily pointed to as 
showing that while 1 in 26 blacks died in Philadelphia each year, in Charleston it was 1 in 
41. But Nott knew that the nationally renowned expert on vital statistics was Shattuck. If he 
were to prove that slaves led longer lives than free blacks, people would expect him to 
compare his figures with those of Boston. Much to Nott’s disappointment, however, in 
Shattuck’s reports  “no allusion whatever is made to the mortality of the colored.”330  In 
1846, Nott wrote Shattuck requesting information on the mortality rates of blacks. While 
Shattucks response has been lost, we know that Nott never received the information he 
requested.331 That is because, much to Nott’s disgust, Shattuck was not dividing whites and 
blacks into two separate and distinct statistical categories. Like many public figures in 
America, Nott complained, Shattuck was acting “as if the question were settled that the 
white man and the negro are essentially the same.” As a man who would devote his life to 
the notion that God had not made blacks and whites the same species, Nott was horrified 
by Shattuck’s statistical classification. He even suspected foul play. “Can it be that that the 
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mortality of the colored population,” Nott asked, referring directly to Shattuck’s 1845 
census, “is concealed on account of its connection with the question of abolition?”332 
 Nott also tried to use vital statistics to prove his polygenesis racial theories. If blacks 
and whites were not of the same race, he argued, than it is likely that mulattoes would be 
physically weaker and less fertile – not unlike mules. Citing the findings of an article from a 
Massachusetts medical journal, he noted that mulattoes between the ages of 40 and 55 
were fifty times more likely to die than “pure” blacks or whites, thus proving that they are 
“the shortest lived of any class of the human race.” Unsurprisingly, it was Nott who 
successfully lobbied the 1850 census to create the racial category of mulatto for the first 
time.333    
While Nott may not have liked Shattuck’s racial classifications, both men did share 
the same basic assumption:  Mortality rates and longevity figures were the most important 
indicators of social progress. Arguing that in Africa, “the average longevity of blacks (as in 
all barbarous nations) will be less than among slaves,” Nott concluded that “history cannot 
point to any epoch, or spot on earth, where the condition of the negro race, either physical 
or moral, has been at all comparable with that of the slaves of the United States.”334 As a 
physician who ran a private infirmary in Mobile dedicated solely to the slaves of wealthy 
planters, it is not surprising that slave mortality rates were a source of pride for Nott.335 Yet 
as we shall see in the following chapter, by the late 1840s many planters were coming to 
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treat their slaves more like capitalized investments than human beings, viewing their 
market price as their greatest source of pride. Nott, however, did not turn to price statistics 
to measure the wellbeing of slaves. Like Shattuck, he rejected the notion that money could 
replace people as the central unit through which progress would be measured. While slave-
owners clearly had a direct pecuniary interest in the mortality rate of slaves, Nott’s 
decision to focus on mortality statistics nevertheless reflects the patriarchal view of slavery 
in the early republic where the chattel principle had not yet become ascendant and 
paternalist planters took pride in the fact that they rarely broke up slave families and cared 
for their slaves till they died, even if they were no longer productive.  
Nott’s view of slave insurance proves this final point. One of the main reasons Nott 
was asked to write about vital statistics in the business-oriented De Bow’s Review was due 
to the ascent of slave life insurance in the South in the 1840s.  Yet while others were hailing 
slave insurance as a godsend, since it would give the south the investment flexibility it 
needed to industrialize (by making it less risky for large scale enterprises such as railroads 
or mining companies to make large capital investments in slaves,) Nott was adamantly 
against the insuring of slaves.336 The argument he gave was a moral one, and illustrates the 
tensions that lurked in the south regarding the destruction of the paternalist, patriarchal 
relations between master and slave:  
As long as the negro is sound, and worth more than insured, self-interest will 
prompt the owner to preserve the life of the slave; but if the slave becomes unsound 
and there is little prospect of perfect recovery, the underwriters cannot expect fair 
play-  the insurance money is worth more than the slave, and the latter is regarded 
rather in the light of a super-annuated horse. 
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Continuing, Nott – much like Shattuck – criticized the pricing of everyday life and the use of 
the dollar as the ultimate measure of society. “Would not many,” he wondered, “be like the 
Yankee Captain with the insured ship, ‘damn the old hulk, let her sink – I am safe,’? he 
asked, warning that “‘the Almighty  Dollar’ would soon silence the soft, small voice of 
humanity.”337 
Conclusions 
A northern society in which the patriarchal relations between master and 
apprentice, husband and wife, or father and son were beginning to unravel was in dire 
need of new sources of order, discipline and authority. Moral statistics helped fill this 
power void, serving as instruments that could instill novel forms of societal control that did 
not emanate out of the hierarchical family order. Often times, such moral statistics ended 
up solidifying and legitimizing nascent capitalist relations amongst workers and bosses. 
With an influx of foreign immigrants and a new division of labor in the workplace, by the 
1820s many laborers and masters no longer lived under the same roof or worked alongside 
each other on the same workshop floor. 338 In the South, it was a booming internal slave 
trade led to the break up of the southern patriarchal household and with it the paternalist 
self-fashioning of slave-owners. Unlike in the North, however, Southern moral statistics 
served less as disciplinary tools – there was the constant threat of the whip and the trade 
block for that – but rather as ideological tools that could assuage the anxieties of southern 
slave-owners while legitimizing the horrors of the internal slave trade.  
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Yet while moral statistics undoubtedly helped cement capitalist relations in both the 
North and the South, the data collected was not capitalist in nature.  The men (and they 
were mostly men) who took on the painstaking task of generating and spreading moral 
statistics were rarely businessmen, but rather professional moral reformers, religious 
figures, government bureaucrats, general do-gooders, prison wardens or local physicians. 
Their goal was never profit maximization. They did not price people as if they were the 
inputs of a capitalized investment stream. In fact, they were adamantly against the 
capitalization of everyday life. Their rejection of such capitalist forms of counting stems 
from the fact that at the heart of these moral statistics was a vision in which the ultimate 
goal of society was not market growth or labor productivity but rather the physical and 
mental wellbeing of American individuals. All moral statistics, in fact, shared one general 
attribute: The basic unit of measurement was always individual human beings, never 
dollars and cents. These statistics measured prosperity by gauging the mental, physical and 
social condition of the American people, even those who were enslaved. Unlike Alexander 
Hamilton’s market productivity figures or Freeman Hunt’s urban growth statistics, the 
human subjects that moral statistics counted, tabulated and aggregated were not used as a 
means in which one could measure economic growth or potential profits. With moral 
statistics, individuals were not a means to an end, but the end in itself.   
The focus on the individual, rather than the household or the “almighty dollar,” 
reveals the close ties which existed between moral statistics and the emerging democracy 
for white men. Dramatic social changes such as the removal of property requirements to 
vote, the death of a culture of deference to elite political figures, and the ascent of 
boisterous party politics reflected the demise of a hierarchical America and the rise of 
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Toquevillian individualism and Jacksonian Democracy.339 In many ways, the same social 
forces shaped moral statistics, at least in the North. Here too the basic unit of statistical 
interest was no longer the household or the community but the individual. That the 
individuals counted and aggregated by moral statistics were not voters but often inmates of 
prisons or poorhouses does not diminish the democratic inclinations of moral statistics but 
rather illustrates the less romantic side of democratic revolution. For better or worse, 
undemocratic societies in which the patriarch is the ultimate source of authority have no 
need for either universal male suffrage or insane asylums.340  
While they did not capitalize American society, moral statistics were undoubtedly a 
modernist project, the quantitative children of the Enlightenment. The moral reformers 
who joined reform societies, built asylums and collected statistics believed not in the 
depravity of mankind or the inevitability of God’s will, but rather in the notion that people 
had the ability to alter the social reality they lived in, to improve the condition of people, 
and to make the world a better place. They placed people in asylums not only to discipline 
them but also because they viewed such spaces as “a grand theatre, for the trial of all new 
plans in hygiene and education, in physical and moral reform.” There was a strong utopian 
slant to these institutions, a genuine millennial belief which sought not only to bring order 
and authority to a rapidly democratizing America but also a better life for everyday 
Americans.341  
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So yes, these statistics were often wielded as elitist tools of power, bent on bringing 
order and discipline to a chaotic new world. And yes, they objectified people into statistical 
categories such as “insane” and “idiotic” that elites themselves had invented practically 
from whole cloth. And yes, Southerners cynically used these figures to legitimize their 
enslavement of the African-Americans.  Yet, in some instances, the values that animated 
these moral statistics were not only elitism, cynicism and paternalism but also equality and 
democracy. Such a tension is evident when looking at the Americans who cited moral 
statistics in their day-to-day lives. While moral statistics were undoubtedly being used by 
manufacturing and capitalist elites to instill an industrial discipline in an emerging 
proletariat, radical reformers and journeyman workers cited them as well.  Such Americans 
were attracted to these figures because their focus on the condition of the individual suited 
their democratic worldview. They also clung to these figures because moral statistics often 
revealed the darker sides of the dramatic social transformation underway in Jacksonian 
America, thus offering an ethical vision that did not view economic growth and rampant 
urbanization as an undeniable and inevitable social good. Finally, they used these figures to 
challenge a nascent brand of capitalizing statistics that turned men, women, slave and child 
into a string of priced inputs. For while moral statistics were many different things, used in 
many different ways, by many different people, precursors of modern, capitalizing 
economic growth statistics they must assuredly were not.   
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Chapter Five 
Tale of Two Capitalisms: The Rise of Growth Statistics in Antebellum America 
In the late 1850s, statistical indicators once again found themselves at the center of 
a bitter sectional dispute in Congress, a dispute that led to the longest speakership battle in 
American history. At the heart of the matter was a book, The Impending Crisis of the South, 
whose publication and dissemination had been supported and funded by Republican 
members of Congress. Written by a North Carolinian by the name of Hinton Helper, the 
vehemently anti-slavery tract had become the Republican Party’s most effective piece of 
political propaganda, thanks in part to the lobbying power of Horace Greeley and some of 
the wealthiest and most powerful men in New York City who bankrolled the second edition 
of the book in 1859. By the fall of 1860, over 200,000 copies had been distributed making 
Helper’s book one of the greatest best-sellers in American history.  The direct association of 
Republican Congressmen in the funding of the book caused a tremendous controversy over 
who would be elected Speaker of the House as southern Congressmen refused to vote for 
any politician who had endorsed the controversial book.342 
The debate over Helper’s book has been well documented. Referring to it as a 
“rehearsal for the secession crisis,” George Fredrickson has gone so far as to suggest that 
the Impending Crisis may very well be “the most important book, in terms of political 
impact, that has ever been published in the United States.” Southerners certainly 
understood the power of Helper’s creation, as they arrested any distributor of the book and 
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even hanged three men in Arkansas simply for possession of it. What has often been 
overlooked , however, was the fact that Helper’s narrative was driven almost entirely by a 
never ending series of statistical tables he had molded out of the 1850 census data.  Driven 
by a belief that Harriet Beecher Stow’s moralizing Uncle Tom’s Cabin would not resonate 
with rational men of business, Helper concluded his preface by noting that while “Yankee 
wives” had given “the fictions of slavery,” it was time that “men should give the facts.”343 
Helper’s book, however, was mostly filled with one very specific type of fact: 
Economic growth statistics which measured the American people’s market productivity. 
Rather than focus on moral statistics as both northerners and southerners had done a 
decade prior, Helper’s first chapter, which was over a hundred pages long, measured the 
“progress and prosperity” of the North and the South by tabulating the bulk amount and 
cash value of agricultural produce that both regions had extracted from the earth. In doing 
so, he discovered that in 1850 the North had produced $351,709,703 of agricultural goods 
while the South only $306,927,067. Throughout the rest of the book, Helper went on to 
concoct a dizzying array of similar market productivity statistics. To give a few examples 
(Helper was nothing if not repetitive), he demonstrated that the North had produced more 
bushels of wheat (72,157,486 vs 27,904,476), more cash from slaughtered animals 
($56,990,237 vs $54,388,377), more money from manufacturing ($842,586,058 vs 
$165,413,027), and more bank capital ($230,100,058 vs $165,078,940).344  
In his diatribe against slavery Helper heaped extravagant praise on northern 
capitalists, some of whom would later fund the book’s second edition. In one passage, he 
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pointed to Massachusetts’s textile industrialist Abbott Lawrence who, according to Helper, 
was “always solicitous to invest his capital in a manner calculated to promote the interest 
of those around him.” According to Helper, Lawrence was eager to build textile mills in 
Virginia but the inefficiencies of slavery made him think otherwise and he ended up 
keeping his money in New England where “he employed his capital in building up the cities 
in Lowell and Lawrence, either of which, in all those elements of material and social 
prosperity that makes up the greatness of states, is already far in advance of all the seedy 
and squalid niggervilles in Old Dominion.”345  
As Helper’s book demonstrates, at some point in the 1850s, as Eric Foner, Stanley 
Elkins and Robert Fogel have all noted, northern discourse surrounding slavery changed.346  
With this shift in discourse came a change in the statistics that anti-slavery proponents 
used. If the most frequently heard arguments against slavery in Jacksonian America had a 
moral basis (and thus often cited moral statistics to make their case,) by the late 1840s 
northern elites had shifted to economic arguments and thus cited economic growth 
statistics. As one skeptical Bostonian of the era remarked, the typical free soil speech 
consisted of “one-third disjointed facts, and misapplied figures, and great swelling words of 
vanity to prove that the South is, upon the whole, the very poorest, meanest, least 
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productive.” Ignoring the plight and suffering of the African America slave, the words that 
came to be used to define the South in Northern discourses over slavery were 
“unprofitable,” “sluggish” and “inefficiency.” In his speech to Boston and New York 
capitalists, for instance, businessman Nathaniel Banks referred to the South not as an 
enemy of freedom but rather the “foe of all industrial progress and of the highest material 
prosperity.”347 
In the South, pro-slavery arguments were shifting from moral to market statistics in 
a remarkably similar way. Helper's book, in fact, can be seen as a detailed response to the 
statistic-laden literature that southerners such as Elwood Fisher and J.D.B. De Bow had 
been generating since the late 1840s. A decade before Helper would ignite the tempers of 
southern Congressmen with his productivity statistics the situation had been reversed, as 
Massachusetts Congressman Horace Mann had become enraged when he found Virginian 
Elwood Fisher's pro-slavery pamphlet "profusely scattered about the House."348 Clearly an 
antecedent of Helper's work, Fisher's short pamphlet used an array of productivity and 
economic growth figures – which he referred to as "landmarks of progress" - to argue that 
the South was far more advanced than the North. Arguing in his opening pages that "the 
first object of civilized life is to accumulate wealth," Fisher assumed that in order to 
undertake "a comparison of the progress of the white people of the respective sections" all 
one needed to do was compare their per capita wealth. Fisher then spent dozens of pages 
doing precisely that, as he compared the amount of property the average white man had in 
Maryland ($531) versus Massachusetts ($406), Virginia ($758) versus New York ($260), 
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and Kentucky ($456) versus Ohio ($276). Of course what Fisher neglected to emphasize in 
these comparisons was that he quantified African American slaves as capital but not as 
people, a statistical choice that made the South's per capita wealth figures look especially 
impressive.349  
By the late 1850s, Fisher's pamphlet was being reprinted in the pages of De Bow’s 
Review and the South was awash with a novel "Cotton is King" literature that sought to 
legitimize slavery by proving how incredibly productive and profitable it was. These 
narratives were based predominantly on priced productivity statistics which were wielded 
in order to prove the value of slavery to American society. The amount of cotton exported 
from the south in the last 39 years, southerner David Christy noted, “has exceeded in value 
the exports of breadstuffs and provisions to the extent of fourteen hundred and twenty-one 
million dollars! Verily, Cotton is King!”350 Statistics collected from Louisiana’s government 
reports, declared southerner Samuel Cartwright, “speak in a language too plain to be 
misunderstood by any one, and prove conclusively that....a dense slave population gives the 
highest value and greatest productiveness to every species of property.”351 “There is not a 
nation on earth,” South Carolina Senator and wealthy plantation owner James Henry 
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Hammond declared in his own famous “Cotton is King” speech, “that can compete with us 
in produce per capita. It amounts to $16.66 per head.”352   
As these examples indicate, antebellum Americans from the North and South 
continued to harness the power of numbers in order to prove that their society was 
developing, thriving, and progressing far more than their respective neighbors. As with 
Jacksonian moral statistics, moreover, we see how the aura of objectivity that numbers 
could generate continued to play a central role in American political discourse. But while 
upper and middle class Americans’ great respect for the impartiality of numbers remained 
constant in the 1850s, the statistics they most often used to measure the progress of their 
societies changed dramatically. As the statistics used in sectional debates demonstrate, a 
slow, uneven yet clearly discernible statistical revolution was taking place in antebellum 
America: As seen in the previous chapter, throughout the 1830s and 40s, in both the North 
and South, the “moral statistics” most frequently used to measure social progress explored 
issues such as insanity, education, literacy, disease, longevity, idiocy, imprisonment, 
prostitution and pauperism. By the late 1850s, however, productivity and wealth statistics 
which priced the market output of the American people took the place of moral statistics as 
the premier indicators of American progress and prosperity.  
 One cannot stress enough the significant ideological and cultural differences 
between these two forms of social quantification. Moral statistics served as potent 
instruments of government and elite power as they were used to discipline the public into 
accepting and internalizing a nascent, middle class set of norms and values regarding 
everything from sexuality to mental normalcy to work ethic.  Nevertheless, at the core of 
                                                 
352 James Henry Hammond, Selections from the Letters and Speeches of the Hon. James H.  Hammond of South 
Carolina (New York, 1866) 315. 
   
202 
 
these statistics lay a social vision that placed people at the center of society. However sexist, 
oppressive, elitist or racist these figures were - and they often were – they measured the 
progress of a society by exploring the effect that certain cultural, social and economic 
developments had on people’s bodies, minds and souls.  
 On the other hand, Helper’s brand of market productivity statistics was based on a 
very different worldview. These figures re-imagined the American people – white or black, 
male or female - as functionaries of capital accumulation that could be plugged into 
growth-maximizing equations. Instead of seeking to measure the effect certain social 
developments or policies had on the physical, material or mental wellbeing of the American 
public, these figures examined the priced effect people’s income-generating labor had on 
economic growth and market productivity. Such a statistical approach tended to separate 
the economic from the moral, as the wonders of market growth and capital accumulation 
came to be reified as an objectively positive “thing” regardless of one’s personal opinions 
on ethics, politics, or society. Helper himself made this very clear in his preface. “It has been 
no part of my purpose to cast unmerited opprobrium upon slaveholders, or to display any 
special friendliness or sympathy for the blacks,” he wrote. “I have considered my subject 
more particularly with reference to its economic aspects as regards the whites—not with 
reference, except in a very slight degree, to its humanitarian or religious aspects.” Later on, 
he added that it was not his purpose "to draw a broad line of distinction between right and 
wrong, to point out the propriety of morality and its advantages over immorality." For 
Helper, in short, slavery was bad not because it was immoral but because it was 
“unprofitable.” Slave labor should be replaced by wage labor, he argued, not because of 
natural rights or moral imperatives, or because of the physical and mental well-being of 
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African Americans, but rather because American society would get more bang for its 
buck.353 
Fogel has accredited the northern shift in discourse with enormous political 
repercussions.  According to him, “the shift took place in between 1854 and 1856 and its 
political success was immediate and spectacular. The new approach transformed the 
antislavery movement from a minor political factor into a political force that could control 
the national agenda.” Fogel was right, although it is important to note the class dynamic of 
this shift. Anti-slavery became a national movement in these years partly because the 
wealthiest and most powerful men in the north were finally convinced that, due to Helper-
like economic arguments, slavery should not be allowed to endlessly expand.354  
But why the shift from moral arguments to economic ones? From Calhoun and 
Jarvis’ moralizing insanity statistics to Hammond and Helper’s capitalizing figures? Why 
could economic figures “control the national agenda” in antebellum America but moral 
figures could not?  And why did this statistical shift occur both in the North and the South? 
Until now, historians have often explained the northern shift in discourse (few have 
recognized the southern one) by noting its pragmatic nature. As Foner, Fogel and others 
have noted, northern Republicans believed that these arguments were more “effective.” 
While this seems to be undoubtedly true, a crucial question still remains: Why is it that, in 
the mid-1850s, American elites had come to believe that the American public would be 
more susceptible to economic growth figures that moralizing ones?  
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 This chapter will try to answer these questions by first documenting how, by the 
late 1850s, in both the North and the South, moral statistics lost their dominant cultural 
grip on American elites quantitative imagination and were largely replaced by a very 
different set of social statistics. Capitalizing statistics. I will then explain why this happened 
by arguing that this cultural shift was due to two main economic developments: The 
capitalization of the white farmer, artisan, shopkeeper, wage laborer or petty commodity 
producer by westward-expanding railroads and the capitalization of the African American 
slave by the western-expanding cotton plantations. Rather than seeing a deepening 
ideological, cultural, economic and ethical chasm grow between North and South in these 
years, I will argue that an analysis of antebellum economic indicators suggest that the 
“impending crisis” which led to civil war may not have been a battle between a pre-
modern, anti-capitalist South and a modern capitalist North but rather a battle between 
two conflicting forms of capitalism. While this chapter does not dare seek to explain the 
origins of the Civil War, it does suggest that the notion that the war, as Eric Foner has 
famously argued, was fought over “two irreconcilable ideologies” appears problematic 
since, as the statistical discourse at least indicates, the value systems of northern railroad 
investors and southern cotton planters were changing in fairly similar ways. In both 
instances, white male elites were turning to worship at the statistical altar of market 
productivity, capital accumulation and profit maximization.355  
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The Rise of the Business Press and the Fall of Moral Statistics 
 To understand the shift from moral statistics to economic growth figures we must 
first examine the institution which played a central role in the generation, articulation and 
dissemination of this new statistical vision – the business and financial press. We will begin 
by looking at the South and then turn to the North.  
Crack open any history of slavery that has been written in the past century, and 
within a few pages you will undoubtedly come across a citation from De Bow’s Review.  The 
leading antebellum periodical for the business-minded southerner, it would not be an 
exaggeration to suggest that De Bow’s was and remains the most important and oft-used 
source for economic and social historians of the antebellum South. And yet, while De Bow’s 
has been combed by hundreds of historians, the man behind the magazine has often been 
overlooked.356 Mentioned usually in passing as a radical “Fire-Eater,” who not only wanted 
to secede from the union but re-open the Atlantic slave trade and conquer the entire 
Southern Hemisphere, De Bow’s ideological and economic views have not been examined 
closely. This may be because De Bow does not fit into the traditional narrative, perfected by 
Eugene Genovese, in which southern society is portrayed as  neo-feudal, anti-modern and, 
most importantly, anti-capitalist.357  
De Bow was a strong proponent of slavery, but he was also a strong proponent of 
railroads, industrialization, territorial expansion, immigration, banking, insurance and 
corporate finance. An overlooked advocate of capitalism living in perhaps the most 
overlooked capitalist city in American history (New Orleans), De Bow began his long and 
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influential career as a statistician, capitalist booster and business journalist by dreaming of 
becoming the South’s Freeman Hunt. When he started his own magazine in the mid-1840s, 
the young De Bow wrote a letter to Hunt excitedly stating that he planned on publishing a 
southern version of Hunt’s Merchants Magazine. De Bow would go on to do just that, and a 
comparison of Hunt’s and De Bow’s reveals a worldview that is far more similar than 
different, even if Hunt was a proud “Free Soiler” and De Bow was a proud “Fire-eater.”358  
In an early issue, De Bow restated Hunt’s vision of a data-driven “science of 
business.” Linking statistical analyses to capital gains, he declared that without statistical 
data “it is impossible than any previous calculations can be made, whether an adventure 
will turn account or not.” “To the ignorant, commerce is but a game of chance,” De Bow 
warned, “but to the accomplished merchant it is a science where skill can scarce fail of its 
reward.”359 As with Hunt, De Bow saw his role as an educator who needed to teach planters 
in the south how to become profit-maximizing capitalists.  As with Hunt, he felt that the 
most important step in this process was mastering the art of statistical analysis. “There is 
among the cotton planters no dissemination or concentration of professional knowledge 
and practice,” De Bow complained, adding that “every farmer lives in an agricultural world 
of his own.” “It is thought by many that at this time,” De Bow continued, “that it would be 
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greatly to the advantage of the planter if the amount of crop could be known. Well, most 
certainly the number of bales could be well as counted.”360  
Enthralled by the role that statistics could play in the transformation of the South 
into a capitalist society, De Bow managed to convince a wealthy New Orleans merchant to 
endow a chair for him at the University of Louisiana as “Professor of Public Economy, 
Commerce and Statistics.” A year later, De Bow convinced the Louisiana state legislature to 
create the first state statistical bureau in the nation, and place him at its head. As he 
explained, the goal of the bureau was to use productivity figures to attract eastern capital 
to Louisiana by “contrasting each period of her Growth and comparing the results with 
those presented by other states of the Union.” In 1853, De Bow parlayed his statistical 
expertise into the most coveted position of all for the numerically minded: head of the 
census bureau. While De Bow arrived in Washington after the 1850 census had already 
been designed and executed, it was he who edited and summarized the census findings in 
the published compendium that would go on to be cited endlessly by northerners and 
southerners alike.361   
 Much like Hunt’s, De Bow’s was filled with statistical data on anything and 
everything that might be of interest to a southern man of business, from cotton yields to 
slave prices to railroad statistics. Furthermore, as with Hunt’s, De Bow’s sought to 
transform population growth into a premier economic indicator of southern wealth 
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Compendium see De Bow, Statistical View of the United States (Washington DC, 1854);  
   
208 
 
accumulation. When Hunt's measured population growth, however, it mostly focused on 
the urban growth of landless wage laborers.  De Bow, on the other hand, focused on the 
reproduction of slaves. In one article, for instance, De Bow wrote of the richest man in 
Virginia who was “the largest slaveholder in the world, unless the serfs of Russia be 
considered slaves.” Gushing over Samuel Hairston of Pittsylvania (De Bow, like Hunt, often 
portrayed successful businessmen as cultural heroes), De Bow noted in awe how he 
managed three thousand slaves and how “they increase at the rate of near one thousand 
every year, and he has to purchase a large plantation every year to settle them on.”362 While 
southerners in the early republic, including Thomas Jefferson, viewed the population 
growth of slaves as both a blessing and a curse, De Bow always viewed the reproduction of 
slaves as a boon that had little downside.  
De Bow’s emphasis on continual growth and expansion can also be seen in his 
editorial choices. Often times, he would publish letters from far-flung boosters on the Texas 
frontier who were trying to convince slave-owners to push westward with their slave 
capital. Using population growth statistics as their main pitch, these letters actually 
sounded a lot like the Hunt’s articles by western urban boosters such as Jessup Scott. 
“There are now about 3,000,000 slaves in the southern states increasing at the rate of 
nearly thirty percent every ten years” wrote one Texas booster to De Bow in a letter he 
later published. “Within that time,” warned the booster, “a home and lands to cultivate 
must be found for another million of them.” As Walter Johnson has argued, the ongoing 
reproduction of slaves forced southerners in this era to constantly push for spatial and 
territorial expansion westward, even if such lands first needed to be “freed” by military 
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campaigns such as the Mexican-American War. De Bow was at the forefront of this 
expansionist worldview and in later years he would advocate for even greater growth by 
reopening the Atlantic Slave trade while eyeing the fertile soil of Central and South 
America.363  
The Texan booster who wrote in to De Bow, however, also cited productivity figures 
and income yields, as he argued that $151,885,440 worth of sugar, $158,214,000 worth of 
cotton and $113,914,080 worth of wheat could be earned in Texas. Such figures were a 
staple of De Bow’s from the beginning as he amassed enormous amounts of data regarding 
land and slave productivity figures. In an ongoing segment of the journal titled 
“Agricultural statistics” Debow would give a monthly review of a choice plantation or 
region that read much like this example from 1847: 
The plantation was commenced in 1821, with about three hundred acres; has been 
enlarged at various times to the capacity of 5,000 acres; situated in the fiat woods of 
Abbexville District, six miles from the Savannah river. The number of negroes on the 
plantation is 175; of these many are employed at indoor occupations, leaving 102 
field workers, many of whom are small, having but recently left the nursery, and a 
number of them women, who occupy much of their time in attending to their 
children, so that the effective force of the plantation numbers 70 task hands. The 
number of mules 24. I found that this force had prepared and cultivated with great 
ease 750 acres of cotton, 325 of corn, 10 of peas, potatoes and squashes, 100 of 
wheat, and 300 of oats. The corn was particularly fine, and promised to yield from 
25 to 30 bushels per acre: the wheat 10 bushels, and the oats 15 per acre, and the 
cotton 1000 lbs. per acre.364  
 
De Bow’s emphasis on slave productivity and population growth, however, changed 
over time. In the late 1840s, when the magazine was in its first years, De Bow published 
numerous articles citing moral statistics. These articles, many of which De Bow penned 
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himself, reveal a man who had read a great deal about moral figures, be it Lemeul 
Shattuck’s or Horace Mann’s reports in Boston, Josiah Nott’s studies in the south or Edwin 
Chadwick’s work in England. In an article titled “Physical and Moral Condition of the 
Blacks, North and South,” for instance, De Bow did not treat slaves like capital as his growth 
and productivity statistics always did. Instead, he looked at their incarceration and 
mortality rates. While such articles never held a dominant position in his magazine, in the 
late 1840s they were often present.365 
By the 1850s, however, De Bow had largely given up moral statistics and had turned 
solely to capitalizing figures. Narrowing his focus to three main issues – railroad 
investment, industrialization and plantation management and expansion, De Bow’s became 
awash with productivity and profit-calculating figures. Unfortunately, while this makes for 
some terrible reading, the only way to get a true sense of how De Bow’s read is to give 
another example at length. Here, in a typical passage, is De Bow capitalizing land and slaves 
in order to demonstrate to southern slave-owners what the South's aggregate return on 
capital might be if it chose to build its own textile mills rather than be dependent on the 
North: 
The best cotton lands will not yield more than three hundred pounds per acre, and 
the general average from year to year probably does not exceed two hundred 
pounds. Suppose, however, the quantity to be two hundred and fifty pounds, there is 
required 1,794,807 acres of land to produce it; and as the product will not average 
more than 2,500 pounds per hand, it will require about 195.480 hands for its 
culture. The land, at $25 per acre, is worth $44,870,175. The hands (slaves) at $500 
each are worth $97,740,000. Thus, the land and slaves together, would amount in 
value to $ 142,610,000. The cost of other necessary appendages, such as cotton gins, 
presses, horses, mules, etc. will make up at least, with the above, the sum of 
$150,000,000 as the capital employed in the production of the above amount of 
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cotton furnished to the British manufacturer. In order to make the estimate high 
enough for the planter, we will suppose his net receipts to be 6 cents per pound. At 
that price, the quantity, 480,000,000 pounds, will return him, say, in round 
numbers. $29,000,000.366 
 
Besides De Bow himself, no one illuminates the shift from moral statistics to 
economic growth figures that occurred in the pages of De Bow’s better than Mobile 
physician Josiah Nott. As we saw in the previous chapter, Nott was the Lemeul Shattuck of 
the South, and can rightfully be remembered as the undisputed father of southern moral 
statistics. In the 1840s, he made a name for himself by publishing a number of articles 
which used moral statistics such as mortality and incarceration rates to prove the 
superiority of southern life. In February of 1851, however, he published an article in De 
Bow’s that read very differently. Titled the "Future of the South," Nott used statistics in 
order to prove that the French abolition of slavery had been an unmitigated social disaster. 
Yet instead of citing moral statistics, Nott turned to productivity figures. “In 1836," he 
argued, "4,932 hands produced in Martinique 6,056,990 pounds of sugar or one hogshead 
each. In 1849, [following the French abolition of slavery in 1848] the proceeds averaged 
one hogshead for 34 hands.” Hinting at what might happen if African-American slaves 
would be freed, Nott reminded his readers that "75 percent of the exports of the union are 
the product of slave labor" and that 1.23 million dollars capital created by northern textile 
factories had been "reared upon the frail foundation of black labor." While his previous 
moral figures had taken a paternalist approach towards the slaves' health and mortality 
rates, Nott now viewed slaves solely as functions of economic growth. "The thread of cotton 
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has gradually enveloped the commercial world and bound the fortunes of American slaves 
so firmly to human progress," Nott concluded, " that civilization itself may almost be said to 
depend upon the continual servitude of the blacks in America.”367 
 Nott’s arguments did not go unnoticed. Five years later, a bestselling pamphlet titled 
“Cotton is King” repeated, in far more statistical detail, many of the arguments Nott’s had 
made in his De Bow article. The pamphlet argued that the global reliance on slave 
productivity had transformed slavery into an “institution that was no longer controlled by 
moral or physical force but had become wholly subject to the laws of Political Economy.” 
Rejecting the notion that freed blacks working for wages could possibly pick cotton as 
productively as slaves, as some antislavery northern capitalists at the time were arguing, 
the pamphlet concluded that “the products of slave labor are in such universal 
demand…that it is impracticable, in the existing condition of the world, to overthrow the 
system.” Seeking to prove the immense and ever-growing productivity of slavery, the 
pamphlet contained a table, which revealed that while the slave-to-exported-cotton ratio in 
1820 was 83 bales per slave, by 1853 it was a whopping 337.368  
 As a journalist, author, professor and statistical bureaucrat, De Bow’s statistical 
writings had an enormous effect on southern ideology. From the evidence that remains in 
his personal papers, it appears that he had a fairly wide readership amongst southern 
planters, especially the more profit-oriented slave-owners who had left Virginia behind and 
had headed to the Deep South. For example, between the years 1849 and 1851, the state 
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that added the most subscriptions was Mississippi, followed by Alabama and Tennessee.369 
From varying sources it is also clear that the leading politicians of the era, such as South 
Carolina Senator James Henry Hammond, Jefferson Davis and Edmund Ruffin, read De Bow 
religiously. Consumed by this elite class of slave-owners who had a firm grip on southern 
politics, De Bow’s educated a generation of plantation owners to think of their slaves not as 
people but as capital and to think of progress not as moral, social or physical improvement 
but rather economic growth and capital accumulation.  
 Turning to the business press in the North in the 1850s, one can discern a similar 
rise of market productivity figures and a fall of moral statistics. Hunt’s Merchants Magazine 
had numerous articles on moral statistics in the 1840s, and had even been one of the first 
papers to discover the controversial results of the 1840 African American insanity figures. 
By the 1850s, however, such figures had disappeared as Hunt's – as we saw in chapter 
three – turned mainly to market productivity and economic growth figures. Besides Hunt’s, 
perhaps the best way to track the shift from moral statistics to growth figures in the 
North’s newspapers is by following the careers of financial journalists Thomas Prentice 
Kettell and Henry Varnum Poor. While these two men’s political inclinations differed 
greatly, an analysis of their writings reveals not only how their shared statistical vision was 
prevailing amongst the business elites of the north but also how it was spilling over into 
everyday newspaper news that non-businessmen read as well.370  
 While in the midst of utterly revolutionizing how Americans received their news, 
New York Herald editor James Bennett hired a former merchant by the name of Thomas 
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Prentice Kettell in 1835 to write the “money columns” in his paper. While Bennett has often 
been credited with inventing sensational journalism and the daily penny press, this too was 
a revolutionary move as Kettell became the first-ever financial editor of a daily American 
newspaper in the country.  As one nineteenth century Wall Street investor later recalled, it 
was Kettell “who gave the [Herald] a reputation among financial men.”371 Kettell would go 
on to contribute numerous articles to De Bow’s and Hunt’s Merchants Magazine while 
editing the much respected United States Magazine and Democratic Review in the 1840s 
and the United States Economist in the 1850s. In his writings Kettel became famous for 
using statistical data to make his arguments. Particularly fond of per capita wealth 
statistics, Kettell would often use such figures in a "before and after" comparison when 
looking to empirically prove the benefits that a bank, railroad or manufacturing company 
had on a city or town.372   
 In 1856, Kettell published a book that immediately sent shock waves through the 
country. Titled Southern Wealth and Northern Profits and promising in its subtitle to use 
“statistical facts and official figures” to show the “necessity of union to the future prosperity 
of and welfare of the republic,” the book was a plea for reconciliation between North and 
South so that the incredibly profitable institution of slavery would not be abolished. “What 
will the future historian say of the North,” Kettell asked rhetorically in his opening words, 
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“which destroyed its source of profit for a mere trivial pretense?” Rejecting the notion that 
the South was unproductive and backwards, and referring to the minor issue of human 
servitude as a "trivial pretense," Kettell argued that “the condition of the South has changed 
to one of the most brilliant promise…the blacks themselves have been gradually elevated in 
material comforts and religious sentiment—not only far above those of any other country, 
but greatly and progressively above their own former condition." Turning the market price 
of slaves into an economic indicator of social progress (not only for whites, but incredibly 
enough, for slaves as well), Kettell then used his patented array of "before and after" wealth 
statistics to prove how wonderful slavery truly was. "From a market value of $250, [slaves] 
have risen to $1500 and $2000. This simple fact alone would show not only the great value 
that their labor is to the Christian world, but that their owners have thus, as it were, come 
under bonds in the sum of $1200 and $1800 each hand, to give them the best moral and 
material care.”373  
A free-trade Democrat, Kettell’s tract was adamantly pro-slavery. Railroad journalist 
Henry Varnum Poor’s approach to the sectional crisis reveals that elite Northerners who 
supported the Republican Party were using very similar statistical measures. In 1860, with 
the threat of civil war looming, Poor was asked by the editor of the New York Times to write 
a series of articles on the impending crisis. Poor was not a political analyst or public 
intellectual but rather an editor of the American Railroad Journal, a financial magazine filled 
with statistics that were designed to help foreign and local investors decide in which 
railroad lines they should put their capital. The fact that he was asked to pen these articles 
reveals how American political discourse was shifting from political, social or moral 
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disputes to financial ones. Poor, interestingly enough, had dabbled in moral statistics when 
he was a young man. In a visit to England, for instance, he had even asked to meet with 
Edwin Chadwick – the leading moral statistician in Great Britain – and then went on to 
spent a substantial amount of time collecting moral statistics to bring home to America. By 
1860, however, after years of editing a railroad journal that stressed the maximization of 
capital returns, Poor’s statistical outlook was completely fixated on issues of productivity 
and profitability.374  
In his articles for the New York Times, which had titles such as “A Businessman's 
Look at the Political Crisis”, the adamantly anti-slavery Poor began his argument against 
secession by treating slaves like capital: “The South must continue to produce Cotton, not 
only as a means to existence, but because they cannot put their labor to any other use,” he 
noted. “According to their estimate, they have $4,000,000 invested in labor, chiefly engaged 
in the culture of this staple. The interest, at 6 per cent, on this sum is $240,000,000. If they 
were no other motive, they are not going to let this vast investment lie idle.” Poor went on 
to argue that due to the South’s dependence on the North’s far more advanced society of 
industry and finance, they could ill afford to secede. To prove the advantages of the North, 
Poor used the same market productivity statistics that Helper and others had already made 
well-known to the average reader of papers such as the New York Times. Citing De Bow’s 
Review (he and Poor were close friends), Poor echoed Helper’s earlier arguments by 
arguing that, for example, the aggregate market productivity of a citizen in South Carolina 
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was $41 a year ($70 if only slaves are considered laborers) while a citizen of Massachusetts 
produced $172 worth of goods annually. Clearly, Poor concluded, such figures proved that 
the North was the more advanced society and had little to fear from secession.375  
De Bow, Kettell and Poor may have been financial journalists but by the late 1850s 
their writings were not being read solely by a small group of businessmen. Whether it was 
the New York Herald, the New York Times, or the Census Compendium, these voices of 
capital accumulation were fast-becoming mediators of everyday life and their hold on the 
middle-class American's social, political and economic imagination was getting stronger. As 
the educators and disseminators of capitalist quantification techniques, they played a 
significant role in the shift from moralizing to capitalizing indicators. Nevertheless, these 
men did not work alone. For their statistical visions to be disseminated, the data they 
endlessly cited first needed to be collected. 
The American Geographical and Statistical Society and the 1850 census 
In addition to sectional disputes and the business press, another illuminating way to 
witness the shift from moralizing to capitalizing statistics is by comparing the two 
statistical associations that advocated for these different figures. Founded in 1839, the 
engine behind the institutionalization of moral statistics was the American Statistical 
Association, an organization that was mostly made up of physicians, clergymen and moral 
reformers such as Lemeul Shattuck and Edward Jarvis. The institutional power behind the 
emergence of capitalizing statistics, on the other hand, came from a very different 
statistical association - the American Geographical and Statistical Society.  
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The American Geographical and Statistical Society was formed in New York City in 
October 1851 in the well-regarded library of John Disturnell. The books that lined the 
shelves of this impressive room offer the first clue as to the nature of the men who resided 
within it on that fall night. Originally trained as a map maker, by the early 1830s Disturnell 
had shifted to compiling information for enterprising businessmen, especially those 
interested in westward railroad investments. He wrote the first American railroad guide in 
1840 and his series of Western railway guides were widely read in New York of the 1840s, 
as was his New York As it Is series and his statistical gazetteer. All these works were chock-
full of business-oriented statistics in general and railroad figures in particular. If you 
opened the 1837 edition of New York As It Is, for instance, you might discover that the 
newly created New York and Harlem Railroad earned $37,000 from 400,000 passengers in 
1834 and $52,000 from 460,000 passengers a year later.376  
Disturnell’s library, however, did not only include the books he had written but also 
the statistical sources he had used to compile these works. A look at his library book 
catalog reveals a cornucopia of statistical data: Agricultural statistics from Ireland to 
Wisconsin, emigration reports from New York to London, the seminal 1853 “Report on 
Colonial and Lake Trade” that was collected by a British consul in America, De Bow’s, 
Hunt’s, government banking records, Canal Commissioner reports, and, outweighing all 
other topics in sheer scope, railroad statistics. These included state railroad charters and 
“stockholders circulars” as well as reports on railroad costs and earnings not only in New 
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York State but also Alabama, Florida, “Mississippi to the Pacific,” and Honduras. The men 
who met that October night and in future society meetings fit right in with the books on 
Disturnell’s wall. They included Henry Varnum Poor, Freeman Hunt, Brooklyn businessman 
Henry E. Pierrepont, retired shipping magnate Henry Grinell, future New York Times editor 
Henry Raymond, promoter of the Atlantic Cable Cyrus W. Field, Edward Mansfield, a 
Cincinnati editor, urban booster and well-regarded statistical wizard, and lastly Archibald 
Russell, the least known man in the room but one of the most important.377  
Just as Edward Jarvis and Lemeul Shattuck were the heart and soul of the ASA, the 
leading figure behind the AGSS was undoubtedly Archibald Russell. Russell had first made a 
name for himself in 1839 when he had published a book which described in great detail the 
types of statistics the decennial census should collect in the upcoming 1840 census. 
Russell’s work apparently was well received as he was asked a decade later, along with 
Lemuel Shattuck, to compose the census tables and questions for the 1850 census. In the 
decision to turn to both Shattuck and Russell we see how the 1850s was a moment in 
which America was at a statistical crossroads with elites and politicians believing that both 
Shattuck’s moral statistics and Russell’s capitalizing ones should be institutionalized by the 
American government.378  
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Shattuck and Russell’s statistical vision could not have been more different.  Even a 
superficial comparison of how they chose to frame their projects effectively illustrates 
some of the key differences between their quantitative worldviews. Russell’s book’s 
subtitle explained how his work included “proposals for uniting and examination into the 
resources of the United States with the Census.” Shattuck’s subtitle, on the other hand, 
noted how the purpose of his work was to create a census “illustrating the history and 
condition of the population, and their means of progress and prosperity.” While Russell 
viewed the census as a tool that should aggregate and standardize the “resources” of the 
United States, which as we shall see included the American people as well, Shattuck saw the 
census as a tool that should focus its energies on measuring the condition of Americans not 
as resources, but as citizens. 
In the opening pages of his 1839 work, Russell made his main statistical goal very 
clear, noting that he was “anxious to procure the opinion of businessmen upon the form 
most suitable for returns from the various manufacturing and agricultural interests.”379 He 
then went on to carefully explain precisely how such data would be collected. In turning 
first to manufacturing, Russell quickly ran into the same problem that Alexander Hamilton, 
Tench Coxe and Albert Gallatin had experienced a few decades prior: American artisans 
and yeoman households did not view their workshops as for-profit enterprises or capital 
investments but rather as extensions of their proprietary livelihood. Russell, however, 
came up with a useful narrative to solve this problem: 
If a village shoemaker is called a manufacturer, what sort of return can he make [?] 
he knows not how many boots he has made, nor the value of those he has repaired, 
but working for minute gains he does not keep accurate accounts of the progress of 
his business. On the whole therefore we believe that the term manufacture ought 
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strictly to be applied to articles intended for wholesale or export trade, and that 
those avocations which merely supply the locality where they are made are more 
properly the product of trades than manufactures. 380 
 
As the above quote illustrates, and as Michael Zakim has noted, Russell worked out these 
contradictions by simply defining his statistical categories according to his own personal 
ideological worldview: If manufacturers do not maximize profits, they are not 
manufacturers. The criteria for manufacturing had changed dramatically. Instead of 
manufacturing being defined by what it produced, it was coming to be defined by the 
profits it earned.381  
 While in this instance Russell chose simply to ignore that which he could not price, 
his work was often quite exacting. For example, unlike Coxe or Blodget before him, Russell 
was wary of the perpetual danger of “double counting,” a fear that the inventors of GDP a 
century later would place at the center of their statistical project. “If we include this wool in 
any estimate of the agricultural produce of the country,” he warned, “we must exclude it 
from its manufactured produce, for if we do not it will be reckoned twice over.” While 
completely discounting and erasing “local” or small-scale manufacturing and farming, such 
a focus on the minutiae of the census figures gave Russell’s statistical vision an impression 
of objectivity, precision and rigor that previous economic statisticians had lacked. 382  
 Finally, in detailing what manufacturing data should be collected, Russell suggested 
that the 1840 census also include “rate of wages” as well as “the aggregate time of work in a 
year.” While most of the other categories he included in the manufacturing census, such as 
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“capital invested” and “total market value,” had already appeared in the 1820 census, these 
last two suggestions were a novelty. In asking for wage rates, Russell was coming to 
recognize the importance of creating a wage labor database for businessmen since such 
figures could enable one to “contrast the different manufactures in this country with those 
in foreign parts.”383 Such wage statistics would allow businessmen to not only see what the 
“competition” in other towns, states or countries was paying for labor but also discover 
how different wage rates affected the bottom line of a firm. In requesting that the census 
add the category of “aggregate time of work in a year,” Russell was looking to create far 
more accurate productivity statistics of the American worker than any of his predecessors 
had thought necessary. Only if one knew how long a laborer actually labored could one 
then calculate the amount of cash revenue they generated in a specific timespan. In the 
1840s, the basic unit used for measuring labor time was still days, so Russell was interested 
in “the whole number of days’ work performed.” Nevertheless, Russell’s request can be 
seen as the first step towards scientific management, or “Taylorism”. As Frederick Winslow 
Taylor would later argue, the most important information needed to ramp up labor 
efficiency was precise labor productivity rates.384  
This was not the only section of Russell’s book that sought to generate new forms of 
labor productivity statistics. Unlike the 1810 and 1820 censuses, Russell believed that the 
government should not only collect manufacturing data but agricultural data as well. In his 
detailed proposal on agricultural statistics, Russell noted that there was at present a 
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“momentous question, in the course of being solved, to which we invite the attention of the 
statist; and that is, whether Cotton can every productively become the produce of free 
labour?” To answer this question, Russell shifted his glance to Hall and Jones counties in 
Georgia. Russell chose these two counties because while they had roughly the same 
number of inhabitants, Hall County had nearly six times as many slaves as Jones County. 
“Now if we could know the exact production of each district, as, for instance, that Hall 
County raised 10,000 lbs. of Cotton, and that Jones County raised 12,000,” Russell noted, 
“we would be able to see the influence which free white labor had in the agriculture of 
Cotton.” To measure the merits of slave and free labor, Russell had concluded, the census 
needed to generate more accurate cotton productivity statistics. To do so, Russell’s 
proposed agricultural statistics also included categories that measured the “average return 
per acre” of such staple crops as wheat, cotton, rice or barley. “One of the most interesting 
features of such returns,” he concluded, “would be to show the exact progress of 
improvement...and to exhibit the increasing wealth of the country at large.”385  
Working with Shattuck on the 1850 census tables a decade later, the statistical 
vision that Russell articulated in 1839 was institutionalized by the federal government. 
Unlike the 1840 census, which had only instructed the census marshals to collect the 
products of farming and manufacturing on a vaguely unclear "district-wide level," the 1850 
census was the work of someone who had put a great deal of thought into how accurate 
productivity figures could actually be collected. For the first time ever, the census marshals 
were given a very precise set of instructions regarding how their tables should be filled. 
Moreover, the agricultural and manufacturing questions were to be answered not on a 
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general “district level” but rather by visiting each farm or factory in the region. To do so, 
the marshal was instructed to “use his discretion in assisting a farmer to estimate fairly and 
accurately the amount of his crops when he keeps no exact account.” The census also 
instructed the marshals to ignore any farm “where the productions are not $100 in value” 
and any factory than made less than $500 worth of goods. As we saw in his book, Russell 
had decided to statistically ignore the labor of the less market-oriented farmers and 
artisans.386  
Just like his 1839 book, the 1850 census placed a clear emphasis on generating 
accurate productivity and economic wealth statistics. While the 1840 census only asked for 
bushels of oats or pounds of wheat, the 1850 census added the number of acres of land 
each farm had and whether they were improved or not. This would allow for the very 
“average return per acre” statistics that Russell had envisioned in his book a decade prior. 
The 1850 census was also the first census to ask farmers to price the overall “cash value of 
the farm,” as well as the “value of homemade manufacturers.” Finally, in fearing double 
counting the marshal’s instructions were clearly influenced, and likely even written, by 
Russell as they requested that if raw materials were purchased for the purpose of 
manufacture, they be removed from the aggregate value of a farm.387  
The main result of Russell’s statistical endeavor was the pricing of the productive 
capabilities of both man and nature. Without this data, none of the numerous economic 
arguments that wielded productivity statistics as the ultimate measure of progress in the 
1850s would have existed. No one makes this point better than Hinton Helper. "In the 
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process of my conversion from the pro-slavery opinions and prejudgments in which, if I 
may so speak, I was born and bred," Helper recalled in a book he wrote in 1871, "nothing 
influenced me so much, nothing so whetted my desire for closer scrutiny into the two 
conflicting systems of society, nothing so hastened my espousal of the cause of white free 
labor, and certainly nothing so strengthened and confirmed me in my utter detestation of 
negro slavery, as the thorough perusal of a certain public document. . . the Seventh 
Census."388 
While the business press, the American Geographical Statistical Society and the 
1850 census played a crucial role in the rise of growth figures and the decline of moral 
statistics, what remains unclear is the timing of this shift. Why did growth figures and 
market productivity statistics begin to capture the American economic elite’s imagination, 
in the North and South, when they did? To answer this question we must turn to the 
dramatic westward expansion of railroads and cotton slave plantations that took place in 
the mid-1830s and onwards. Both the railroad revolution and the cotton boom were 
closely linked to the flow of capital westward, be it in the shape of iron rails or human 
bodies. Only by exploring the effect that the cotton boom and internal slave trade had on 
the quantitative imagination in the south, and the effect that the railroad revolution 
similarly had in the north, can we understand why American elites in both regions came to 
measure social progress and success by pricing the market productivity of the American 
people, be they black or white, slave or free. 
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Cotton Boom, Internal Slave Trade and the Capitalization of Slavery 
Since the time of the first Virginia tobacco plantations in the seventeenth century, 
slavery had been a commercial enterprise. Following the cotton boom and the western 
expansion of slavery in the early nineteenth century, however, slaves and land were 
coming to be viewed by their southern owners not only as pieces of property but also as 
pieces of capital. The South was transforming – not entirely unlike the north - from a 
patriarchal commercial society into a capitalist one.389 The evidence for the capitalization 
of slavery is overbearing. Frederick Douglass recognized one aspect of this process as early 
as 1846. “I will give you an invariable rule,” he noted. “When cotton gets up in the market in 
England, the price of human flesh gets up in the United States.”390 Economic historians have 
corroborated Douglass’ comment.391 Following the invention of the cotton gin, the 
expropriation of western land from natives and the emergence of a booming internal slave 
trade in the 1830s, the prices of slaves began to move in tandem with the prices of cotton. 
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This is because slave owners were coming to imagine their slaves as income generating 
units of capital. Like the price of any person, place or thing imagined as a capital good - be it 
a textile machine, an urban lot or an acre of land - the market value of slaves was beginning 
to be determined mostly by the future revenue streams that slaves would yield to their 
masters. In the antebellum South, such a revenue stream was determined by the price of 
cotton.392  
Further evidence of the constant valuing of slaves according to their income-earning 
capacity can be seen in the overlap between a slave’s price and their age. The average price 
of an antebellum slave peaked roughly at the age of 30 and then began to decline. Clearly, 
slave-owners were shrewdly pricing their slaves according to the present and future 
annual revenue streams they produced. Slave-owners were also taking into account their 
slaves ability to reproduce. Even though slave-owners believed men could pick far more 
cotton than women, the average price of a ten-year old boy and girl were the same: 400 
dollars. Such a convergence can only be explained by the fact that slave-owners were not 
only capitalizing future bales of cotton but future generations of enslaved children as well. 
393  
The valuation of slaves according to their market productivity can also be seen by 
the ways in which slaves were priced according to their physical capacities and supposed 
character traits. At a slave auction in Richmond, Virginia in 1853, for instance, an enslaved 
boy who was 5 feet tall was worth 850 to 950 dollars while a boy who was only 4 foot 8 
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inches was worth only 700 to 800 dollars. Apparently, each inch of the young slave’s body, 
in the slave-owners eye, was a sign of increased market productivity.394 Plantation 
inventories of the antebellum era further illustrate how slaveholders were coming to 
imagine the slave first and foremost as a unit of income producing cash. James Coles Bruce 
was one of the largest slave-owners in the South. His slave inventory listed the age of the 
slave, measured their productivity in units of “hands”, their market value and finally, their 
temperament and their health. Claiborn West, a 28-year old “full-hand,” was listed as a 
“good negro” and was worth 800 dollars. Bob Scooner was also a 28-year old “full-hand” 
but was only worth 700 dollars because he was “well disposed but sloe.” Bruce, apparently, 
had calculated that Scooner’s lower productivity was worth roughly 100 dollars. Finally, 
John Miller was also a 28-year old “full-hand,” and there is nothing to suggest that he was 
not a productive worker. But Miller was listed at only 600 dollars because he had runaway 
in the past. The 200 dollars Bruce knocked off his market value was apparently the 
capitalized risk premium of him doing so again.395  
From a capitalist’s point of view, slaves were a dream investment in the 1850s. 
Their earnings were stable, the markets for them liquid, their value was constantly on the 
rise and unlike machines or land, they could both reproduce themselves and be spatially 
moved from place to place. Southerners understood all of this. One does not, therefore, 
need to look only at cotton or slave price patterns to prove that slaves were being 
capitalized. We can also listen to the slave-owners themselves. “The peculiar institution,” 
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one southern commentator noted in De Bow’s, “had become the most profitable and safe 
investment in the whole country.”396  James Henry Hammond reveled in the fact that slaves 
not only earned profits for their owners in the field but in the marketplace, noting how “the 
very negro who, as a prime laborer, brought 400 dollars in 1828 would now, with thirty 
years upon him, sell for 800.”397  
A strong connection between the price of a slave and their market productivity 
could, however, only come about if slaveholders more-or-less knew, in every given year, 
the market productivity of their slaves. As slave narratives and other sources show, 
enslavers clearly had such data at their fingertips thanks to the daily routine known as the 
weighing of the cotton. “When a new hand, one unaccustomed to the business, is sent for 
the first time into the field,” escaped slave Solomon Northup explained, “he is whipped up 
smartly, and made for that day to pick as fast as he can possibly. At night it is weighed, so 
that his capabilities in cotton picking are known.”398 Historians have shown that this was a 
widespread practice. A crucial method not only of discipline but also of capitalization, the 
daily meeting of slave and overseer included not only a whip but also a slate that carefully 
documented the number of bales that each slave picked. Finally, it is important to note that 
even those slave-owners who did not weigh their own slaves’ cotton could still estimate 
their productivity rates thanks to planter journals such as De Bow’s.399   
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The capitalization of slaves, however, did not emerge solely out of the goings-on on 
the slave plantation but rather had much to do with the booming markets for slaves that 
were developing in every major southern town in antebellum America. One of the main 
reasons the widespread capitalization of slaves did not take place on colonial tobacco farms 
was due to the crucial fact that most slaves in colonial America were rarely re-sold through 
a liquid slave market. The early American tobacco plantation was still based on the 
paternal and proprietary tenets of the patriarchal household. As a result, slave-owners 
were very hesitant to sell their slaves and most sales occurred only after death or 
bankruptcy. Furthermore, since slaves, much like land, were viewed as property but not 
capital in early America, slave-owners rarely kept track of their slaves’ fluctuating market 
values. In the direct tax law of 1798, for instance, it was noted that “all slaves, whether 
negroes, mullatoes or mestizos above the age of 12 and under the age of 50…shall be 
assessed at fifty cents.”400  When calculating the wealth of a plantation in 1798, and again in 
1815, there was no difference in the price of a 49-year old or an 11-year old. This is partly 
because the fairly rare occurrence of slave selling created a minimal internal slave market 
that was not very liquid or widespread.  Furthermore, due to the patriarchal-commercial 
nature of slavery in colonial and early America, few slave-owners sought to value their 
slave by extrapolating how much tobacco or rice they would annually pick for the next 
twenty or thirty years.401  
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Besides the capitalist discipline and pricing practices taking place on the plantation, 
the second central development which led to the capitalization of slaves was, therefore, the 
explosion of the internal slave trade and the social ascendance of the chattel principal in 
antebellum America. While the chattel principal, of course, existed in colonial and early 
America, other social principals such as patriarchy, paternalism and proprietary held more 
sway. By the 1830s, however, this was no longer true. Historians agree that the 1820s and 
30s were the crucial decades for the internal slave trade and the ascendance of the chattel 
principal as perhaps the most dominant force in the antebellum South. Between 1790 and 
1810, roughly 115,000 slaves had been either bought or sold via the internal slave trade. 
Between 1820 and 1840, that number exploded to 415,000.402  As the set templates of slave 
accounting books in the antebellum era reveal, this booming trade caused owners to begin 
to annually update the price of their slaves as they constantly had one eye on the market. If 
you were to ask a slave-owner in 1750 Virginia how much one of his slaves was worth, 
you’d likely get a very generic price that had not changed in years. In 1850 Alabama, on the 
other hand, you’d likely receive a far more accurate, updated and thought-out price. The 
fairly static wealth of an agrarian civilization had liquefied into the dynamic flow of a 
capitalist society where slaves were becoming mobile units of capital that could be 
exchanged in a highly liquid capital goods market.403  
  Besides the internal slave trade and the global cotton boom, other factors also 
played a role in the capitalization of the slave. The emerging field of slave life insurance, for 
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instance, forced even less business-oriented slave-owners to think about the future 
revenue stream they would receive from their slaves. You could not answer the 
question”How much should I insure my slave for?” without first capitalizing them.  Like the 
slave market, life insurance companies were sites of capitalist education and discipline as 
they served, much like slave traders, as experts on the “proper” price of certain slaves.404 
Banks also played a crucial role in the transformation of slaves into capital when they 
began to lend out mortgages to buy slaves. Should I purchase a slave on credit for 8 percent 
interest? Like any investment made on credit, a slave-owner would only mortgage a slave if 
they had already answered this question by contemplating the return they would get by 
pricing the slave’s future productivity. After all, before purchasing a slave with credit the 
slave-owner needed to know if the cotton-picking abilities of the slave would cover the 
interest as well as the principal of the loan.405 Finally, the urban industrialization of slavery 
played an important role in the capitalization of slaves as well. 31 percent of all urban slave 
workers had been hired out in the antebellum south. Hiring slaves out required slave 
owners to price not only the ma rket value of their slave but their annual earnings. Do I ask 
for 10 dollars a year or 12? Only by pricing the slave’s market productivity could that 
question be answered.406  
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As the main social goal of southern slave-owners shifted from the patriarchal-
commercialism’s objective of proprietary power over enslaved people to the capitalist 
objective of  investment maximization, and as slaves came to be seen not only as property 
but as capital, southerners began to view slave productivity not only as a marker of their 
plantation’s success but southern progress overall. No one demonstrates this clear 
connection between market productivity figures collected on slave plantations and the 
economic indicators used to praise southern progress more than South Carolina Senator 
James Henry Hammond. As historian Drew Faust has demonstrated in great detail, 
Hammond was a very business-oriented planter. On the day that he arrived on the 
plantation he received through his wife’s inheritance, he conducted a “slave census.” Soon 
later, he calculated what the capital returns of the previous plantation owner had been and 
discovered that it was less than one percent. As a result, he shifted his slaves to the far 
more productive and industrial form of “gang labor.” He also began to keep careful track of 
how much cotton his slaves picked and often used contests to try and boost their 
productivity.407  
As a result, Hammond was constantly calculating his slave’s productivity as well as 
the return they yielded him. In a document he titled “Crop Statistics for Silver Bluff,” he 
calculated that he earned a profit of $215 a year from each slave.408  Keeping close tabs on 
his overall revenue, in 1841 he noted how his annual income averaged $12,500.409 Finally, 
Hammond was very aware of what other slave-owners were doing (thanks to the market 
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productivity statistics he received in magazines such as De Bow’s) and felt the need to 
prove his social worth as a planter by squeezing more money out of his slaves than others. 
“I feel a strong desire to beat the western planters,” he wrote to his close friend Edmund 
Ruffin, “on my whole crop, per acre, and per hand.”410 
By the late 1850s Hammond’s focus on his slaves’ market productivity transformed 
from a tool used to maximize his plantation’s profits to a tool used to measure southern 
society as a whole. In his Cotton is King speech, Hammond spent a great deal of time 
carefully comparing northern and southern productivity statistics in order to show that the 
South produced $220 million a year while the North only $95 million. “If I am right in my 
calculations as to $220,000,000 of surplus produce,” Hammond concluded, “there is not a 
nation on the face of the earth, with any numerous population, that can compete with us in 
produce per capita.   It amounts to $16.66 per head.” Just as Hammond would measure the 
productivity of his slaves every night with a whip and a slate, so he chose to measure the 
progress of southern society.411   
An Investor’s Millennium: The Statistical Revolution of the Railroad 
In 1851, the wealthy railroad investors of Boston, a city that was undoubtedly the 
antebellum heart of American railroad finance, decided to organize a celebration in honor 
of the “completion of various lines of Railway, which connect the Canadas and the Great 
West with the Tide Water at Boston.” To prepare for the celebration, a number of 
committees were organized. There was a committee “to arrange for the meeting of the 
merchants,” for “fireworks,” for a “harbor excursion,” as well as a committee in charge of 
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creating a statistical “tabular representation of the present condition of Boston in relation 
to railroad facilities, foreign commerce, population, wealth, and manufacturers.”412  
The statistical report that was eventually written contained a great deal of figures 
which calculated the different Boston railroads’ gross earnings, costs and profits (“the net 
income was more than 6 per cent”) while also keeping track of real estate values, 
manufacturing output, freight tonnage and population growth. Desiring an accurate 
estimate of daily passenger traffic, a committee even paid a private police force of 55 men 
to spread out across the city from 630AM to 730PM on September 6th 1851 in order to 
count the number of passengers who came in (41,729) and out (42,313) of the city on a 
given day. As the report demonstrated, a great deal of people now used the railroad to 
come to Boston: 11,963 came by train, 14,310 by foot and only 127 by horseback. 413  
As American historians have long recognized, the railroad revolutionized American 
society in countless ways: Railroads were the first large, multi-unit corporation in 
American history. They developed new forms of corporate management, finance and 
control. They turned the American stock market from a backwater institution into a global 
powerhouse. They attracted massive flows of capital from across the world. They had a 
dramatic effect on the natural environment. They helped create robber barons, the Knights 
of Labor, the Granger movement, grain elevators, and Chicago. They radically altered 
politics, power relations and labor conditions. They annihilated time and space.  Railroads, 
however, also brought with them a statistical revolution. The fact that railroad investors 
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chose to celebrate not only with fireworks and harbor tours but statistical tables was no 
coincidence. Statistics were part and parcel of the railroad revolution. Railroads, as William 
Cronon has noted, "generated vast new quantities of statistics which themselves helped 
revolutionize the American economy by making possible increasingly intricate analyses of 
trade and production."414 To fully understand the statistical revolution that the railroads 
wrought, however, we must first look back at canals, the state-run predecessors that 
privatized railroads quickly made obsolete.415 
One of the most profound moments in American history came when the toll 
statistics from the first Erie Canal comptroller report were published in the winter of 1825. 
These toll reports, which translated how much freight traffic had been transported on the 
canal into earnings in dollars and cents, were published in all the local newspapers along 
the canal corridor, from the Rochester Telegraph to the Ithaca Journal. Most importantly, 
however, these reports caught the eye of New York elites. While many New York 
businessmen supported the state’s construction of the Erie Canal by purchasing state 
bonds, many others were wary about investing so much capital into such a massive and 
novel transportation project. That was the main reason the canal became a state project in 
the first place – American and European capitalists were unwilling to risk so much money 
in such an unprecedented act of human engineering. All that began to change with the first 
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canal comptroller report in 1825. Quickly digesting the toll data it had received, the New 
York Evening Post excitedly noted that “together with the tolls, the debt will be paid in 
about ten years...the duty on the salt may be removed and leave an income to the state of 
about one million per annum.” The traffic statistics that the canal created had suddenly 
made the very risky into the very quantifiable: Not only would the Erie Canal pay back its 
debts, it would be immensely profitable.416  
The canal tolls, however, did more than just whet the appetite of capital.  They also 
changed the way investors viewed the United States and its inhabitants. Below is an article 
from the Albany Argus which includes a few tables taken from the canal comptroller report 
in 1826. Next to each town along the canal corridor appears the amount of revenue that the 
canal had earned from their respective tolls. Just by glancing at this one chart, capitalists 
could get a sense of the market output of each town.  The citizens in the town and 
hinterland of Palmyra and Port Byron, this chart reveals, were clearly producing more 
goods for the market than those of Rome or Little Falls. The canal was not initially designed 
to become a generator of market statistics – but that’s precisely what happened. Never 
before had American investors been able to get such a clear and concise sense of the 
American people’s market productivity. As we saw in earlier chapters, attempts were made 
in the 1810 and 1820 census –but they failed miserably. Unsurprisingly then, canal toll 
reports soon became staples of the American statistical vision. They appeared in 
newspapers, gazetteers, daily newspapers and government reports. Often tabulated much 
like the chart below, these reports translated the labor of the American people and the 
                                                 
416 New York Evening Post, Feburary 11th 1825; Rochester Telegraph, Feb 8 1825; Ithaca Journal, Feb 9 1825. 
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products of American land into a single, easily digestible number. While slave-owners in 
the south were pricing people, the canals in the north were pricing whole towns.417  
 
Figure 12: Canal Toll Statistics. Erie Canal tolls allowed investors not only to track the income earned 
from domestic commerce but to imagine whole cities as a series of prices. New York Spectator, 
December 26th, 1826.  
 
                                                 
417 For examples of canal toll statistics see William Darby, A New Gazetteer of the United States of America 
(Hartford, 1833) 439-451, esp 448; “Finances of Pennsylvania,” Niles Weekly Register, April 27th 1833; The 
American Almanac, 1 (1830): 265; Samuel Hazard, Hazard’s Register of Pennsylvania, 12 (1833):63,96, 141-3;  
John Disturnell, Disturnell’s Gazetteer of the State of New York (1843), 40. 
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As capitalists began to calculate the profits that could be reaped from 
transportation, they began to pour massive amounts of capital into other canal projects as 
well. In the same year the canal reports were first published, the Ohio state government 
easily sold $400,000 worth of canal bonds to the first Wall Street syndicate in American 
history led by Nathaniel Prime, John Jacob Astor, John Robins and John Bone. By the mid-
1830s, New York and Boston businessmen began to realize that instead of lending capital 
for state projects, they could own their very own privatized, highly capitalized, revenue-
making transportation systems. The railroad revolution had begun. Railroad construction, 
however, required enormously unprecedented amounts of capital. It was never easy to get 
American or foreign investors to place their precious capital in novel endeavors. As with 
the Erie Canal toll reports, therefore, statistics became a crucial tool in convincing investors 
- local or foreign, small or large - to put their money in railroads. For investors to part ways 
with their money, they needed to first imagine their profits. Statistics allowed them to do 
so.418   
One of the first Americans to realize the power that numbers could have in the 
world of railroad finance was Boston newspaper editor and railroad booster Nathan Hale. 
Hale was raised in Westhampton, Massachusetts and briefly taught math at Phillips Exeter 
Academy where he discovered his love of the quantitative. In 1814 he purchased the Boston 
Daily Advertiser, the first daily newspaper in Massachusetts. A fanatic about railroads, Hale 
would go on to become the first president of the first steam railroad in America, the Boston 
                                                 
418 On canals see Roy, Socializing Capital; Harry Scheiber, Ohio Canal Era: A Case Study of Government and the 
Economy (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1969); Carter Goodrich, Canals and American Economic 
Development. On the crucial shift from public canals to private railroads see also Louis Hartz, Economic Policy 
and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776-1860 (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1948). 
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and Worcester. Concurrently, he ran and edited the Advertiser until 1854. A proud 
Brahmin, Hale married Sarah Preston Everett, the sister of the powerful businessman, 
orator and politician Edward Everett. The Advertiser soon became the mouthpiece of 
Brahmin capital, and Hale’s son would later recall “seeing his mother rock the cradle in 
which reposed his sister…whole [Daniel] Webster and Judge Story dictated to her speeches 
that were to appear in her husband’s paper.”419 
When Hale first began preaching for a railroad between Boston and Albany in the 
1820s few listened to him. He recalled in his own memoirs how his closest friends left his 
house “with expression of pity,” after he had tried to convince them of the railroad’s 
practicality. A competing paper in Boston referred to Hale’s proposed Boston and Albany 
railway as “a project which everyone who knows the simplest rule of arithmetic to be 
impracticable, but at an expense little less than the market value of the whole territory of 
Massachusetts; and which, if practicable, every person of common sense knows would be 
useless as a railroad from Boston to the moon.” As this quote suggests, Americans in the 
1820s apparently did not yet wield the capitalizing arithmetic needed to invest in railroads. 
Hale, however, would devote the next 30 years of his life to changing precisely that.420  
In 1829, Hale became the head of the Board of Directors of Internal Improvements 
of the State of Massachusetts in order to carry on an “educational campaign” for railroads. 
The first step of this campaign was a report, largely written by Hale, “on the practicability 
and expediency of a Railroad from Boston to the Hudson River and from Boston to 
                                                 
419 Hale Family Papers, Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College, Five Colleges Archives, Northampton, MA. 
Edward Everett Hale quoted in Hale Family Papers, Biographical Note. 
 
420 Hale memoir can be found in Hale Family Papers; For Hale’s statistical obsession with railroads see Nathan 
Hale Papers, Library of Congress; folder 1-3, passim which are filled with endless doodles in which he thought 
to estimate the future revenue of the Boston and Albany Railroad. 
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Providence.”421 In this report, Hale began by first citing an engineer’s estimates regarding 
the costs of constructing a railroad to Albany and Providence.  Shifting to the future 
potential income of these railroads, Hale turned to a diverse array of market output 
statistics he had apparently been collecting for years. The figures Hale cited, such as the 
amount of merchandise imported each year from Albany to Boston (roughly 6,091 tons), 
the number of passengers that traveled each year between the two towns (23,475) or the 
cords of firewood (120,000) Boston annually consumed, allowed him to present a 
seemingly rationalized, empirical and accurate estimate of how much money the railroad 
would make.422 When Hale sought to measure “the business of the country lying between 
Boston and Albany,” however, he was forced to admit that “this is a branch of our inquiry in 
which it is difficult to attain that degree of certainty which is desirable.” As a result, Hale 
explained to the reader that “agents have been employed to visit most of the towns in the 
counties of Berkshire, Franklin, Hampshire, Hampden and Worcester, and to procure on 
the spot, from the best sources of information, estimates of the amount of merchandise 
brought from the seaboard into each town, for the supply of the inhabitants ; the amount of 
produce carried from each, to the seaboard; the amount of raw materials brought into each 
town, for the use of the manufacturing establishments; and the quantity of manufactured 
goods carried abroad.”423  
Hale was not the only railroad booster seeking better market input/output 
statistics. By the 1840s, in fact, there was an unquenchable thirst for such figures. As one 
                                                 
421 Massachusetts Board of Internal Improvements, Report of the Board of Directors... on the practicability and 
expediency of a Railroad from Boston to the Hudson River and from Boston to Providence (Boston, 1829). 
 
422 Ibid, 28 
 
423 Ibid, 30. 
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Pennsylvania railroad booster grimly noted in 1841, “all who, as holders of stocks, 
capitalists, and dealers, are pecuniary interested in the financial history and condition of 
the commonwealth, have long felt and lamented the want of necessary and accurate 
information. To learn anything, an examination of various and scattered documents was 
required, and the statistics there given were always dubious and often most incorrect.”424 
Was the fact then that that the 1840 and 1850 censuses were the first to try and supply 
precisely these types of statistics a mere coincidence? Probably not. While there is no 
“smoking gun” linking the 1840 or 1850 census to railroad boosters, the fact that Archibald 
Russell was a leading member of the American Geographical and Statistical Society, an 
organization that put railroad investment at the forefront of its concerns, suggests that 
those pushing for an expanded agricultural and manufacturing data in the 1850 census had 
railroads on their mind when doing so.  
Thanks to the data collected on agriculture and manufacturing in the 1840 census, 
by the 1840s there was no need for railroad boosters to send agents out across the land as 
Hale was forced to do. As a result, the market productivity statistics which appeared in the 
census soon became staples of the railroad booster’s report. In 1844, for example, 
businessmen looking to build a railroad from Providence to Worcester explained how the 
"following statements are presented, to exhibit the inducements it offers for capitalists to 
subscribe the means necessary for its construction." They then went on to supply an array 
of productivity statistics taken from the 1840 census, such as the fact that "a papermaker 
                                                 
424 John Hammond, Tabular Statement of the Cost, Revenue and Expenditures of the Several Finished Lines of the 
Canals and Railroads of the Commonwealth (Harrisburg, 1841). 
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employs fourteen hands, pays freight on more than four hundred tons of merchandize and 
ships to New York one hundred tons annually."425 
In 1845, the New York and Hartford Railroad published a similar report in order to 
estimate “the amount of business, transportation and travel in the immediate vicinity of the 
line, and the annual income it is reasonable to expect on the first opening of the 
railroad.”426 At the center of this report was the table found below. Similar to the canal toll 
figures, the table below - which was typical of the age - supplied an array of statistics on the 
towns that would be situated on the future railroad. Thanks to the 1840 census, this table 
could now supply the reader with town-by-town information on the number of people, 
cotton and wool mills, spindles, looms, yards of cotton and woolen cloth produced per 
week, bales of cotton and pounds of wool consumed per year, “machine shops,” as well as 
the number of females and males employed. Calculating freight costs and passenger prices, 
the table then aggregated all this market productivity into two prices: The estimated 
amount the railroad would earn in each town and from passengers and from freight. Once 
again, we see how the desire for railroads was leading Americans to price the market 
productivity of whole communities.427  
                                                 
425 Facts and Estimates relative to the Business on the Route of the contemplated Providence and Worcester 
Railroad; (Providence, 1844). 
 
426 Report of Committee upon the statistics of business and of the engineer upon the survey of the several routes 
for the contemplated New York and Hartford Railroad via Danbury. (Hartford, 1845), 4. 
 
427 Ibid, 25. 
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Figure 13: Calculating the Railroad Business. Taken from a report seeking to attract capital for the 
New York and Hartford railroad, this elaborate table reveals how railroads caused American 
businessmen to quantify, in great detail, the market productivity of American towns. New York and 
Hartford Railroad, 25. 
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Once a railroad was built an explosion of statistical data ensued.  Suddenly, the 
income statistics from freight and passenger traffic were no longer an estimate but a 
reality, (albeit likely an exaggerated one in the annual railroad reports.) All one had to do 
was analyze the traffic data in these annual reports in order to capitalize the market 
productivity of the American people into present or future returns. This is precisely what 
Henry Varnum Poor did as the financial editor of the American Railroad Journal, and it was 
a huge success. In the 1850s alone, five weekly and two monthly railroad periodicals were 
begun. Poor, however, led the way. The Railroad Journal’s subscription list increased from 
only 12,000 in 1849 to 30,000 in 1854. Consuming hoards of data on railroad’s operational 
costs and incomes, Poor digested and translated these figures into easy-to-read profit-
oriented statistics and tables. Poor was not only conveying a series of objective numbers 
but also a social vision of capitalized growth. “With accumulated capital, which represents 
time, we can in fifty years reach a point which, without it, it would take us two hundred to 
attain,” he exclaimed with growth-maximizing excitement in one typical article.428  
As a financial journalist who gave statistical advice as to where capitalists should 
invest their money, Poor was constantly quantifying American towns and the people who 
populated them into incoming yielding sources of capital gains. He understood that while 
profits may appear to come from the abstracted financial instruments known as railroad 
bonds that were traded in the now booming New York stock market, the true source of 
these capital gains lay in the American people who lived in the small villages and farms that 
                                                 
428 Poor, American Railroad Journal, 25 (1852): 506; For railroad freight and passenger statistics that 
calculated the income of railroads look at any annual railroad corporate report of the era at the Baker Library 
Archives, Harvard Business School. For a sampling of the digested data prepared by Poor from a single 
volume see American Railroad Journal, 25 (1852): 232, 410-411; 506-7; 552; 561-2; 600, 776, 689-90. 
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dotted the American landscape. Poor’s financial data, in short, was not just capitalizing the 
iron tracks that were crisscrossing America but the millions of farmers, factory workers, 
artisans and shopkeepers across America who produced and distributed the goods that 
rode the rails. Is it any wonder then, that when Poor turned to compare the progress of the 
North with that of the South in a series of New York Times articles he used the very same 
economic growth and market productivity statistics that he used to measure the future 
stock dividend of a railroad corporation?  
The same pattern appears in the journalistic work of Thomas Prentice Kettell and 
Nathan Hale. For three generations, Nathan Hale supplied his Brahmin readership with a 
steady stream of railroad statistics through the pages of his Advertiser. As with Poor, these 
figures depicted the inhabitants of Massachusetts as income yielding units of railroad 
capital. Kettell loved to write about the wonders of the railroad and, like Poor, he 
disseminated a statistical vision of capitalized growth as social progress in his newspaper 
articles.  “Why the railroads of Massachusetts have cost 50,000,000, and the wealth of the 
state has increased 300,000,000 or six times the amount in ten years,” Kettell gushed in a 
typical statement. “That is to say, from the land at Plymouth to 1840, two hundred years 
elapsed, in which the wealth of Massachusetts reached $299,878,327. Ten years of rail-
roads have added a sum equal to the whole results of those two hundred years. Is that not a 
railroad pace?”429 As with Poor, when Kettell turned to the question of Northern and 
Southern progress, he too chose to measure societal wellbeing with the same capitalizing 
statistics he gauged railroad profits. 
                                                 
429 Kettell, “Influence of Railroads.”  
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Seeing how potential American railroad investors were being bombarded by Hale, 
Poor and Kettell’s statistics which depicted the American people as potential sources of 
income throughout the 1840s and 1850s, it is not surprising that Hinton Helper’s 1857 
narrative, which used the same type of productivity statistics to measure the progress of 
American society, became a best-seller among American elites in the north. In early and 
Jacksonian America, few American businessmen were directly dependent on national, 
regional or even local productivity growth for their own pecuniary benefit. But as a class of 
merchants, shopkeepers and manufacturers slowly transformed into a class of railroad 
investors, their own day-to-day investment gains began to be closely intertwined with the 
market productivity of iron welders in Worcester, dry goods merchants in Cincinnati or 
seamstresses in Chicago. Market statistics became the medium through which these 
connections were first forged and understood. These figures, in short, changed the way 
investors saw the America people while also teaching them that their own economic 
success hinged on the American people’s market productivity.  As a result, they came to 
conflate market productivity with progress, equate capital accumulating with societal 
wellbeing and measure everyday life not with moral statistics but capitalist ones.  
Conclusions 
There might not be a greater set of dichotomies in the American historical 
imagination than the ones that the Civil War helped to create: North vs. South, Union vs. 
Confederacy, wage labor vs. slave labor, modern vs. anti-modern, freedom vs. slavery. 
These dichotomies, of course, are not inaccurate: By antebellum times, the north and the 
south were very different societies in countless different ways, especially when it came to 
the life experiences of wage laborers and slaves. The notion that one can compare the 
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horrors of slavery to wage labor is both ridiculous and perverse. Nevertheless, the 
enormous differences between slave plantations and northern factories have obscured 
some of the ideological similarities which existed in these two societies, especially amongst 
the economic elite of each region. As I hope this chapter has demonstrated, railroad 
investors and slave planters were quantifying the people of their respective societies in 
comparable ways, a fact that led to clear similarities in the way northern and southern 
elites began to measure social progress in the 1850s. While the fact that planters needed 
whips to attain their information while railroad investors needed only reading glasses must 
never be forgotten or downplayed, we must also remember that the pricing of  people did 
not end with Appomattox.  
In blurring some of the lines between northern and southern society, this chapter 
has hoped to add to a rich new research regarding the linkages between slavery and 
capitalism.430 While other historians have rightly begun looking at plantation practices, 
networks of exchange or global accumulation of capital in order to tie slavery to capitalism, 
this chapter explored the ideological overlap between North and South that emerges when 
one examines the ways in which elites in these societies measured social progress.  
If historians are to make a convincing argument regarding the capitalist nature of 
slavery, however, they are going to have to challenge Eric Foner, Eugene Genovese, 
Barrington Moore and David Brion Davis’ incredibly convincing narrative that, in the end, 
the Civil War was fought over two incompatible social systems. In this chapter, I hope I 
have taken a small step in that direction by taking a closer look at how northern and 
southern elites invested their westward moving capital. Such an examination of capital 
                                                 
430 See Sven Beckert and Seth Rockman, Slavery’s Capitalism, forthcoming.  
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flows – and it is important to note that neither railroads nor the internal slave trade appear 
prominently (if at all) in Foner, Genovese, Moore or Davis’ narratives – allows us to see not 
a tale of two irreconcilable ideologies but rather a tale of two, albeit very different, forms of 
capitalism.  
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Chapter Six 
Capitalization and its Discontents: Labor Statistics in Gilded Age America  
On March 3rd, 1893 Senator Nelson Aldrich, head of the powerful Senate Finance 
Committee, submitted a report to Congress titled “Wholesale Prices, Wages, and 
Transportation.” Known at the time as the Aldrich report, it has become a mere footnote in 
American history. Glance at the report, and one immediately comes to understand why. 
After a few pages of brief introduction, the 658 page report was made up almost entirely of 
pages upon pages of statistical indices which measured the wholesale prices of every major 
commodity, including labor, in American society from 1840 to 1891. For example, below is 
a typical table listing the indexed wages of different textile workers, with 1860 as the 
baseline (and hence equal to 100.0). The entire report was filled with fifty-year price 
indices such as in the image below, be they on wages, food or clothes prices.431  
Statistically speaking, it was a gargantuan task of epic bureaucratic proportions. The 
report included no less than eleven statistical appendices. Appendix A alone included 84 
statistical tables. In generating a fifty-year time series on food prices, the report tracked the 
price of 53 articles, from Boston Crackers to Nutmeg. For the “cloths and clothing” section, 
the report charted the price of 28 articles, from “bleached sheetings” to “Ohio fine fleece.” 
Finally, in creating a fifty year time series on the price of labor, which included the chart on 
textile wages seen above, the report tracked the changing wages of over five hundred 
occupations, from textile “waste sorters” to “bricklayers’ helpers.”432 
                                                 
431 Wholesale Prices, Wages, and Transportation: Report by Mr. Aldrich from the Committee on Finance, Part I 
(Washington, 1893). From hereon report will be referred to as Aldrich Report.  
 
432 Aldrich Report, 27-184.  
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Figure 14: Aldrich Report. A typical page from the Aldrich Report, this table traces  the relative wages 
in the textile industry from 1840 to 1861. Aldrich Report, 123. 
While much of the data was gathered, organized and tabulated by Carroll Wright, 
the Commissioner of the recently-formed Department of Labor, the Aldrich report also  
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received a great deal of statistical assistance from businessmen. The Manufacturing 
Chemists’ Association supplied the price series on drugs, the National Association of Wool 
Manufacturers on wool, and the Bostonian Arkwright Club on cotton textiles. When trade 
associations were not available, Wright turned to the heads of private companies. The 
American Screw Company gave the price of screws, Roxbury Carpet Company the price of 
carpets, New York Knife Company the price of pocketknives, and Nicholson File Company 
the price of files.433 
Why did the finance committee devote so much time to such a painstaking collection 
of price data across a fifty-year time span? Why were businessmen and trade associations 
from across the country, not usually known in the nineteenth century for their eagerness to 
share their business data, willing to expend so much energy for a government report? To 
answer these questions we must first understand the main goal of the Aldrich report’s 
price indices, which was “to ascertain through accurate and adequate statistics of prices 
and wages, the changes which have taken place in the condition, as shown by the relative 
purchasing power of their earnings, of the great mass of people in the country for the half 
century which has just closed.” Imagining Americans, not only in 1890 but also in 1840, 
solely as market consumers and wage earners, the basic premise of the Aldrich Report was 
that in order to measure the prosperity of the American people all one had to do was 
compare wages to cost-of-living. “The relative standard of life at the different periods,” the 
                                                 
433 Aldrich Report, 6-7; On Carroll Wright’s career as a labor statistician see James Leiby, Carroll Wright and 
Labor Reform: The Origins of Labor Statistics (Cambridge, 1960); See also Mary O. Furner, “Knowing 
Capitalism: Public investigation and the labor question in the long Progressive Era”, Supple and Furner eds., 
The State and Economic Knowledge: The American and British Experiences (New York: 1990). 
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report explained, “can, of course, be obtained only from a combination of prices with 
average earnings or wages.” 434 
While the Aldrich report’s statistical methods and ideological assumptions were 
quite novel at the end of the nineteenth century, today they likely seem quite familiar.  That 
is because the Aldrich Report is the direct precursor of the Consumer Price Index, a metric 
which, as historian Tom Stapleford and others have shown, has had an enormous effect on 
Americans’ everyday lives, from setting labor contracts to stabilizing the monetary system. 
As a result, today the logic behind the Aldrich Report seems to be sheer common sense, 
absent of any ideological underpinnings. What could be more sensible then measuring the 
prosperity of the American people by tracking whether their wages purchase more or less 
consumer goods than they used to?435  
 There was, however, nothing natural or obvious about the Aldrich Report, nor the 
fact that the statistics it generated went on to become central indicators of American 
progress and wellbeing. The Aldrich Report’s cost-of-living statistics had a history, and that 
history can be traced back to industrial cost-accounting techniques. The Aldrich Report 
was, in other words, the product of the managerial revolution business historian Alfred 
Chandler has so famously described. It was the child of "The Visible Hand." Examining how 
cost-accounting figures shaped cost-of-living statistics, this chapter demonstrates that the 
managerial statistical tools that Chandler documented ended up being used not only to 
manage a firm but to run a nation. Chandler was one of the first historians to recognize the 
                                                 
434 Aldrich Report, 5.  
 
435 In The Cost of Living in America, Stapleford traces the origins of the consumer price index back to the 
Aldrich Report and Carroll Wright. Focusing mostly on the implementation of CPI in the twentieth century, 
however, Stapleford does not seek to detail the intellectual, social, political and cultural origins of the Aldrich 
Report or cost of living statistics.  
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importance of data in managing a corporate capitalist society. And yet, his life’s work 
focused mostly on firms. This chapter suggests that we need to bravely go where Chandler 
rarely went before: Beyond the firm. Instead of focusing only on the microeconomics of the 
corporation, we must explore the macroeconomics of the nation. Instead of only analyzing 
the “visible hand” of the firm, we must examine the visible hand of everyday life. In doing 
so, not only can we incorporate the state into Chandler’s managerial thesis but also 
questions of culture, class and power since, after all, we usually do not imagine democratic 
governments being run with the same tools as giant corporations nor do we realize that the 
calorie statistics that appear on the sides of our cereal boxes – as this chapter will show - 
are yet another manifestation of Chandler’s Visible Hand.436  
How and why did statistics that were designed for maximizing factory production 
end up becoming the national yardsticks used to measure American wellbeing? As this 
chapter will demonstrate, it was only in the Gilded Age that a consolidating American 
bourgeoisie succeeded in capturing the government institutions which determined, to a 
large degree, how Americans would measure prosperity and value progress in the 
twentieth century. Focusing on the power struggles over the state bureaus of labor 
statistics, this chapter will show how adherents of two conflicting statistical visions - one 
molded by the producerist, free labor ideology of patriarchal commercialism and the other 
by the profit-maximizing, consumerist logic of mass industrialization - battled over what 
type of economic statistics should be institutionalized by the state as the standard bearers 
upon which economic life was to be measured and evaluated.  
                                                 
436 Alfred Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Mass: 
Belknap Press, 1977); For the importance of data in the managerial revolution see Chandler, Visible Hand, p. 
109-120 and Thomas C. Cochran, "The Business Revolution," American Historical Review, 78 (1974): 1449-
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Taking a closer look at certain crucial moments in this ideological and political 
battle over economic indicators, this chapter depicts how the formulation of certain 
controversial statistics by the American labor movement, such as the first income 
inequality figures in American history, pushed a bourgeois coalition of businessmen, 
economists and politicians not only to institutionalize their own capitalist statistical vision 
in the form of cost-of-living statistics but also to construct an elite, expert-based, 
depoliticized bureaucracy which could be insulated from democratic pressures. Despite a 
bitter battle by the Knights of Labor for control of the American government’s statistic-
collecting institutions, this chapter argues that the emerging bourgeoisie’s efforts were a 
rousing success. As the Aldrich Report indicates, by the turn of the twentieth century a 
corporate capitalist vision that emphasized consumerism, productivity and corporate 
efficiency was quickly coming to serve as the statistical foundation for the emerging liberal 
regulatory state and the measure of progress and wellbeing in America.  
The Opening Salvo: The Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Our story, however, begins not with the Aldrich Report of 1891 but rather the 
founding of the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics in the years following the Civil 
War. In 1869, the Lynn branch of the Knights of St. Crispin, one of the largest trade-unions 
in the nation, requested an incorporation charter from the Massachusetts state legislature 
so that their shoemaker cooperative could become a state-sanctioned owner of property. 
Continuing a trend that began before the Civil War, an unprecedented numbers of 
corporations were receiving general incorporation charters in Massachusetts in the late 
1860s. Yet despite this, the Knights of St. Crispin were denied. Furious, the Crispins left the 
Republican Party and helped found the Labor Reform Party which, much to the horror of 
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the Massachusetts elite, garnered a surprising 10 percent of the vote in state elections.  
Panicked by this sudden political threat, the Massachusetts state legislator hastily sought a 
way to assuage the anger of the working class. On June 23rd 1869, a resolve originally 
initiated by Radical Republican Wendell Phillips calling for the establishment of the 
Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics was passed. It was the first such bureau in the 
world. 437  
Along with Ira Steward, a skilled mechanic and the leader of Massachusetts’s eight-
hour workday movement, Phillips had been lobbying for a bureau of labor statistics that 
would serve as a political platform which raised awareness to the “labor question” and 
convince workers, the public, and the state to legislate an eight hour work day. At one of 
the conventions of Steward’s Eight Hour League in 1865, Phillips declared that since “the 
country was ruled by its brains,” laborers needed “something” through which they could 
“break into that debating society up in the State House and make them discuss the eight 
hour day.”  Four years later, that something turned out to be the Massachusetts Bureau of 
Labor Statistics.438  
To please the working classes, it was decided that Phillips would also be allowed to 
appoint the bureau’s chief and deputy. In collaboration with Steward, Phillips chose two 
pro-labor men to staff the bureau: General Henry K. Oliver and George McNeill.  McNeill 
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was a wage-earning machinist and the President of the Boston branch of the Eight Hour 
League. General Oliver, on the other hand, was not your typical labor reformer of the era. 
Like Phillips, he was from one of the finest Massachusetts families and a cousin of Oliver 
Wendell Holmes.  After the Civil War, Oliver became the first ever superintendent of the 
newly opened Atlantic Mills in Lawrence. There, he witnessed firsthand the difficult 
conditions of wage laborers and became known for his pro-labor policies. As a result, he 
did not last long at the mills. Yet while Oliver had great misgivings about the wage-labor 
system and was not afraid to voice them, he was still a well-respected gentleman. Phillips 
had found the perfect man for the job.439  
As Mary Poovey has noted, for information to be perceived as factual by the mid-
nineteenth century, political economists and statisticians were expected to “separate 
between the descriptive and the interpretive” due to the agreed upon supposition that 
“systematic knowledge should be derived solely from non-interpretive descriptions.”440 
The first reports of the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics, however, did nothing of 
the sort. With statistical charts appearing only on a handful of pages, most of the 
quantitative information on wages and hours was supplied via the personal testimonies of 
workers. Mixing heart-wrenching descriptions of urban poverty and factory conditions 
with eye-opening statistics on such topics as social mobility, economic independence and 
women’s factory wages, the bureau harnessed their data to conclude that wage labor was 
nothing more than “the modern facilities of burglary.” At the end of the report, they 
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summarized their position by providing a list of recommendations regarding what should 
be done to ameliorate the situation, their central recommendation being the legislation of 
the eight-hour workday as a first step towards the abolition of permanent wage-labor.441  
The bureau leaders chose not to separate the statistical from the interpretive 
because they imagined statistics as a means to a political end. Arguing that the bureau’s 
mission was “far greater in importance than figurate returns of industry,” Oliver let it be 
clear that the bureau would not be a “collector of mere facts.”442 Envisioning the bureau as 
a political tool and a moral compass, Oliver and McNeil hoped that when the people of 
Massachusetts read their reports “a cry of mingled surprise and shame and indignation will 
arise that will demand an entire change of the methods of earning and pay.”443 In 
attempting to appeal to Americans sense of moral justice, the bureau hoped to use to 
statistics to show that “factory life any way is a bad life, physically, morally, socially and 
intellectually.”444 
Even when the bureau did include statistical charts these tables did not solely price 
everyday life through wage and consumer statistics as the Aldrich Report would do a 
generation later. The bureau believed that "the real and ultimate value of [manufacturing] 
to the true prosperity and abiding good of the commonwealth can only be learned, by 
placing money in one scale, and man in the other.”445 This notion that the human condition 
could not be encapsulated merely in price statistics led Oliver and McNeill to seek out the 
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the type of moral statistics that had been popularized in antebellum America such as 
literacy, time spent at work, education and even time for dinner. 
 
Figure 15: The alternative statistics of the Massachusetts Bureau. This table demonstrates how the 
first Massachusetts bureau reports did not only price people’s labor but also tracked literacy, 
education and time for dinner. 
The economic indicators Oliver and McNeill constructed were a statistical reflection 
of their own producerist and republicanist beliefs regarding what should be defined as 
“free labor.” Yet not unlike the future Aldrich Report, the bureau did sometimes compare 
wage figures to cost-of-living statistics. But their objective in doing so was not to come up 
with a consumerist “standard of living” but rather to show that wage-laborers had no 
chance at becoming their own employers because wages were far too low and therefore 
they could not accumulate any savings. Like Abraham Lincoln and most other Americans of 
era, the bureau chiefs conceded that if the laborer could earn enough to accumulate his 
own capital, the wage-system could be legitimized as a stepping-stone to republican, 
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proprietary independence. Their statistical inquiries, however, illustrated that if the 
current status quo remained, few workers would have the opportunity to attain self-
employment, leaving the wealthy few with a monopoly on credit and capital.446  
The bureau’s statistical indicators exhibited not only the free-labor emphasis on 
social mobility, self-mastery and proprietary independence but also its demand for equality 
and disgust of uneven power relations. The kinds of economic growth statistics seen in 
chapter five did not impress the Massachusetts bureau since these figures did not take 
questions of distribution into account. “Although manufacturing undoubtedly increases the 
material wealth of the nation," the bureau noted, "it does it, as now managed, at the 
expense of its manufacturing people."447 Such a fixation on equality and power stemmed 
from the zero-sum nature of American producerism and a belief in a labor theory of value. 
Like most Americans of the era, and much like the classical economic theories which 
prevailed until the neoclassical revolution of the 1880s, the bureau chiefs believed that 
only productive labor could create wealth. As a result, they thought capital gains emerged 
out of the same pool of value that workers had created. The notion that capital could earn a 
six percent return because of the price of time, the scarcity of money, risk premiums or 
entrepreneurial activity simply was not acceptable within the framework of America’s 
mainstream producerist ideology.  Profits, therefore, were envisioned to be the amount of 
value produced by laborers that, for whatever reason, they did not receive as part of his 
wages. As a result, American workers in the 1860s and 70s often focused almost as much 
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attention on their employer’s profits as they did on their own wages. To prove that men 
were not receiving a full return of their labor, for instance, Ira Steward pointed to the 
profits of capitalists in his popular public speeches. “If we had been paid all we earned,” he 
would ask, “would such rich men as A.T. Stewart, William B. Astor and Auguste Belmont 
have been possible?”448 
But when the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics went looking for profit 
statistics, they discovered that they were almost impossible to collect. When Oliver and 
McNeill began gathering data for their first reports, they painstakingly wrote a long survey 
of questions to regional capitalists, manufacturers, financiers and corporate stock owners. 
These questions included everything from their profits to the spatial dimensions in the 
workers' work area and the manner in which rooms were heated in the winter. A reflection 
of the class conflicts already present between employer and employee in postbellum 
Massachusetts, not one circular was returned. Furious, Oliver turned to the state legislature 
and demanded that he be given the legal power to summon business owners. His request 
was denied. The lack of data significantly hindered the bureau’s plans. They were left to 
rely only on the testimonials and data retrieved from laborers. Not only would some 
readers perhaps find labor’s responses unreliable or biased, Oliver feared, but such a lack 
of data left bureau unable to compare profits to wages and therefore prove what they 
believed to be an “unequal distribution of wealth.”449  
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The Battle for the Bureau 
Aghast by the bureau’s first two reports in 1869 and 1870, Boston’s manufacturing 
and financial elite initially tried to silence the bureau by cutting its budget or abolishing it 
completely- but to no avail. The problem, it seemed, was that the bureau was gaining quite 
a following not only amongst wage laborers, but Americans of all walks of life. While the 
elite, business-minded Boston Daily Advertiser continuously slammed the bureau for its 
questionable findings, many Americans found the first reports compelling. From renowned 
authors, to professors of political economy to members of Mercantile Library Associations, 
the list of people who wrote in to commend the bureau on its work read more like a 
veritable who’s who of postbellum middle-class reform than it did of working-class 
radicalism. The Lowell Daily Citizen believed that the bureau’s statistical reports were “the 
best thing…[the] state had done since the War” since “information is the real want of the 
laborer and the chief requisite to the success of his cause.”450 Chicago Tribune’s liberal-
minded editor Horace White hailed it as the “virtual inauguration of the church of 
economists” as “statistics take the place of texts, while facts and figures supersede psalms 
and prayers.”451 Comparing the labor statistics to Charles Francis Adams Jr.’s “systematic 
investigation” of the railroads, even the New York Free Trader congratulated the bureau for 
its “admirable method” and “extraordinary accumulation of facts.”452  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
450 Lowell Daily Citizen, June 2nd, 1871. 
 
451 Chicago Tribune, May 28th, 1871. 
 
452 Free Trader quoted MBLS, Fourth Annual Report, 26. 
   
263 
 
Others focused more on the report’s troubling conclusions, but with no less 
enthusiasm.  A Cincinnati paper exulted at how the report “shows how completely the 
Lords of the Loom have the workmen under control.”453 In an article in the Atlanta 
Constitution titled “Massachusetts Decaying,” the Southern author gleefully proclaimed that 
the “labor statistics show a downgrade in civilization…that would stimulate any other 
people to drop for a while the management of the universe and attend to home 
concerns.”454 Even the well-regarded Nation – the center of the Mugwump universe if ever 
there was one – joined in the chorus. “It is difficult to exaggerate the value of such labor as 
is so intelligently done by the Bureau of Labor Statistics,” noted J.R.  Hodgkins, the 
magazine’s leading economic correspondent.   Continuing, he wrote: 
The proofs are numerous and unmistakable to the almost incredible fact that the 
condition of the working-classes throughout Massachusetts is a declining one, that 
the contrast between the relative positions of employer and employed is steadily 
becoming greater, that the number of men who emerge from the condition of 
workingmen is extremely small, and that the relations between employers and 
employed are becoming more and more hostile and defiant. …when we read such 
things as these, we are introduced to a condition of affairs of which is far from 
generally known.455 
 
As The Nation recognized, the bureau had uncovered a most disturbing truth:  It appeared 
that the widespread belief that wage-labor was only a temporary stop for white men on the 
route to proprietary independence, social mobility and republican equality had become but 
a myth. In 1854, Abraham Lincoln could stand on the steps of Independence Hall and 
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declare that “there is no permanent class of hired laborers among us.”456 By 1870, the 
bureau’s statistics made such statements ring hollow. 
That a statistical bureau calling for the end to wage-labor could gain such 
widespread support demonstrates how little the institution of wage-labor had become 
legitimized in the United States by the 1870s.   A comparison of E.L. Godkin’s editorials in 
The Nation and Steward’s eight-hour day pamphlets in the years following the Civil War 
further exemplifies how broad the “free-labor” consensus that rejected the notion of a 
permanent wage-laboring class really was. According to the thoroughly middle class 
Godkin, wage laborers were being “steadily demoralized” as they became servants “subject 
to another man’s will.” The source of this subservience, Godkin noted, was that wage-labor 
created, as Godkin put it, a “disassociation of labor from capital” since most white American 
men no longer owned productive property or the profits of their labor.457 Steward’s 
working class argument was essentially the same, as he noted that “men no longer control 
their economic fate or daily lives" and how “the wages received under the present system, 
are not a just equivalent for our Labor.”458  
Past historians have often missed just how vehemently anti-capitalist these post-
bellum arguments were because they have conflated free labor and patriarchal-commercial 
principals – such as the admiration for individual initiative, private property and 
decentralized free markets - with an industrial capitalist ideology that rested on, among 
other key pillars, the inherent legitimacy and freedom of permanent waged labor. Despite 
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recognizing that most Americans in the 1860s rejected the notion of a permanent wage-
laboring class, Eric Foner nevertheless referred to the patriarchal-commerical free labor 
ideology he so elegantly dissected as “capitalist,” mainly because it valued competitive 
commodity production and an individual, acquisitive nature. Much like Godkin and 
Steward’s arguments, however, the 1866 Massachusetts commission to investigate the 
“conditions and prospects of the industrial classes” serves as yet another good example as 
to why capitalist and commercial ideology were far from being one and the same and how a 
desire to acquire wealth through market exchange and productive labor did not necessarily 
translate into a “capitalist” worldview.459  
Headed by Franklin Sanborn, who had founded the American Social Science 
Association a year before, the Massachusetts commission concluded that the government 
could not intervene in the contractual relations of wage-labor “without so far subverting 
the right of individual property and establishing communism.”460 This may seem like a 
classic capitalist argument, but then the commission went on to assert that “men should be 
the master, not the servant of his work” and through the “practice of economy” wage 
workers could “become their own capitalists” and once again “be masters of their own time 
and their own terms.”461 Such a contrasting of wage-labor with self-mastery and personal 
freedom would never have appeared in an official state commission by the 1890s. 
Sanborn's  statements, therefore, demonstrate that even the fairly conservative members 
of the commission either rejected the tenets of a capitalist social system or believed that 
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the larger public did. The notion that permanent wage-laborers could live a life of freedom 
and independence was, even to these refined men, unacceptable. 
Godkin, Steward and the Sanborn commission’s arguments once again prove, as we 
saw in previous chapters, that Americans viewed wage-labor as the corruption of their free 
market system, not its latest manifestation. In their opinion, when commodity producers 
lacked their own capital or productive property (be it land or tools) they lost their 
proprietary bargaining power and were forced to enter into dependent – and hence 
coercive - wage relations. Working for wages was no independent market exchange 
between self-interested “masters,” free to enter and exit into voluntary contractual 
relationships as they wished. In short, to postbellum Americans the very notion of a “labor 
market” sounded like an oxymoron.  
For the rising manufacturing elite in New England, such a widespread rejection of a 
permanent wage laboring class was obviously dangerous. Having Midwestern periodicals 
or southern newspapers question the notion of industrial progress in Massachusetts was 
one thing. Hearing it from the most respected of New York publications such as The Nation 
was quite another. For Massachusetts’ businessmen – especially those involved in textile 
manufacturing – this was unacceptable. Something had to be done. A review of The Nation 
reveals that something was done quite quickly: Hodgkins’ editorial praising the bureau 
would be his last contribution to the magazine. Unsatisfied solely with this move, however, 
Bostonians also made sure to call in their own statistical cavalry. A harsh response to 
Hodgkins’s article was sent to Godkin, the editor of The Nation, by the eminent Edward 
Atkinson, a well-known Bostonian cotton manufacturer, economic thinker and statistical 
expert on everything from tariff reform to cotton yields. Pointing to the “rapid increase in 
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savings banks deposits” as evidence that factory wages were high enough to allow 
operatives to accumulate wealth and one day open their own business, Atkinson insisted 
that the bureau’s arguments had “no foundation in fact.”462   
Atkinson’s letter would come back to haunt him. For the third annual report by the 
bureau published in the spring of 1872 centered on none other than a statistical analysis of 
the Massachusetts savings banks. Taking a careful look at savings bank records, the bureau 
discovered that over fifty percent of the deposits made were for more than 300 dollars – a 
sum that clearly no wage-laborer could have attained. Aggregating these mysterious 
deposits together, the bureau calculated that one-seventh of the savings accounts held 
around half of the total wealth deposited in the banks. Not only had the bureau disproved 
Atkinson’s oft-heard argument regarding labor’s ability to save, it had created the first 
income inequality statistics in American history. To add insult to injury, the bureau accused 
Massachusetts capitalists of using the savings banks in order to evade taxes, since at that 
time savings deposits were taxed at a much lower rate than other forms of property.463   
Again, Boston’s bourgeoisie moved fast. Before the report was even presented to the 
legislature, it was swiftly turned over to the state’s financial and banking committee for an 
investigation into the bureau’s statistical methods. Called into to testify at a closed hearing, 
the bureau chiefs were surprised to discover that a number of bankers had been placed on 
the commission. Following a quick investigation, the commission concluded that the 
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bureau’s “inferences and conclusions…are based upon insufficient returns and data.”464 
Desperate to rid themselves of the bureau, Boston elites tried to pass a resolve that would 
abolish the bureau completely. With the Advertiser serving as their mouthpiece, they 
declared that when they had read the bureau chief’s “unspeakably mischievous” report, 
they were “astonished at [his] audacity” and accused him of lending “himself at the outset 
to a false and indefensible theory of labor, which made it next to impossible for him to 
collect statistics except such as favored his theory.”465  
A majority in Massachusetts, however, was not only against the abolishment of the 
bureau but still tended to trust its statistical findings. The Springfield Republican wrote that 
“each successive year increases, perhaps we may say doubles the value” of the bureau’s 
reports.466 The Boston Commonwealth, the paper of choice for small business men and the 
petit-bourgeois, defended the bureau from attack as well. Turning the tables on the 
Advertiser’s questioning of the bureau’s motives, the paper retorted that “capital…was 
objecting to investigation of its methods,” since “the rich man hugs his money, and objects 
to change.” In the end, even the banking committee’s declaration regarding the 
unsubstantiated claims of the savings banks statistics was rejected by the state 
legislature.467  
With the situation quickly spinning out of control, the time had come for the best of 
Boston’s best men: Charles Francis Adams Jr. Fresh off his damning indictment of Jay 
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Gould’s nefarious railroad schemes in The Chapters of Erie, Adams was undoubtedly the 
most admired reformer in the state.468 Furthermore, as chairman of the Massachusetts 
Railroad Commission he was viewed as an expert of statistical analysis. Devoting over ten 
pages to the bureau’s third report in the elite North American Review, Adams charged the 
bureau with not deducing their conclusions solely from the statistics at hand. “We have 
facts of great interest and opinions of no value what so ever,” snapped Adams, “tumbled 
together with disputed industrial theories, here advanced as settled facts, and garnished 
with specimens of the worst rhetoric.”469 Unlike other Bostonian businessmen, however, 
Adams was against the abolishment of the bureau.  Much like Atkinson and Godkin, Adams 
was an active leader in the newly-founded American Social Science Association, an 
organization which lamented the fact that statistics were not used more in legislation by 
civil servants as an “efficient,” bureaucratic alternative to partisan politics.470  
Thanks in large part to the harsh commentaries of Adams, Atkinson and the Daily 
Advertiser, the conflict over the bureau had transcended the realm of the legislature and 
become a cultural struggle over who had the social power to decide what was objective and 
what was not. Since the ballot box played no role in such battles, the bureau found itself at 
a distinct disadvantage. By claiming that statistics were wholly objective facts that could be 
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severed from any political inclination or interest, liberal reformers such as Adams gained 
the upper hand by transforming the dispute over the bureau into a seemingly depoliticized 
affair of science and empiricism. With their journals of social science and Harvard 
diplomas, men like Charles Francis Adams Jr. had the institutional prestige, cultural clout 
and intellectual capital to convincingly undermine the work of the bureau. Naturally, the 
fact that men such as Adams and Atkinson were part of a social circle which included the 
richest and most powerful men in the state didn't hurt either.471    
Sure enough, less than a year later Adams and Atkinson got their wish as 
Massachusetts Governor relieved the bureau chiefs of their duties and appointed Carroll 
Wright, a former state senator who had voted numerous times against the ten-hour work 
day, as director of the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics. The fact that Wright had no 
background in statistics reflected how the academic infrastructure of social science was 
still not developed enough for the bureau to be placed in the hands of “experts.” Since the 
social sciences did not yet have great institutional authority, the apparent 
disinterestedness of the bureau’s chief became crucial.  Francis Amasa Walker, the federal 
census bureau chief, head of the American Statistical Society, and a fellow Brahmin, 
understood this. After Wright’s appointment, Walker wrote to him with some words of 
advice. “I have strong hopes that you will so distinctly and decisively disconnect the Bureau 
from politics, from dependency on organization, whether of workingmen or employers.”472 
Limited by his lack of statistical knowledge, Wright transformed Walker’s advice into his 
raison d’être. In fact, he even printed Walker’s letter on the first page of his first bureau 
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report.  Constantly repeating the mantra of non-partisan objectivity with mottos such as 
“figures don’t lie and liars don’t figure,” Wright soon gained the respect and trust of both 
the economic elite and the public at large. 473  
In his first report in 1874, Wright focused mainly on calculating the cost of living 
and comparing wages in the United States to Europe, a comparison in which the American 
laborer fared rather well. Turning to the question of the eight hour day, Wright contended 
that the “hours of labor will take care of themselves.”474 By his second report, Wright had 
concluded that wage-labor was a legitimate economic system, and that “the iconoclasm that 
strives to break it down, will be devoid of fruitful results or permanent benefits.”475 As for 
the savings banks, Wright did look into the matter in his first report and discovered that 
the bureau’s original calculations had largely been on the mark. He never looked into 
savings banks again. 476  
Accounting for Carroll Wright 
Wright would remain the head of the Massachusetts bureau until 1885, when he 
was appointed chief of the newly founded U.S. Bureau of Labor, beating out Knights of 
Labor leader Terrence Powderly for the highly coveted federal appointment. In 1894, the 
middle classes’ perception of Wright as the embodiment of non-partisanship led him to 
chair the commission which investigated the Pullman strike in Chicago.477 History has been 
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kind to Carroll Wright as well. Today, Harvard’s online collection of the Massachusetts 
bureau’s reports explains that while the “pro-labor” founders of the bureau became 
“embroiled in controversy,” Wright was determined to “make the new bureau an objective, 
scientific organization that was free of political bias.”478 And while the founders of the 
bureau have been relegated to a historical footnote, Wright has widely been regarded as 
the father of labor statistics – and rightfully so. From productivity rates to cost-of-living 
statistics, it was Wright’s statistical vision – not the bureau founders – that was reproduced 
and institutionalized first by the Aldrich report in the 1890s and then time and again with 
the rise of the liberal regulatory state in the early twentieth century.  
To understand the ideological and political underpinnings of twentieth century 
labor statistics and economic indicators, therefore, we must take a closer look at Wright’s 
statistical work. Perhaps the most striking characteristic of Wright’s voluminous statistical 
reports was his knack for putting a positive spin on the most controversial social, economic 
or political questions of the day. Were male skilled laborers, as many workers of the era 
decried, being displaced and deskilled due to the rise of machines? No, Wright replied in 
two separate influential reports, machine production actually created more and better jobs. 
Were strikes useful in improving the condition of the worker? No, Wright’s reports replied, 
strikes actually hurt workers. To prove this, Wright did not explore the earning gaps 
between employers and employees but simply calculated the amount of priced production 
that “society” had lost due to labor struggles.479  
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Progress, Wright seemed to assume in all his reports, was not a question that 
needed to be examined statistically, but rather an inevitable trait of modern 
industrialization.  The notion that life may not have been getting better for most Americans 
was absurd. Statistics enabled him to trace the linear ascent of progress. “History is 
statistics ever-advancing,” he noted in one report, while “statistics is history standing 
still.”480 Unsurprisingly, Wright’s reports, as he himself noted, became a hit with the 
capitalist classes. “When the introduction to the report for 1875 was written,” Wright 
would later reminisce, “the circumstances were entirely different from those existing 
today. Then the manufacturers of the State were, to a considerable extent, afraid of the 
bureau, and in some sense, inimical to it; today, they are, as a rule, friends.”481 
It is not a coincidence, furthermore, that Wright ended up preparing the cost-of-
living statistics for the Aldrich report in 1893. Following nearly two decades as the chief of 
state and national labor statistic bureaus, he had become the undisputed father of cost-of-
living statistics as they came to stand at the center of nearly all of his statistical writings. A 
reading of these reports reveals how the indicators he used for measuring the “human 
condition” were slowly narrowing towards the singular cost-of-living statistic. In his first 
reports, Wright focused a great deal of energy on cost-of-living and productivity statistics 
but he also included data on schooling, sanitary conditions, the number of volumes in local 
libraries, literacy rates, hours of leisure, fallen women, female health, cooperatives, 
pauperism and crime, convict labor, and factory safety.  By the 1880s, however, these 
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“moral statistics" were appearing less and less in his reports. While his 468-page report in 
1884 included 334 pages on wage and cost-of-living figures, for instance, it included only 
133 pages on “the working girls of Boston.” While his 563-page report in 1885 included 61 
pages on the “health statistics of female college graduates,” it included 367 pages on cost of 
living and wage comparisons.482  
As these moral statistics faded away, Wright focused more and more of his time on 
cost-of-living statistics. Clearly, Wright felt that such figures should serve as the premier 
economic indicators of the day. “No comparison as to the prosperity of industrial 
communities can be just,” he argued, “that does not take into consideration the relative 
ease with which the workingmen in those communities may procure the means of 
subsistence, and the relative amount of comfort attainable for a given outlay of time and 
effort.”483 Much like the future Aldrich Report he would help shape, Wright did not 
challenge the institution of wage-labor, but rather embraced it. Unlike his predecessors at 
the Massachusetts Bureau, he did not use cost-of-living statistics to see if Americans were 
saving enough to escape wage-labor. On the contrary, since he viewed moderate consumer 
comfort earned from wage work as the main goal of American society, cost-of-living 
statistics went from being a means to a producerist, republican end to an end in itself. The 
ideological and moral principles which undergirded these cost of living statistics were no 
longer producerist goals of social mobility, equality or proprietary independence, but 
rather consumerist goals of “comfort” and “subsistence." Cost-of-living figures were also 
useful in supplying his reports with a rosy hue during the painfully difficult years which 
                                                 
482 For Wright’s use of “moral statistics” see MBSL, Fifth Annual Report (1874) ch. 3; MBSL, Sixth Annual 
Report, ch. 1, 2, 5; MBSL, Eighth Annual Report (1877) ch. 2, 4,5. MBSL, Ninth Annual Report (1879) ch. 2, 5.  
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followed the panic of 1873: By measuring workers’ prosperity mostly through the lens of 
cost-of-living statistics, for instance, Wright’s data often painted a picture in which the 
condition of the laborer was improving, even though his wages were rapidly falling, 
because the cost of goods was dropping even faster.  
The underlying message from Wright’s cost-of-living figures, and the main 
conclusion of the future Aldrich report, was this: While wage laborers no longer had much 
of a chance to gain proprietary independence, and while the deskilling of labor might have 
led to greater inequality among capital and labor, none of this was of particular social 
consequence since a worker’s wages still bought, thanks to the wonders of mechanization, 
corporate consolidation, and economies of scale, far more food, clothing or consumer goods 
than ever before.484 Cost-of-living statistics, in short, were politically useful to Wright 
because they did not focus on distributive issues between labor and capital nor did they 
explore questions of proprietary independence, inequality, social mobility or power in the 
workplace. Shifting the emphasis from producerist values to consumerist ones, cost-of-
living figures created a statistical logic in which the more goods a society churned out the 
better things looked for workers since the price of these goods would go down and 
therefore workers could consume more of them (even in cases in which wages declined 
slightly as well). Such figures, therefore, legitimized not only permanent wage labor but 
giant, vertically integrated corporations in which economies of scale and deskilled labor 
processes allowed for enormous productivity gains that jettisoned petty producers out of 
the market. While the early Massachusetts bureau’s producerist statistics on proprietary 
independence or equal income distribution would have made such corporate consolidation 
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look like a nightmare, consumerist cost-of-living figures made it look like paradise as wage-
workers could suddenly enjoy more and more fruits of industrial progress. 
Perhaps the best way to summarize Wright’s worldview is through a final example 
from his work. In the early 1880s, Wright organized an annual conference for all the 
commissioners of the state bureaus of labor statistics in the country (as we shall see, by 
then there were quite a few.) In 1884, he decided that these commissioners should all go on 
a joint field excursion to the new Pullman town outside of Chicago. While visiting Pullman, 
the commissioners of the different statistical bureaus were hosted by Duane Doty, the 
town’s official statistician who kept very detailed reports on everything that went on in the 
town, from labor consumption to rent payments to labor productivity. After this visit, 
Wright wrote a glowing report on Pullman’s town, praising it as the model for a new 
America. He especially appreciated the detailed statistical analyses that Doty had collected 
in order to run the town as smoothly as they ran their factory. Not once did Wright bother 
to note the clearly authoritarian nature of the town, nor did he mention the great profits 
Pullman was accumulating. As with his entire body of statistical work, questions of power, 
labor independence, inequality and coercion were never addressed, as his statistical gaze 
was firmly set solely towards issues of stability, productivity and consumer comfort.485  
David Wells’ Annual Reports and the Birth of Cost-of-Living Figures 
Examining some of the political reasons Wright enthusiastically adopted cost-of-
living figures still leaves a central question unanswered: Where did these cost-of-living 
statistics, which by the 1892 Aldrich report would come to serve as the central indicator 
for measuring the American “human condition,” come from? What was their history? That 
                                                 
485 For Wright’s favorable report on Pullman Town see MBSL, Sixteenth Annual Report (1885): 3-26. 
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story begins in the late 1860s in Washington DC. Just as the initial founders of the 
Massachusetts bureau of labor statistics were sitting down to write their first statistical 
report, a young economist by the name of David Wells was about to do the same, although 
in a very different manner. In the late 1860s, David Ames Wells was one of the most 
important political figures in America, thanks to being hired as Special Commissioner of the 
Revenue in one of the last political moves of Abraham Lincoln’s life. Each year, Wells issued 
an influential report whose goal it was to describe the main trends in the American 
economy, mostly through the use of statistical data. At his disposal was a new institution, 
the Bureau of Statistics in the Treasury department, which helped him collect the statistics 
he required. Such institutional support was unprecedented in the history of the American 
state.  While the Treasury Department did generate some reports in antebellum years, such 
data was collected in an ad-hoc manner and the reports were not widely read. On the 
contrary, Wells reports quickly became annual events designed to give his reader a firm 
grasp of all elements of American economic life, including agriculture, the money supply, 
bank capital, industrial output, the public debt and more.  During the years in which they 
were published, the reports became the fulcrum of many political debates, as his figures 
were constantly used to either legitimize or criticize various economic policy proposals.486  
Due to the broad sweep of Wells’ brush, it is perhaps surprising to discover that the 
central issue he returned to time and again in his reports was the cost of living in America. 
In his final report from 1869, for example, he wrote:    
                                                 
486 For a blow-by-blow account of Wells’ work at as Commissioner of Revenue as well as the many political 
controversies which surrounded it see Herbert Ferleger, “David A. Wells and the American Revenue System,” 
(PhD. Diss., Columbia University, 1942).  
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While as a nation we possess the greatest area of fertile and cheap land, unrivalled 
means of intercommunication, and the freest and most popular form of government, 
domestic production, as measured in price, is nevertheless carried on and 
maintained on terms of less advantage to the consumer than is the case in any other 
kindred and competing nation.487  
 
Wells consistently noted that the biggest problem in America was that the prices of 
consumer goods were too high. While Wells gave a number of reasons for these high prices 
such as paper money, tariffs, and high taxes, the first cause he listed was the problem of the 
country’s labor force.  Lamenting the “greatly increased cost of nearly all forms of labor,” 
Wells believed that American laborers earned too much money for too little work. “The 
universal testimony of manufacturers,” he noted with concern in his first report, “is that the 
operatives who entered the army from their establishments have not, as a general thing, 
returned to their old employments.” While Wells briefly noted that this was partly because 
they were dead, he gave other explanations for this troubling development as well:  
Some have engaged in the cultivation of cotton, and in various other industrial 
pursuits in the south; a much larger percentage have sought new homes and new 
employments at the extreme west, or on the Pacific coast; while others, taking 
advantage of the capital made available to them through the payment of bounties 
and previous savings, have become principals rather than subordinates in 
business.488 
 
To most Americans, Wells’ laments must have sounded quite odd. Instead of 
celebrating the fact that a greater majority of people were finding self-employment and 
proprietary independence, Wells was upset by it. While Horace Greeley famously told the 
young, American laborer who managed to survive the Civil War to “Go West!,” Wells very 
much preferred that he head to the nearest factory. In the next paragraph, he made his 
disdain for labor’s independence even more evident. “During the summer of 1866,” he 
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bemoaned, “the product of the cotton mills of New England was variously reduced from 
five to twenty five per cent through the inability to obtain female operatives, even with the 
inducement of the highest rates of wages ever paid in this branch of manufacture.”489 
According to Wells, this “independence of labor over capital” had dire ramifications. 
Comparing the entire nation to a capitalized investment, Wells lamented how “the 
accumulation of new capital in the United States...is at a much slower rate than it ought to 
be.” For capital to accumulate at faster rates, Wells argued that besides tax reform and tariff 
removals, the government needed to find ways to help employers cut wages without 
sacrificing America's overall market output.  To cut labor costs and increase productivity, 
however, Wells needed to know what exactly made up labor costs. He needed to know the 
cost of living in America. This led him into the home of the American worker. In one report, 
he estimated the cost of living by using data from a French-Canadian boardinghouse of 
factory operatives in New England. Noting that these families were “frugal and simple,” 
Wells illustrated that the “average consumption of butter amount[ed] to about $16.51 a 
year for each person, including women and children.” He then did the same for milk, eggs, 
and cheese while adding a full appendix on “the quantity and cost of food and other 
necessaries of life consumed in the New England factory boarding house.” Concluding his 
remarks, Wells proudly noted how “no similar investigation, as respects accuracy, has ever 
before been instituted in the United States.” Wells was right. Such detailed cost-of-living 
statistics had never before collected before.490 
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What was Wells doing? Why did a report on the economic condition of the American 
people contain a detailed statistical analysis on the cost of butter or the amount of cheese 
consumed by French Canadian factory workers in a New England boardinghouse? Had John 
Edgar Thomson, Daniel McCallum or Thomas Scott, the heroes of Alfred Chandler’s The 
Visible Hand, examined the report they would have likely recognized that Wells was doing 
cost-accounting. Only unlike the Pennsylvania Railroad, this cost-accounting was not on the 
level of the firm but on the level of society. The main idea, however, remained very much 
the same: Just as a corporation sought to lower the price of inputs that went into a factory’s 
production process, Wells hoped that he could lower the price of inputs that went into 
people in the form of food, clothing and housing.  
Wells focus on cost of living statistics and labor productivity did not, however, 
emerge from his personal experiences in manufacturing, of which he had none. 
Nevertheless, the factory floor, capital-labor relations and managerial cost accounting had 
no doubt shaped Wells views – and statistics.  As Wells’ personal correspondences in the 
late 1860s clearly demonstrate, the cost-of-living statistics he cited, and the economic 
vision which animated them, were coming from one very specific source: Boston textile 
manufacturer Edward Atkinson. The key to understanding the rise of cost-of-living 
statistics lies, therefore, less in the mind of bureaucrat David Wells – or Carroll Wright for 
that matter - and far more so in the mind of Edward Atkinson. It is here, in the actions of a 
man who worked tirelessly to link the interests of New England textile mills to the 
emerging government bureaus of statistics, that the strong connection between cost-
accounting figures and cost-of-living statistics becomes both obvious and profound.  
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The Ubiquitous Edward Atkinson 
Edward Atkinson was first and foremost a cotton manufacturer, a manager, an 
accountant and a capitalist. Born and bred in Brookline, Massachusetts, he became 
treasurer of the Ogden textile mills in 1851 and within a few years he was managing six 
mills from Maine to Rhode Island including the Lincoln, Cohoes, Kennebec and Indian 
Orchard. In his correspondence with factory owners, it is clear that Atkinson was running 
the show: He oversaw all the books, including payroll; he calculated profits and determined 
dividends for the stockholders; he made the decision if a mill should be shut down if 
expenses were too high; he bought the raw cotton from the south; he decided how many 
spindles each factory should construct. In his role as mill manager, Atkinson quickly 
became infatuated with cost-cutting. When he was hired to manage a mill in 1858, for 
instance, he immediately requested that reports on costs be sent to him monthly instead of 
semi-annually, as had been done prior. Over the years, Atkinson expressed a particularly 
keen interest in labor costs, and carefully examined the payrolls of all his mills. In 1861, he 
even wrote a best-selling book titled Cheap Cotton and Free Labor, which argued that 
slavery should end because the labor costs of growing cotton would be reduced under a 
regime of wage labor.491  
As a textile mill manager, Atkinson not only ran factories but essentially small 
towns. In this era in New England, many workers, be they local girls from the countryside 
or immigrants from Ireland, often ate in boardinghouses or slept in tenements owned by 
                                                 
491 For a sample of Edward Atkinson’s work as a treasurer see Atkinson to Hutchins, Sept 5th 1857; Atkinson 
to Jenkins, Sept 21st 1857, Atkinson Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society; For examples of his use of cost 
accounting see Atkinson to Brown, Feb 17th , Feb 22nd 1858, Atkinson Papers; For examples of his penchant 
for profit maximization see Atkinson to Benjamin Sanders, Nov 20th 1858, Atkinson Papers. For his interest in 
lowering labor costs, see for example letter to Clegg, on April 20th 1858, Atkinson Papers in which he hatches 
a plan to put fugitive slaves to work in his factories. On his argument against slavery see Cheap Cotton and 
Free Labor (Boston, 1861).  
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the textile factory. Atkinson, therefore, also oversaw the construction of operative 
tenements near the mills and kept a running interest in how much food his workers ate. 
These aspects of the company were treated to the same profit-maximizing economic 
analysis as factory operations. When Wells, for instance, asked Atkinson if he was willing to 
help employees purchase their own homes, he replied that “I do not believe in philanthropy 
toward the able-bodied that does not pay six percent.”492  
But while Atkinson always had cotton manufacturing on his mind, he was also a one-
man political juggernaut.  As illustrated by the stunning breadth of his personal papers, 
which spans 78 volumes and 50,000 pages, while Atkinson never officially entered politics 
he was, without a doubt, one of the most powerful political forces in America for nearly a 
half century.  Publishing an amazing 291 pamphlets, articles and books in his lifetime and 
corresponding at a dizzying rate with the most powerful men in the country, from 
businessmen John Murray Forbes and Andrew Carnegie to Presidents Grover Cleveland, 
William McKinley and James A. Garfield, Edward Atkinson was – as historian James 
Livingston has eloquently put it – a “ubiquitous” presence in the most important political 
disputes of the era, be it money and tariff reform, the labor question or foreign policy.493  
Atkinson was especially adept at transforming impressionable men in key political 
positions into agents of his own interest. His voluminous correspondence with David Wells 
is a textbook case. In 1865, Wells had been hired by Lincoln to write but one revenue 
report. It was Atkinson who helped make the job permanent. After securing the position for 
Wells, Atkinson began to use him as his political eyes and ears in Washington, requesting 
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that he dig up information on bills that had yet to be made public or influence the latest 
tariff laws that were in the works. Wells became very dependent on Atkinson, constantly 
asking for his help and advice. As a result, Atkinson’s influence on Wells' statistical reports 
was vast. While Wells had arrived in Washington as an ardent supporter of high tariffs, 
Atkinson soon convinced him that the biggest problem in America was high labor prices.  
Lower tariffs and free trade, Atkinson explained to Wells, would reduce the cost of basic 
consumer goods and therefore labor’s wages. As his long correspondence with Wells 
reveals, Atkinson's concern with high labor prices was clearly a product of his own cost-
cutting concerns.  In a letter written to Wells as the latter was preparing to write his first 
report, Atkinson hammered his main points home:  
In consequence of the forced division of labor into unnatural channels and the 
withdraw of labor into the army, labor advanced and has become too independent. 
The wages of a large portion of the labor the country are now unnaturally high and 
the laborer do not do a full day work. The prices of commodities, of all material and 
manufacturers are therefore unnaturally high yet they may pay no profit and in 
many cases a loss.494 
 
If the line on the independence of labor sounds familiar, that is because Wells used 
the very same expression in his final report. Atkinson wasn’t only feeding Wells lines but 
statistics as well. It is no coincidence that the cost of living statistics Wells used in his 
revenue reports were based on French Canadian immigrants working at a textile mill. 
Atkinson had supplied him with these figures just as he had supplied him with much of the 
statistical information on labor that found its way into Wells' reports. Wary of showing the 
                                                 
494 Atkinson to Wells, April 11th 1866, Atkinson Papers. For the masterful way in which Atkinson “turned” 
Wells, see for instance his letters to Wells on Nov 21st 1866, January 9th 1867, February 6th 1867, Atkinson 
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clear linkage between these statistics and his own manufacturing interests, however, 
Atkinson requested that the name of the mills be left out of the final report.495  
A look at Atkinson’s own writings in the 1860s reveals why he had turned his 
attention towards cost-of-living statistics. “In England the rate of wages is nominally much 
lower,” Atkinson explained in one article, “but a suit of strong fustian clothing can be 
purchased for one pound or five dollars. Beer costs three half-pence a glass, or three cents. 
Meat is not higher than in this country, and house rent is less; and, notwithstanding our 
great natural advantages, skilled laborers are said to be rapidly returning to their homes in 
Europe.”496 While nearly every American commentator of the era used England as a 
euphemism for pauperism and poverty, Atkinson believed England should serve as a model 
for the United States. Using cost-of-living figures, he argued that the situation of skilled 
laborers in England was actually better than in America, because in England things were 
being produced more cheaply.  
Atkinson's initial move to use cost-of-living statistics to cut labor costs on a national 
scale, mostly through tariff reform, failed. In 1870 David Wells was unceremoniously 
dismissed from his position as revenue commissioner after it had become clear to tariff-
loving Republicans that he had shifted his allegiances from protectionism to free trade. This 
initial blow to Atkinson’s policy goals, however, was tempered a few years later by the 
panic of 1873, which led to massive unemployment and, as Atkinson excitedly remarked to 
Wells in 1875, “an excess of laborers willing to work at low wages.”497 Only in the 
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deflationary 1880s, when the Knights of Labor were beginning to gain national attention, 
did Atkinson once again turn to cost-of-living figures. “The reduction in the cost of living,” 
he complained to anyone willing to listen, “was greater than the reduction in wages.” As a 
result, Atkinson grimly concluded, “the capitalist sees less and less proportion of the 
product and the laborer gains steadily.” This time, however, Atkinson looked not to Wells, 
who no longer had any political power, but rather to Carroll Wright, the well-respected 
head of the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics who would soon be hired as the 
Commissioner of the newly established Department of Labor. In so doing, Atkinson took 
the next crucial step in a political process that would lead, a decade later, to the writing of 
the Aldrich report and the meteoric rise of cost-of-living statistics.498   
Trimming the Fat 
In the fall of 1884, Edward Atkinson gave a talk in front of American Social Science 
Association titled “What Makes the Rate of Wages?” “The true cost of any given article is the 
quantity of labor or the human effort expended in its production,” Atkinson argued in front 
of his esteemed audience, articulating the conventional wisdoms of classical economics that 
still ruled America in the early 1880s. In the following sentence, however, Atkinson took 
the tenets of classical economics to a place few Americans had dared to venture. “Now, if 
we consider a human being as an automatic machine, similar to any other mechanical 
power or force,” he argued, “the true cost [of any given article] is the quantity of food and 
fuel expended in the conversion of a given amount of material substance into human 
force.”499 Treating people like one of his textile machines, Atkinson assumed that the cost of 
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human labor, like the cost of his spindles, was determined not by what the machine 
produced but rather by what it cost to keep the machine producing. The fact that this 
particular machine happened to be human mattered little to Atkinson’s statistical analysis.  
Treating people like machines and their lives as an ongoing process of capitalist 
production, Atkinson then did what he did best: He turned to cost-accounting, which in this 
instance amounted to cost-of-living. After spending the summer of 1885 sending out 
numerous requests to various manufacturers for statistics on the amount and cost of food 
their laborers consumed, Atkinson finally hit the jackpot when the Maryland textile mill 
Hooper and Sons sent him the figures below regarding the consumption and cost of food. 
Atkinson was ecstatic, noting that it was “difficult to obtain a detailed statement of the real 
cost of subsisting working people until you gave me this extremely valuable one. It will be 
the nucleus for a great deal of work in all the bureaus of statistics.”500 
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Figure 16: Atkinson's cost of living statistics. A statistical table created by Edward Atkinson which 
calculates the cost of keeping laborers alive and productive.  Atkinson, The Distribution of Products, 
159. 
As this quote suggests, by 1885 Atkinson had already worked his charm on the 
bureaus of labor statistics, especially Massachusetts chief Carroll D. Wright. A few months 
prior he had written a letter to Wright about his failed attempts to gather information on 
food costs, explaining the “great difficulty for an unofficial person to explore the subject.”501 
Sure enough, the seventeenth report of the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics 
published a year later included a long, statistically detailed section on the cost and 
efficiency of working class food consumption. As we can see below the bureau’s statistics 
looked a lot like the statistics Atkinson had begun collecting on his own. With generous 
government funding and a fairly large workforce of data miners at its disposal, however, 
Wright’s bureau succeeded in generating dozens of “dietary schedules” from factory 
boardinghouses in Lowell, Lynn and Lawrence as well as detailed data on the cost of living 
in working class families from East Cambridge and Boston. Atkinson was proud that he had 
managed to shape the bureau’s inquiries and often bragged about his ability to influence 
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statistical bureaus. “I have prepared the interrogations for all the bureaus of statistics and 
for Carroll Wright,” he noted in one correspondence. “Carroll Wright will adopt my 
formula,” he noted in another, showing optimism “that bureaus of statistics in thirteen 
states” would soon follow suit as well.502  
 
Figure 17: Massachusetts Bureau's dietary schedule. Note the resemblances between this cost-of-
living table and the one Atkinson made privately a year prior (fig. 16). MBSL, 17th report, 249.  
As can be seen in the bureau’s statistical tables, however, a novel aspect had been 
added to Atkinson’s original statistics on the cost and quantity of food consumed by 
workingmen and women. The reader now received a comprehensive breakdown of how 
much proteins, carbohydrates and fat laborers consumed for each cent of food they ate. 
                                                 
502 Atkinson to Putnam, June 13th 1885; Atkinson to Atwater, May 23, 1885, Atkinson Papers. For the report 
on the food consumption see the MBSL, 17th Annual Report, 1886.  
   
289 
 
Charting the cost of food was not precise enough, the report explained, and “the relative 
cheapness or dearness of different foods must be judged by comparing not the prices per 
per pound but the costs of the actual nutrients.”503 Atkinson was the architect behind this 
statistical innovation as well. In May of 1885, as he was reaching out to Carroll Wright, 
Atkinson also wrote a letter to Wilbur Olin Atwater, a chemistry professor at Wesleyan 
University interested in questions of human nutrition and metabolism. “You have entered 
upon an inquiry as to the necessary elements of food…from the stand point of the naturalist 
or biologist,” Atkinson wrote. “I have been investigating the whole subject as an economist 
and there is an extraordinary death of accurate information.”504 Atkinson suggested that 
the he and Atwater work together, along with Carroll Wright, to create nutritional cost 
statistics. Atwater enthusiastically agreed.  
This was the beginning of a beautiful friendship as Atwater and Atkinson would go 
on to collaborate on numerous projects regarding the minimum amount of nutritional 
energy people needed to be productive workers. While it is unclear who wrote the actual 
food consumption report for the Massachusetts Bureau that year, it clearly had Atkinson’s 
fingerprints - along with Atwater’s nutritional expertise - all over it. The report began by 
framing nutritional cost accounting as a project that would mostly help the laboring 
classes. “It is undeniably true,” the report noted, “that much money is wasted in the 
purchase of food whichfgf is lacking in the elements of nutrition, and that the income of the 
working classes might be made far more effective if it were expended in accordance with 
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the results of scientific research.”505 As the report continued, however, the actual reasoning 
behind the collection of cost-of-living statistics became abundantly clear. Either directly 
through their boardinghouse expenses, or indirectly though their generously high wages, 
manufacturers were feeding their workers too much food, and in an inefficient manner. 
Workers could make do with far less, the report argued. And since food expenses made up 
50 to 60 percent of the worker’s annual expenditures, a sharp reduction in food costs 
meant a sharp reduction in labor costs. While the report never said so specifically, it did not 
take a mind-reader to see where the argument was heading: Cutting food costs would allow 
industrialists to cut wages. Atkinson made his true intentions perfectly clear in his personal 
correspondence, writing to Atwater, for instance, that the “rate of wages depends on the 
adequacy of the food supply.”506  
In the bureau report, examples of laborer’s inefficient gluttony were frequent.  “The 
French Canadian laboring man whose food we have examined,” the report noted, 
“consumes at home three and one-half pounds (including milk) per day. But when he 
comes to Massachusetts and works in a factory...he consumes five pounds.”507 The report 
also noted “the excessive quantities of fat in the American dietaries” and gave an estimate 
for the “minimum quantity of protein [that] is requisite for healthful nourishment.” 
Towards the end, the report made some pragmatic suggestions regarding how “dietaries 
could be so altered as to make them at once less expensive, equally wholesome and 
                                                 
505 MBSL, 17th report,  247. 
 
506 Atkinson cited in Atwater to Atkinson, Nov. 6th 1886, Atkinson Papers. 
 
507 MBSL, 17th report, 311 
   
291 
 
palatable, and much more healthful.” Clearly directed at manufacturers’ boarding houses, 
the report recommended serving less meat and more vegetables.508  
Atkinson and Atwater’s foray into nutritional cost accounting did not end here. In 
1888, Atkinson requested that Atwater come up with a suggested ration of food that 
manufacturers could use when feeding their workers. While the 1885 bureau report found 
that workers spent roughly 25 cents a day or $1.50 a week on food, Atkinson urged Atwater 
to come up with an equally nutritious formula that would cost only a dollar a week. 
Atkinson also sought to reduce the cost of living for workers, and earn some money on the 
side while doing so, by mass-producing his patented “Aladdin Oven,” whose name had been 
chosen due to its supposedly magical ability to preserve fuel by heating food more 
efficiently thanks to a kerosene lamp that was placed in the middle of an cast-iron stove 
(see Atkinson's drawing below.) In The Science of Nutrition, a book which Atkinson wrote in 
1896, he proudly noted how, thanks to the magic of the Alladdin Oven, he had managed to 
serve several friends at his whist club a seven-course dinner with a fuel cost of just 13 
cents a serving, which was less than the cost of the after-dinner cigars. With his own 
obsession for cost-cutting, it comes as little surprise that Andrew Carnegie, who had begun 
to correspond frequently with Atkinson in the 1890, decided to purchase 3,500 copies of 
Atkinson’s book in order to donate them to every major library in the country.509  
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Figure 18: The Aladdin Oven. A drawing of the Aladdin Oven by Edward Atkinson. Note the "magic 
lamp" located beneath the food. Atkinson, Science of Nutrition, 247. 
Atwater ended up becoming world famous as the father of the modern calorie 
largely due to Atkinson’s intellectual inspiration and political connections. While the idea of 
the calorie had been floating around in Europe for some time, it was Atwater, following 
Atkinson’s persistent urgings, who transformed it into a quantifiable unit of measurement. 
Thanks to some generous funding from the Department of Agriculture that Atkinson had 
managed to attain, Atwater was able to construct the world’s first respiration calorie-meter 
in 1896. As the newspapers of the day described, the respirator was an airtight chamber 
“about as large as an ordinary’s convict’s cell” whose interior was visible through a triple-
paned glass window.  Previously used to measure the combustive efficiency of an engine, 
this newly designed chamber was designed not for machines but for men. Once a person 
was placed inside, all of his inputs and outputs could be registered through a barrage of 
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instruments that measured the amount of food he ate and the amount of excrements he 
passed. The first subject who entered the chamber was the school janitor, who was asked 
to lift dumbbells while thermometers measured the rise and fall of temperature within the 
house of glass.  From the beginning it was clear that the calorimeter was designed for a 
very certain class of men.510  
In the 1890s, Atkinson’s dietaries schedules spread like wildfire through middle 
class reform organizations. The Hull House settlement, the New York Association for the 
Improvement of the Condition of the Poor, the Industrial Christian Alliance and even the 
Tuskegee Institute replicated Atkinson, Wright and Atwater’s studies.511 Not everyone, 
however, was pleased with this new fad. “As labor will be forced to a new level,” the 
Philadelphia Inquirer decried, “we are to have chemical apparatus and half-weight scales 
and frugal diets, and dyspeptic inspectors travelling around and telling us that we eat too 
much.”512 Eugene Debs wrote a personal letter to Atkinson denouncing these studies as 
“scientific degradation” that would reduce the American worker’s labor to “a cost as low as 
Chinamen are subjected to.”513 A Boston labor leader argued that the savings would go to 
the employers profit not the workman’s wages.514  
When approached by census marshals, bureau workers or missionaries, many 
workers refused to answer the questions. A wife of a Pittsburgh artisan who had refused to 
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say how much food her family bought and ate explained that “the neighbors were 
convinced that it was a scheme to see how much it actually cost for a man to live, in order 
that his wages might be reduced.” Other workers at boardinghouses purposely stuffed 
themselves with twice as much food on the day that the inspector had come to measure 
their cost-of-living. If they couldn’t influence the labor statistics the state bureaus had 
chosen to collect, they could still manipulate them.515 
The Knights of Labor and What Might Have Been 
The battle over the Massachusetts bureau was perhaps the most prominent struggle 
over the power to shape government labor statistics, but it was hardly atypical. Beginning 
in the 1870s and continuing into the 1880s, over twenty states founded bureaus of labor 
statistics. Many of these bureaus, like those which emerged in the industrializing states of 
Ohio, Illinois, Connecticut, Pennsylvania and Maryland, were initially controlled - either 
directly or indirectly – by union activists or skilled labor organizations. The Ohio bureau, 
for instance, was pushed through the state legislature by the president of the Coopers’ 
International Union as well as the President of the National Association of Mechanical 
Engineers. The Philadelphia Board of Trade complained how the Pennsylvania Bureau of 
Labor Statistics was “communistic.” What is more, many of the western labor bureaus – 
such as those in Missouri, Kansas, Iowa and California, had strong ties to the agrarian 
populist movement.516   
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Much like the Massachusetts branch, most labor bureaus sought to challenge the 
very legitimacy of wage labor. The Connecticut Bureau of Labor Statistics, before it was 
taken over by the more conservative Yale economist Arthur Hadley, challenged the very 
idea of a labor market, noting that “circumstances have given [the employer] power to 
dictate terms to his workmen.”517 The New York Bureau made a confession that illustrates 
just how much Gilded Age laborers were departing from their Jacksonian ancestors’ free-
market liberalism. “We have reached a point in our development of governmental 
conscience,” the Connecticut Bureau admitted, “that laissez faire policy on the basis of 
every man for himself, is no longer possible.” What is more, the Connecticut bureaus’ 
second and third reports did not settle for merely collecting statistics on wages but sought 
out statistics on profits as well.518  
The Ohio Bureau tried to maintain an artisanal system in its rapidly industrializing 
state by concluding that “without a system of apprenticeship, the status of our mechanics 
as such will certainly deteriorate.” In its reports, the Ohio bureau fought against “boys 
doing skilled laborers jobs with furnaces” while also demanding the “creation of 
cooperative associations for manufacturing and mining purposes.”519 Just as with the 
Massachusetts Bureau, the Ohio bureau also discovered that they could not collect the 
information they desired because employers were not supplying them with the figures they 
need. As a result, they insisted they receive the power to “administer oaths,” “inspect 
factories,” and force “every corporation organized under the general incorporation act of 
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the state,” to fill out a questionnaire the bureau had designed. “No person,” the bureau 
noted, “should be allowed to prevent the fulfillment of the evident intent of the law by 
refusing to give the statistical information asked for.”520  
The Illinois Bureau managed to avoid the problem of employers not supplying 
information because it had strong ties to the Knights of Labor. While other bureaus had to 
beg capitalists for data, the Illinois Bureau turned to the thousands of Knights of Labor 
locals distributed across the state, noting how it was the Knights who offered “the best 
source from which to derive authentic information concerning the classes they 
represent.”521 As a result the statistics supplied by the Illinois Bureau in their 1886 report 
were very different from the rosy statistics generated by Carroll Wright, who by then had 
become the commissioner of the federal Bureau of Labor. For example, in referring to the 
infamous Haymarket affair, the bureau noted how “out of the 17,029 who work only eight 
hours, 11,316 have acquired the shorter day as a result of the agitation of May, 1886.”522 
While Wright had sought to prove that strikes were “unproductive,” the Illinois bureau 
proved that they effectively improved workers’ lives. The bureau also slammed Wrights 
conservative estimation that the unemployment rate was 7.5 percent by showing that 
among Knights of Labor organizations the figure was 19 percent, and this did not even 
include, the report added, unskilled laborers. The Illinois bureau also made sure to collect 
figures on the meteoric rise of the Knights of Labor, noting how “during the year and a half 
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preceding July 1886, the number of trade-organizations has increased a hundred fold” and 
13,000 people had enrolled prior to the May 1st strike.523 
Scholars have largely overlooked the heavy importance the Knights of Labor placed 
on the collection of economic indicators and the formation of bureaus of labor statistics. In 
the 1878 Preamble to the Knights Constitution, a document that would spread in pamphlet 
form across the country, these were the first three points: 
I. To bring within the folds of organization every department of productive industry, 
making knowledge a standpoint for action, and industrial and moral worth, not 
wealth, the true standard of individual and national greatness. 
II.  To secure to the toilers a proper share of the wealth that they create; more of the 
leisure that  rightfully belongs to them; more societary advantages; more of the 
benefits, privileges, and emoluments of the world, all those rights and privileges 
necessary to make them capable of enjoying, appreciating, defending, and 
perpetuating the blessings of good government. 
III. To arrive at the true condition of the producing masses in their educational, 
moral, and financial condition, by demanding from the various governments the 
establishment of bureaus of Labor Statistics.524 
 
Not only were the Knights of Labor pushing for bureaus of labor statistics, but much like 
the Massachusetts bureau, they were envisioning a statistical system that measured moral, 
societal and distributive aspects of humanity rather than pricing everyday life by making 
wealth “the true standard of individual and national greatness.”  
Such declarations where not empty words. While Carroll Wright wound up being 
the federal Commissioner of Labor, Terrence Powderly – the Grand Master himself – had 
spent much of his time and energy in 1884 seeking to become the first chief of the new 
federal bureau of labor statistics. It appears the skilled laborers who made up the ranks of 
the Knights understood the importance of having control of the bureau as well. When 
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Powderly applied, in person, to President Chester A. Arthur for the position he presented 
petitions from 1567 branches of different labor organizations. He also presented clippings 
from 37 labor papers and 115 daily papers. In response, however,  President Arthur 
handed Powderly a document of his own, one which had been sent to him by a group of 
manufactures. This is what it read: 
It is feared by the employers of labor that if Mr. Powderly is appointed by your 
excellency he will exert his influence in opposition to the interests of employers. It is 
also feared that he is in sympathy with the communist element, and that he will be 
influenced and guided largely by that class.525 
 
While Powderly was far from being a communist, he had been reared by the zero-
sum ideology of American patriarchal commercialism. As a result, capitalists had good 
reason to fear him. In his autobiography, written a few years after he lost the nomination to 
Wright, Powderly made clear how he would have run the Federal Bureau of Labor had he 
been made chief. ‘The legitimate aim of the Labor Bureau,” Powderly noted, “is to ascertain 
beyond the shadow of a doubt what the earnings of labor and capital are in order that 
justice may be done to both, in order that unscrupulous employers will not have it in their 
power to rob labor of its just dues and take all the profits of the combination of labor and 
capital for their own aggrandizement.”526 Stressing the importance of open information, 
Powderly criticized employers for focusing only on the conditions of labor and not the 
conditions of capital. The employer, he noted, “was disposed to be generous in the matter 
of stating what was paid to labor; what labor could live on; how much the workman spent 
for strong drink; what a fondness the workman had for canned goods; and such other 
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information as could best be given by the workman himself.” Clearly criticizing the cost-of-
living figures of Carroll Wight, Powderly did not let up, as he slammed the labor bureaus for 
turning only laborers into the subject of statistical inquiry while the capitalist’s “own affairs 
were not considered proper subjects for public scrutiny, and not being obliged to state 
what his own profits were, or what he spent for strong drink, he made no mention of such 
insignificant trifles.” Powderly then decried how “the public has a right to know what a 
corporation earns. It is granted valuable franchises by the public; it lives on the public; it is 
designed to benefit the public; and to the public it should render an account of its 
stewardship. The legitimate earnings of capital should become known to the people in 
order to put a stop to illegitimate profit-taking.”527 
What is more, a closer look at the statistics that the Knights of Labor did collect 
demonstrates that the previously masculine, patriarchal ideology of American laborers was 
becoming more open to issues of women's labor and gender discrimination. The best 
example of this is the statistical work of Leona Barry. An Irish Immigrant, Barry’s husband 
died in 1881. “"I was left, without knowledge of business, without knowledge of work, 
without knowledge of what the world was, with three fatherless children looking to me for 
bread," Barry would later note.528 These miserable conditions likely led to the death of her 
oldest child. Desperate to find work to keep her other children alive, she got a job at a 
hosiery mill, where she made eleven cents a day.  It was while working at the mill that she 
joined the Knights of Labor. Apparently, Barry had a knack for labor organizing and within 
two years she found herself not only the master workman of her own branch but the leader 
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of an entire district assembly of 52 locals. She then was voted to represent her region at the 
national general assembly in 1886 where she was one of only 16 women among 660 
delegates. While at the national assembly, Barry was named the head of the new Woman’s 
Work Department. Her main mission was to traverse the country, collecting statistics on 
woman’s labor that would not only reveal “the abuses to which or sex is subjected by 
unscrupulous employers” but also the need “of equal pay for equal work.”529  
By the late 1880s the Knights had an estimated 65,000 female members and Barry 
had made a name for herself in the statistical reports she had compiled for the annual 
general assemblies between 1887 and 1889. A striking depiction of the condition of 
women’s labor in America, Barry’s reports combined statistical data with a strong moral 
critique of capitalism. Moreover, just as Powderly had intended, her reports focused not 
only on labor’s wages but on employer’s profits, which enabled her to measure the level of 
exploitation at the American workplace. “The contractor who employed five operatives 
made 30 cents per unit, or 1.50 a day,” she noted in one example, “while each worker 
received only 30 cents for the entire days work." “Men’s vests are contracted out at 10 
cents each," she noted in a similar example, "the machine operative receiving 2.5 cents and 
the finisher 2.5 cents each, making 5 cents a vest for completion.”530 Since twenty vests 
constituted a day's work, Barry calculated, "a contractor who employed five operatives 
reaped a dollar a day for doing nothing while his victim has 50 cents for eleven and twelve 
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hours of her life’s energies.”531 By the 1890s, however, Barry was once again forced to 
return to the factory. With no Terrence Powderly in the federal government, and with the 
Knights of Labor all but destroyed, there were no statistical institutions through which 
Barry could make her voice, and those of countless other women, heard.  
Conclusions 
In his description of Ira Steward in Beyond Equality, David Montgomery noted how 
“Steward, like all his contemporaries in the labor movement, had no conception of the 
active role for the machinery of the state.”532 The shared statistical vision of Ira Steward, 
George McNeill, Terrence Powderly and Leona Barry demonstrates that Montgomery was 
wrong. Skilled workers and the Knights of Labor were very much aware that they needed 
to take over the emerging bureaucracy. The problem is that they failed to do so. The 
problem was not one of political consciousness, in this instance, but of political power. 
Counterfactuals are not the usual domain of historians, and rightfully so. Yet the story of 
the bureaus of labor statistics and the rise of cost-of-living figures in the 1870s and 1880s 
begs one to ask: What would twentieth century American economic policies and political 
discourse have looked like if the original founders of the Massachusetts bureau had not 
been removed from their posts after only four years? If Terrence Powderly had taken the 
reigns of the Labor Bureau instead of Carroll Wright? If skilled laborer Ira Steward had 
even half of the political power of skilled capitalist Edward Atkinson? 
The fact that the Senate Finance Committee and its 1893 Aldrich Report deemed 
Carroll Wright’s cost-of-living statistics the proper metric with which to measure the 
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condition of the American people demonstrates how the visible hand of Edward Atkinson 
was touching the lives of every American by the 1890s. The political ramifications of the 
Aldrich Report’s figures were enormous. Much like the cost-accounting figures they 
mimicked, cost-of-living figures presented people as priced inputs of production whose 
cost was determined not by the amount of value they marginally produced, as the 
neoclassical myth goes, but rather the amount of money it took to keep them coming to 
work every day. By focusing only on that which could be priced, moreover, the cost-
accounting vision which shaped the Aldrich Report had been emptied of any free labor 
imperative since it was impossible to place a price tag on proprietary independence, good 
education, leisure time, mental wellbeing or any of the other demands worker’s had that 
were not strictly pay raises.  
American freedom itself came to be defined differently within these figures: In the 
Aldrich Report the definition of liberty was not self-employment, self-mastery, social 
mobility or gender and economic equality but rather moderate consumer comfort 
stemming from increasingly efficient productive processes. Disregarding the heated 
political arguments which raged throughout the Gilded Age over the proper role of 
corporations in American life, the Aldrich report made a very clear political argument when 
it chose to focus solely on cost-of-living: Corporate capitalism was good for Americans 
because it reduced the price of consumer goods.   Legitimizing giant corporations and 
economics of scale, cost of living statistics cared not if the small, petty, competitive 
commodity producer was being consolidated into a single massive, managerial corporation. 
As long as factories were churning out more and more goods at lower and lower prices it 
did not matter if Americans had gone from bosses to bureaucrats or from skilled artisans to 
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exploited workers. As long as you earned a “standard of living,” the terms of which the 
Aldrich Report itself had defined, there were no other burning social issues in America. 
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Epilogue 
Towards GDP and the One Percent 
“Climate change will affect the basic elements of life for people around the world,” 
warned the executive summary of the 700-page Stern Review, a 2006 report widely 
regarded as the largest and most complete economic analysis of climate change ever 
undertaken. “Hundreds of millions of people could suffer hunger, water shortages and 
coastal flooding as the world warms.” Continuing, the report cautioned in the very next 
paragraph how “if we don’t act, the overall costs and risks of climate change will be 
equivalent to losing at least 5% of global GDP each year, now and forever.”533 For us 
moderns, the report’s effortless shift from human suffering to GDP probably seems entirely 
obvious as we have become accustomed to the notion that Gross Domestic Product –a 
statistic which measures “economic growth” by aggregating the monetary prices of all 
commodities produced and consumed - is an accurate measure of human progress and 
prosperity. It is only when one takes a few moments to think about such assumptions that 
the questions begin to emerge. How and why did GDP become the benchmark for human 
progress? Why did the Stern Review decide to battle global warming by pricing the future 
of the planet as if it was a capitalized investment? 
 By tracing the history of our current economic indicators back to nineteenth century 
America, this dissertation has sought to answer these two questions. As the Stern Review 
clearly demonstrates, the importance of these questions cannot be understated: The future 
of our planet may lie in the balance. Luckily, in the last few years there has been a growing 
                                                 
533 Sir Nicholas Stern, “Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change,” Executive Summary, ix, 2012. 
Accessed April 10th 2013 from http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/stern_review_report.htm.  
   
305 
 
discourse surrounding the problems of using GDP as the main indicator of social 
progress.534 Despite their good intentions, however, these narratives rarely historicize the 
emergence of GDP. As a result, the story often ends up being one in which well-meaning 
economists and policymakers accidently or erroneously mistake GDP as an accurate 
measure of societal wellbeing. In these narratives, the lesson to be learnt usually is not that 
GDP is a political tool that furthers some people’s interests over others, or that GDP is a 
cultural mirror that reflects the priorities of our capitalist society, but rather that GDP is 
simply an empirically inaccurate measure that needs to be tinkered with.  
 The hegemonic rise of GDP, however, was no accident, error or mistake. As this 
dissertation has demonstrated, statistics that price everyday life as if it were a capitalized 
investment became the barometers of human progress in part because of a series of 
contested social, political, cultural and economic processes that occurred in nineteenth 
century America. These developments include the ascendance of plantation slavery, 
corporate bureaucracy, railroad finance, urban real-estate speculation, industrial cost-
accounting, a national business press and a Hamiltonian public policy which believed that 
the goal of the American state was to the make the United States a safe and profitable 
investment for capitalists.  The rise of capitalizing indicators was also dependent on the fall 
of moral statistics and other alternative methods of quantifying American progress, policy 
and life. As a result, the origins of GDP can also be traced back to the decline of Jeffersonian 
yeomanry and republicanism, Jacksonian democracy and moral reform, paternalist 
hierarchy and patriarchal production, and the Knights of Labor and their “free labor” 
ideology.  
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Just as the transformation of America from a producerist, patriarchal-commercial 
republic into a consumerist, corporate capitalist empire revolutionized all aspects of 
American life and led to the "rebirth of a nation," so too did this process revolutionize the 
ways in which Americans measured their prosperity and valued their society.535 Much like 
the few corporations which came to exert an enormous amount of control on American 
capital, policy, labor and culture following the great merger movement of the late 
nineteenth century, these capitalizing indicators focused not on issues of inequality, 
democracy, proprietary independence, exploitation, morality or poverty but rather on the 
maximization of market production, market consumption and capital accumulation.536  
Statistics are like a cultural mirror: Show me what you count and I will show you 
what you believe. By the turn of the twentieth century, the United States' government, 
mainstream press and leading economic thinkers all believed that labor productivity, 
market growth, consumer spending and capital accumulation should be the benchmarks of 
American progress and the main objectives of American society.  This was not an accident, 
or a mistake, or a coincidence. The elite, white men who designed these figures – and they 
were almost entirely elite, white men – had created economic indicators in their own self-
image. American progress was being measured in capitalizing statistics by the turn of the 
twentieth century because American society had become capitalist.  
The most famous, widespread and powerful progenitor of these nineteenth century 
capitalizing statistics, GDP, is therefore an economic indicator that was, quite literally, 
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tailor-made for a capitalist America. By flaunting those areas in which American capitalism 
does well, while ignoring those issues in which it is less than sparkling, GDP and other 
capitalization statistics usually make American capitalism look good. Nothing proves this 
point better than a chart released by investment bank J.P. Morgan in 2012 (due to 
copyright issues I cannot include it here) which depicts global GDP rates since the time of 
Jesus. In this image, 2000 years of human civilization are compressed into a single chart 
which reveals that nothing of consequence occurred in human history (it looks like a flat 
line) until around 1800 when Western Europe and the U.S. suddenly ascended like a 
phoenix from the ashes into an era of glorious growth.  
In you are to judge a society solely on GDP, as this chart does, the United States 
appears as the most successful society in human history. But what if a different indicator 
were used? What if we were to gauge the United States according to incarceration rates, a 
measure that - as chapter four of this dissertation revealed - was exceedingly popular in the 
1840s? As the chart which follows plainly shows, if we still measured American progress as 
they did in Jacksonian America, the United States would quickly drop from first to worst. 
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Figure 19: Incarceration rates of OECD countries, 2008-2009. Data taken from International Center 
for Prison Studies, University of Essex.   
Towards GDP 
With all this talk of GDP, however, one mustn't forget that Gross Net Product (the 
precursor to GDP) was only invented in the 1930s by Harvard economist Simon Kuznets at 
the request of the United States Commerce Department. Since this dissertation ends with 
the institutionalizing of cost-of-living statistics by the Senate Finance Committee’s Aldrich 
Report in 1893, it clearly does not tell the whole story of the hegemonic rise of GNP and 
other capitalizing economic indicators. In a brief gesture to the book I intend to write, there 
are three crucial developments that occurred between the 1890s and the 1930s that should 
be mentioned here.  
First, there is the crucial issue of race. The final chapters of this project will not only 
explore how Americans in general came to count and be counted in a capitalist manner but 
also how racialized spatial indicators segregated urban African Americans into a statistical 
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“black box” were they were often not priced and capitalized, but rather ignored. For 
example, between 1933 and 1936 the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation - a federal program 
initiated by President Franklin Roosevelt as part of the New Deal - helped over one million 
American homeowners in danger of foreclosure refinance their mortgages by offering them 
government-subsidized loans. In order to decide who would receive these refinanced gifts, 
the government produced a series of color-coded statistical maps in over 200 cities that 
assigned residential urban areas a “risk grade.” As historians have shown, African American 
neighborhoods were disproportionately given the lowest color grade on the map – red. 
This was redlining, a racial mapping system that would have immense effects on urban 
space in the post-war era.  
One of the keys to understanding the origins of the American post-war “urban crisis” 
lies in the fact that these redlining maps concluded that large financial institutions could 
not earn steady capital returns in African American neighborhoods. With racism trumping 
capital in this instance, few banks or real estate developers bothered to capitalize the labor 
or purchasing power of the men, women and children who lived in this statistical “black 
box.” Yet since America was fast becoming a highly capitalist society, in which many social 
services had to take the form of for-profit enterprise, African Americans’ neighborhoods 
were often left to rot. While white Americans were being priced as sources of potential 
productivity and consumption through indicators such as GNP and consumer confidence, 
redlining reveals that urban African Americans were often being statistically erased or 
segregated. The rather disturbing conclusion I may reach in these final chapters is that the 
worst thing that can happen to a person or a community in a capitalist society is not to be 
priced and capitalized like a financial investment. 
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Second, there is the institutional and intellectual history of how GNP came into 
being in 1935 which will require a closer look at the history of economic thought and the 
discipline of economics in the early twentieth century as well as an analysis of the 
enormous expansion of state capacity in the Progressive and New Deal era. Examining 
G.N.P, business cycle statistics, the consumer price index, and other economic indicators, I 
intend to explore institutions such as the National Bureau of Economic Research, the Wall 
Street Journal, Herbert Hoover’s Commerce department and the Federal Reserve as well as 
economic thinkers such as Irving Fisher, Wesley Mitchell and Simon Kuznets. Seeking to 
insure continued economic growth, consumer spending, and a corporate-friendly, anti-
inflationary monetary policy, I plan to show how these economic indicators played a 
central role in maintaining and stabilizing a New Deal order of steady corporate profits, 
bread-and-butter unionism and mass consumption. 
Finally, I intend for there to be a final chapter which is global in scope that will focus 
on the role that economic indicators have played in early twentieth century American 
foreign policy. Looking at how American corporations and policymakers used economic 
statistics to control, discipline or indirectly influence the economic and social policies of 
countries such as Cuba and the Philippines, I hope to demonstrate how the United States 
government began pricing and capitalizing not only American citizens but the men and 
women of the Global South as well. I believe this early twentieth century statistical 
imperialism served as the foundation for later attempts, by the World Bank for instance, to 
export and institutionalize the American system of capitalist quantification across the globe 
by conditioning the receipt of loans on the performance of certain macroeconomic 
indicators such as GNP.  
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The Rise of Capitalism and the One Percent 
Yet while the book will bring the narrative roughly up to the invention of GNP in the 
mid-1930s, the mid-1890s still seem like a fitting place to end this dissertation. I say this 
for two main reasons.  
Firstly, the defeat of the Knights of Labor and the labor organizers who controlled 
numerous state bureaus of labor statistics in the 1880s marks the final moment in 
American history in which an alternative statistical vision to that of capitalizing indicators 
was effectively being canonized and institutionalized by the American government, leading 
economic thinkers and the mainstream press. From here on out, the story of economic 
indicators – like the story of economic discourse in America in general – is far narrower 
and one-sided. Yes, there are enormously crucial differences between economic 
conservatism and economic liberalism, Keynes and Hayek, or the 1930s and the 1970s. But 
by the turn of the twentieth century, both conservative and progressive economic 
indicators would be grounded in a similar corporate-capitalist worldview that aimed for 
maximum market production and consumption above all else. While heated debates 
existed and still exist over such issues as the role of government in the marketplace, few 
economists, policymakers or even everyday Americans in the twentieth century have 
argued over what the overarching goal of public policy should be. From stimulus-loving 
Keynesians to neoliberal free marketeers, nearly all non-marginalized Americans, be they 
laymen or pundits, are largely in agreement that the government's main mission should be 
the maximization of economic growth.   
Secondly, the turn of the twentieth century is a fitting moment to end this 
dissertation because, as the final chapter of this dissertation only partially demonstrates, 
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by the late 1890s many – all though certainly not all - of the key institutional, cultural and 
economic developments which led to the hegemonic rise of capitalizing economic 
indicators were already in place:  
 Around 1900 or so, a professionalized class of neoclassical economists, led by the likes 
of John Bates Clark and Irving Fisher, began taking over political economy departments. 
These men would quickly transform political economy into "economics" - a highly 
quantitative and a-historical endeavor which skirted distributive and political issues by 
focusing mostly on the allocation of resources and inputs (including people of course) 
that maximized market production and consumption.537  
 Around 1900 or so, technocratic, depoliticized and "expert"-led government 
bureaucracies began to take control of statistic-generating institutions such as the 
census. (The census only became a permanent bureau in 1903. Beforehand, its work 
plan had been mostly determined by elected legislators in Congress, not experts or 
bureaucrats.)538  
 Around 1900 or so, with the fall of the Populists, the American people no longer decided 
the fate of their money or banking system in electoral politics or public debates as 
monetary policy came to be determined by the public-private hybrid known as the 
Federal Reserve.539  
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 Around 1900 or so, the “great merger movement” crushed any lingering patriarchal-
commercial hopes that American society would be a nation of petty producers, small 
businesses and proprietary individualism.540 (Not coincidentally, it was in the 1890s 
that two men, Dow and Jones, not only founded the Wall Street Journal but also invented 
a statistical index which measured economic progress by calculating the capitalized 
value of the biggest publically-traded corporations.)541  
 Around 1900 or so, the fall of the Knights of Labor and the rise of the AFL insured that 
labor conflicts would no longer focus on such issues as corporate profits, gender 
inequality, a permanent wage laboring class, leisure time, social mobility or control of 
the workplace but would rather more narrowly on “bread-and-butter issues” such as 
higher wages or cost of living.  As this shift from the Knights of Labor to the AFL 
exemplifies, the producerist politics and values of the nineteenth century had been 
replaced by the corporate-friendly, consumerist politics and values of the twentieth 
century.542   
 Around 1900 or so, corporate processes of mechanized mass-production radically 
altered the American bourgeoisie’s biggest obstacle to continuous and stable capital 
accumulation. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the main challenge for 
American capital was the fear of “ruinous competition” both abroad (hence the tariff) 
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and at home (hence the desire to merge into giant monopolistic corporations.)543 With 
the rise of the giant corporation around 1900 or so, this problem became obsolete and a 
new central challenge emerged: finding enough consumers to purchase the never 
ending flow of commodities being mass-produced by American corporations.544  
 Finally, and in relation to the previous point, around 1900 or so American leaders 
began to see (and quantify) other nations as potential markets for their endless array of 
products. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the first American census taken outside 
the continental United States was taken in Hawaii in 1896, followed by Cuba in 1899 
and the Philippines in 1904.545  
These economic, political and social developments all played a crucial role in the 
cultural and institutional canonization of capitalization statistics. After 1900 or so, to 
conclude, it was almost unimaginable for leading American policymakers, economists or 
bureaucrats to argue that popular nineteenth century indicators such as incarceration 
rates, prostitution percentages, poverty figures, proprietary independence or wealth 
inequality should serve as benchmarks of American prosperity. While critical 
developments leading up to the invention of GNP still had not taken place, it would not be 
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an exaggeration to say that by 1900 or so the capitalist dye had been cast on mainstream 
America’s statistical imagination.   
The forgotten story of Dr. Charles Spahr illustrates this final point. Close friends 
with the muckraking, anti-corporate activist Henry Demarest Lloyd, Spahr was an editor, 
writer and economic thinker living in New York City.  In the early 1880s, when the political 
battles over the political nature of political economy departments had not yet played out, 
Spahr received a PhD at Columbia University. Thanks to business-friendly, neoclassical 
Columbia economists such as John Bates Clark and Richard Mayo-Smith, however, by the 
1890s Spahr’s leftist leanings made it impossible for him to receive a professorship at 
Columbia.546 Turning to newspapers editing, Spahr still managed to publish his research in 
1896. The title of his book was An Essay on the Present Distribution of Wealth in the United 
States. It was part of a series published and edited by institutional economist Richard Ely, 
who only two years before was put on trial at the University of Wisconsin for suspicions 
that he was a socialist.547 In his book, Spahr meticulously mined pages upon pages of 
wealth statistics in order to prove one point: As time passed, the distribution of wealth in 
the United States was becoming more and more unequal. “Seven-eighths of the families [in 
America] hold but one-eighth of the national wealth,” Spahr concluded, "while one per cent 
of the families hold more than the remaining ninety-nine.”548 Over a century before the 
Occupy movement, Spahr had discovered the "one percent."  
                                                 
546 On the politics of the political economy departments in the late nineteenth century see Cohen, 
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As this dissertation has persistently documented, the issue of wealth inequality was 
very dear to the hearts of most Americans in the nineteenth century since their republican 
beliefs led them to see inequality as one of the greatest threats to a functioning democracy. 
If Spahr’s findings had been published in the 1840s, 1860s or even 1880s, it likely would 
have led to a massive public uproar against the “one per cent.”   By 1896, however, this was 
no longer the case. While a few marginalized socialists would go on to cite Spahr’s book in 
the first decade of the twentieth century, his statistics were almost entirely ignored at the 
time of their publication and have been largely discarded ever since. Spahr never got a job 
as a professor and his economic writings fell into complete obscurity. Today, Spahr’s life 
remains shrouded in mystery as he does not even appear in any of the “Who’s Who” 
biographies of the twentieth century past 1909, has no obituary which tells his life’s story, 
and has never been written about by any historian.  
A glance at the scathing review of Spahr’s book published in the leading academic 
journal of the era partially explains his historical obscurity. The review was written by 
Columbia Professor of Political Economy Richard Mayo-Smith, a wealthy man who had 
written his own book on economic statistics in 1888 that was filled with cost-of-living 
figures, economic growth metrics and many other capitalizing statistical indicators which 
calculated the overall wealth of America in 1880 at $43 billion (yet of course did not detail 
how such wealth was divided up amongst the American people.) 549 Mayo-Smith opened his 
extremely harsh review of Spahr's book by questioning his calculations. Realizing perhaps 
that such a view might tarnish the reputation of all statistical indicators, however, Mayo-
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Smith quickly shifted his argument to the question of wealth distribution statistics in 
general. “Having shown that property and incomes are unequally distributed and that (in 
his opinion) the inequality is increasing,” Mayo-Smith contends, “Dr. Spahr seems to think 
that his task is ended. But that is only the beginning. The real question is whether such a 
concentration of wealth is not a good thing for the whole community.” Mayo-Smith then 
goes on to suggest that British economist Sir Robert Giffen’s cost-of-living and consumer 
spending statistics serve as a far better benchmark of social progress than wealth 
distribution figures, noting that “the happiness of individuals is measured not according to 
their ownership of property...but according to their command of the enjoyments of life.”550 
Perfectly articulating the revolutionary shift from proprietary patriarchal-commercialism 
to consumerist corporate-capitalism, I cannot think of a better statement with which to end 
this dissertation. 
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